SERAMONTE ASSOCIATES, LLC v. TOWN OF HAMDEN
AC 42770
Appellate Court of Connecticut
February 2, 2021
Bright, C. J., and Alvord and Oliver, Js.
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Pursuant to statute (
Pursuant further to statute (
The plaintiff, an owner of several rental properties in the defendant town of Hamden, appealed from the judgment of the trial court, which upheld the decision of the defendant‘s Board of Assessment Appeals affirming a 10 percent penalty imposed by the defendant‘s assessor on the tax assessments of the plaintiff‘s properties pursuant to
- The trial court properly rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the count of the complaint that alleged that the board improperly upheld the 10 percent penalty: the plaintiff could not prevail on its claim that the word “submit,” as used in
§ 12-63c (a) , essentially means “to mail,” as the word “submit,” when viewed in the context of other tax statutes, was unambiguous and meant that the assessor must receive the forms by June 1; the legislature‘s decision not to include the phrase “or postmarked” in§ 12-63c (a) was dispositive, meaning that those forms must be delivered to the assessor‘s office by June 1 in order to comply with the statute. - The trial court properly granted the defendant‘s motion to strike the plaintiff‘s constitutional claims: the excessive fines clause of the eighth amendment to the United States constitution did not apply to the 10 percent penalty in
§ 12-63c (d) , as that penalty was not punitive within the meaning of the eighth amendment, and, accordingly, the plaintiff‘s alleged violations of the eighth amendment necessarily failed; moreover, under the state constitution, the 10 percent penalty in§ 12-63c (d) was not a fine that subjected it to the excessive fines clause and, even if this court assumed that the clause applied, the court was not persuaded that the 10 penalty was unconstitutionally excessive under the facts of the case and controlling Connecticut precedent.
Argued October 15, 2020—officially released February 2, 2021
Procedural History
Appeal from the decision of the defendant‘s Board of Assessment Appeals denying the plaintiff‘s appeal of a penalty imposed by the defendant‘s assessor and added to tax assessments on certain of the plaintiff‘s real properties, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Haven, where the court, S. Richards, J., granted the defendant‘s motions for summary judgment and to strike, and ren
Brenden P. Leydon, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Zachary J. Phillips, with whom was Adam J. Blank, for the appellee (defendant).
OLIVER, J. The plaintiff, Seramonte Associates, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant, the town of Hamden, as to count one of the plaintiff‘s complaint and granting the defendant‘s motion to strike the plaintiff‘s constitutional claims in count two. On appeal, the plaintiff claims, with respect to count one, that the court erred in holding that the word “submit” as used in
The following undisputed facts and procedural history, as set forth by the trial court in its memorandum of decision and otherwise gleaned from the record, are relevant to the plaintiff‘s claims on appeal. The plaintiff was the owner of certain parcels of rental property located in Hamden known as 520 Mix Avenue, 609 Mix Avenue, and 617 Mix Avenue (properties). On February 1, 2016, the assessor for the defendant assessed those properties at $15,683,080 for 520 Mix Avenue, $2,927,890 for 609 Mix Avenue, and $10,521,560 for 617 Mix Avenue. Pursuant to
On September 28, 2016, pursuant to
On February 27, 2017, the plaintiff filed a withdrawal form in the Superior Court, stating that it was withdrawing its claim insofar as it alleged excessive assessments, and that it was proceeding with its claim insofar as it concerned the impropriety of the 10 percent penalty added to the assessments. On March 27, 2017, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, and, on April 26, 2017, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment.
On May 1, 2017, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint (operative complaint) to clarify, in part, its February 27, 2017 withdrawal form. In the operative complaint, the plaintiff alleged, in count one, that the board improperly had upheld the assessor‘s imposition of the 10 percent penalty and, in count two, that the penalty was unconstitutional under the excessive fines clauses of both the federal and the state constitutions. See
On December 21, 2017, the defendant filed a new motion for summary judgment as to count one of the plaintiff‘s operative complaint. The defendant argued that it properly had imposed the 10 percent penalty pursuant to
Also on February 5, 2019, in a separate memorandum of decision, the court granted the defendant‘s motion to strike count two of the plaintiff‘s operative complaint, agreeing with the defendant that the excessive fines clauses of both the federal and the state constitutions do not apply to tax penalties. With respect to the federal constitution, the court held that the tax penalty in
With respect to the state constitution, the court held that the 10 percent penalty in
I
The plaintiff first challenges the summary judgment rendered in favor of the defendant as to count one of its operative complaint and claims that the trial court erred when it held that the word “submit” as used in
The defendant counters that “submit” means present, file, or formally deliver, arguing that “[i]n some tax settings the legislature has intended for the date of sending to be considered the date of filing or submission. Crucially, however, when the legislature so intends, it expresses that intent explicitly by adding words such as ‘or postmarked’ to the statute.” With respect to the rule of lenity, the defendant argues that it applies “only if the statute remains ambiguous after all sources of legislative intent have been explored ... [and that] [w]here, as here, after full resort to the process of statutory construction, there is no reasonable doubt as to the meaning of the statute, [the court] need not resort to the rule of lenity.” Finally, the defendant argues that “strict construction neither requires nor permits the contravention of the true intent and purpose of the statute as expressed in the language used.” The defendant claims that the statute is not ambiguous and, therefore, strict construction is inapplicable, arguing that the “plaintiff urges a construction that rewrites the statute and eschews its plain language by adding the words ‘or [postmarked]’ when the legislature intended to leave those words out.” We agree with the defendant.
We begin with our standard of review. “The standard of review of motions for summary judgment is well settled. Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. . . . The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and that the party is, therefore, entitled to judgment as a matter of law. . . .”
“On appeal, we must determine whether the legal conclusions reached by the trial court are legally and logically correct and whether they find support in the facts set out in the memorandum of decision of the trial court. . . . Our review of the trial court‘s decision to grant [a moving party‘s] motion for summary judgment is plenary.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Smigelski v. Dubois, 153 Conn. App. 186, 197, 100 A.3d 954, cert. denied, 314 Conn. 948, 103 A.3d 975 (2014).
Initially, we are called upon to determine the meaning
The text of
In the present case, the trial court concluded that, because the statute does not define “submit” and because dictionary definitions of “submit” could support either party‘s position, the word “submit,” therefore, is ambiguous. In making that determination, the court discussed the statute‘s legislative history and certain Superior Court decisions. Pursuant to
An examination of our tax statutes reveals that our legislature frequently includes the phrase “or postmarked” when it intends for the date of mailing to be considered the date of filing or submission. For example,
Those statutes guide our conclusion that when the date of mailing is to be considered the date of filing or submission, our legislature includes language to that effect in the statute. At oral argument before this court, however, the plaintiff argued that those statutes are distinguishable because they use the word “file” as opposed to “submit.” The plaintiff claims that the word “submit” essentially means “to mail,” and, therefore, that the tax statutes that include the phrase “or postmarked” do not compel the conclusion that “submit,” as used in
Our legislature‘s use of the word “file” or the word “submit” does not bear on whether the forms to be filed or submitted must arrive at their destination, or merely be postmarked, by any certain date. Rather, the legislature‘s decision not to include the phrase “or postmarked“, or other similar language that would define submit to include mailing, is dispositive. “[I]t is well settled that the legislature is always presumed to have created a harmonious and consistent body of law . . . . [T]his tenet of statutory construction . . . requires [this court] to read statutes together when they relate to the same subject matter . . . . Accordingly, [i]n determining the meaning of a statute . . . we look not only at the provision at issue, but also to the broader statutory scheme to ensure the coherency of our construction.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Felician Sisters of St. Francis of Connecticut, Inc. v. Historic District Commission, 284 Conn. 838, 850, 937 A.2d 39 (2008). Accordingly, we conclude that, when viewed in the context of other tax statutes, all of which appear in title 12 of the General Statutes, the word “submit” as used in
Therefore, the trial court properly rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendant as to count one of the plaintiff‘s operative complaint.
II
Next, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly granted the defendant‘s motion to strike its constitutional claims in count two of the operative complaint and rendered judgment thereon. Specifically, the plaintiff argues that, “[a]s a matter of proportionality and fundamental fairness, a penalty of over $130,000 for at worst being one day late with an ambiguous statutory time is grossly excessive” and, thus, the imposition of that penalty was a violation of both the federal and the state constitutions. With respect to the federal constitution, the plaintiff argues that the penalty was imposed, in part, to deter the delinquent payment of taxes. Citing Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 610, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 125 L. Ed. 2d 488 (1993), the plaintiff claims that “United States Supreme Court precedent has been clear that if civil sanctions are even in part serving a deterrent purpose they are subject to excessive fine analysis.” With respect to the state constitution, the plaintiff characterizes the trial court‘s decision as hinging on whether the penalty was imposed due to conviction of a felony or a misdemeanor. The plaintiff argues that “[t]his analysis is incorrect and the Connecticut Supreme Court itself recognized in 1936 that an excessive ‘fine’ could include civil penalties.” See Second National Bank of New Haven v. Loftus, 121 Conn. 454, 459-60, 185 A. 423 (1936). We are not persuaded by either of the plaintiff‘s arguments.
We begin with our standard of review. “The standard of review in an appeal from the granting of a motion to strike is well established. Because a motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court, our review . . . is plenary. . . . We take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint that has been stricken and we construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency. . . . Thus, [i]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied. . . . [A] motion to strike is essentially a procedural motion that focuses solely on the pleadings. . . . It is, therefore, improper for the court to consider material outside of the pleading that is being challenged by the motion.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dlugokecki v. Vieira, 98 Conn. App. 252, 256, 907 A.2d 1269, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 951, 912 A.2d 483 (2006). “For the purpose of ruling upon a motion to strike, the facts alleged in a complaint, though not the legal conclusions it may contain, are deemed to be admitted. . . . A motion to strike is properly granted if the complaint alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Metcoff v. Lebovics, 123 Conn. App. 512, 516, 2 A.3d 942 (2010).
A
Federal Excessive Fines Clause
In order to determine whether a financial penalty is unconstitutional under the excessive fines clause of the eighth amendment to the federal constitution, courts rely on the two step inquiry established in United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 328, 118 S. Ct. 2028, 141 L. Ed. 2d 314 (1998). At the first step, a court must determine whether the financial penalty constitutes a punishment and is, thus, a “fine” within the meaning of the excessive fines clause. Id., 334. If it is determined that the penalty constitutes a punishment, the court then must proceed to the second step of the analysis and determine whether the challenged forfeiture is unconstitutionally excessive. Id.
With respect to the first step, the trial court, relying on United States v. Viloski, supra, 814 F.3d 109, noted that the excessive fines clause “applies only to those forfeitures that may be characterized, at least in part, as ‘punitive‘—i.e., forfeitures for which a defendant is personally liable.” “In contrast, purely ‘remedial’ forfeitures—i.e., those in rem forfeitures intended not to punish the defendant but to compensate the [g]overnment for a loss or to restore property to its rightful owner—fall outside the scope of the [e]xcessive [f]ines [c]lause.” United States v. Viloski, supra, 109. Additionally, the trial court explained that “[a] forfeiture does not constitute ‘punishment’ to the extent that it is remedial, such as where the amount of forfeiture is rationally related to the costs of enforcing the law and societal costs of the proscribed conduct . . . .”
The plaintiff argues that the penalty in the present case serves, in part, a deterrent purpose, and that under Austin v. United States, supra, 509 U.S. 602, a civil sanction is subject to the excessive fines clause if it is retributive or has a deterrent purpose. As the defendant correctly notes, however, that method of analysis was drawn from United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448, 109 S. Ct. 1892, 104 L. Ed. 2d 487 (1989), which was abrogated by Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 118 S. Ct. 488, 139 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1997). Indeed, in Dept. of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 128 L. Ed. 2d 767 (1994), the United States Supreme Court held that ”Halper‘s method of determining whether the exaction was remedial or punitive simply does not work in the case of a tax statute. . . .
The 10 percent tax penalty in the present case lacks the obvious punitive and penal nature of the tax at issue in Kurth Ranch. It was not imposed during a criminal proceeding, and it does not require any conviction for imposition. Rather, as the trial court stated, “it is imposed to ensure compliance with the timely payment of taxes and to deter delinquent payment of taxes, which could harm the government with additional expenses of ensuring compliance in collecting those taxes.” We conclude that the 10 percent penalty in
B
Connecticut Excessive Fines Clause
Article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution provides that “[n]o person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall excessive bail be required nor excessive fines imposed. . . .” Similar to its federal counterpart, Connecticut courts generally interpret the state constitution‘s excessive fines clause not to apply to tax penalties. See Bankers Trust Co. v. Blodgett, supra, 96 Conn. 369.
The plaintiff relies on Second National Bank of New Haven v. Loftus, supra, 121 Conn. 454, for the proposition that excessive fines can include civil penalties. In that case, our Supreme Court quoted Bankers Trust Co. v. Blodgett, supra, 96 Conn. 368, to define a fine as a “pecuniary punishment imposed by a lawful tribunal upon a person convicted of [a] crime or misdemeanor.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Second National Bank of New Haven v. Loftus, supra, 459. It then stated that “[t]he meaning of the term [‘fine‘] in any connotation may not be extended, at most, further than to include a pecuniary penalty or forfeiture recoverable in a civil or criminal action.” Id. However, the court explained that “the amount of the fine which the legislature may properly impose depends largely upon the object designed to be accomplished by the imposition of the fine, and the widest latitude is to be given to the discretion and judgment of the legislature in determining the amount of the fine necessary to accomplish that object.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 460 The court concluded that “[w]e would be very reluctant to say that the legislature had exceeded its powers in imposing excessive penalties, and ought not to do so
The plaintiff argues that the tax penalty in the present case is grossly excessive and disproportionate to any harm the defendant suffered. Our Supreme Court, however, explicitly addressed that proportionality argument in PJM & Associates, LC v. Bridgeport, supra, 292 Conn. 145. While interpreting the same statute at issue in the present case,
We conclude that, under article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution, the 10 percent penalty in
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
OLIVER
JUDGE
Notes
“(c) . . . Any person claiming to be aggrieved by the action of the asses-
“(d) Any owner of such real property required to submit information to the assessor in accordance with subsection (a) of this section for any assessment year, who fails to submit such information as required under said subsection (a) or who submits information in incomplete or false form with intent to defraud, shall be subject to a penalty equal to a ten per cent increase in the assessed value of such property for such assessment year. . . .”