165 Iowa 525 | Iowa | 1914
Alf. Tallaekson Brackey, by his last will and testament, devised to his son, Albert A. Brackey, a life estate in. a certain quarter section of land with remainder over equally to all the children of Albert A. The remainder of his estate, both real and personal, was devised equally to all his children. At the time of decedent’s death, Albert A. had in his possession $3,260 which belonged to his father, or his estate. Albert was then and has ever since been insolvent. Decedent died April 12, 1909, and Albert A. offered the will for probate. All the other heirs joined in contesting the will, and a trial was had which finally reached this court, resulting in an order confirming the will and probating the same. T. A. KEngland was appointed special administrator of testator’s estate, in October, 1909. He brought suit against Albert A. Brackey for the amount of money held by him belonging to his father’s estate, and as a result thereof, in the same month, recovered judgment for the amount claimed. In June and November of the year 1911, Albert A. Brackey executed mortgages to various parties, which covered all his interest in the quarter section of land specifically devised. These mortgages were executed to Senneff, Senneff & Bliss, the Farmers’ State Bank of Lake Mills, the First National Bank of Lake Mills, and the Lake Mills Implement Company, respectively. Each of said
A few more facts should be stated in order that the exact legal propositions may be fully understood. The mortgages covered not only the life estate devised to Albert A. Brackey, but also his one-seventh interest in another eighty-acre tract of land which was afterward sold at referee’s sale, in a partition suit, by T. A. Kingland, referee, and one-seventh of the proceeds from the sale was paid to plaintiff Senneff to be applied on one of the mortgages held by him. The interest of Albert A. Brackey in the personal estate of his father will not exceed $500. The original notice of the suit brought by the special administrator against Albert A. Brackey was served on March 16, 1910, and the petition was filed March 18, 1911. .In June of the year 1911, Brackey made one of the mortgages, heretofore referred to, to John A. Senneff to secure the sum of $1,500, and on November 4, 1911, the mortgages were made to one of the banks, and the implement company before referred to, and on the same date he executed a mortgage to Senneff & Bliss to secure the sum of $1,200. On November 11, 1911, a verdict was returned for the special administrator in the suit brought by him for the sum of $3,260.
On June 29, 1912, Brackey filed a petition in bankruptcy, and on October 5th of the same year judgment was rendered on the verdict. At the time the will was made, Albert did not owe his father any money, but at the time of the testator’s death he (Albert) held $3,260 in his hands, belonging to the estate, which he refused to turn over. The
At the time of th$ making of the $1,200 mortgage, SennefE knew that if judgment was obtained by the special administrator Brackey would be insolvent, but he testified that at the time of the taking of the $1,500 mortgage he was not aware of the mortgagor’s insolvency, although he was advised of the claim made by the special administrator. The $1,200 mortgage was given while the suit of the special administrator was being tried;' SennefE & Bliss, the mortgagees, being attorneys for the mortgagor. Albert A. Brackey was in fact insolvent at the time of testator’s death and remained so until he went into bankruptcy. Neither SennefE nor SennefE & Bliss knew of this fact, however, at the time the first mortgage to SennefE was made, but they were advised before the taking of the SennefE & Bliss mortgage that, if the special administrator recovered in his suit against Brackey, Brackey would be unable to pay the amount to the estate.
After recovering the judgment, the special administrator brought the second action referred to in the title to this opinion, in which he asked that his judgment be declared to be a specific lien upon the real estate devised to him by the testator, prior and superior to the liens created by the several mortgages, and that SennefE be required to refund the amount received by him from the referee in the partition suit, representing Albert A. Brackey’s interest in the lands sold in that suit.
The $1,500 mortgage was made to secure the money with which to pay SennefE & Bliss for their attorney’s fees in the will contest, and possibly some other matter.
It is conceded by the parties that, at the time of the death of Alf. T. Brackey, deceased, Albert A. Brackey was indebted to various and sundry parties in an amount sufficient so that together with the amount of the above judgment he was insolvent. The evidence shows that, if the claims of the defendants are allowed priority over said judgment, the effect will be a loss to said estate of a substantial part, or perhaps all, of said judgment. I am of the opinion that the ‘diligent creditor’ rule does not apply, and that the defendant Albert A. Brackey ought not to be permitted, either by direct or indirect means, to avail himself either personally, or by assignment to others, of property which comes from the estate of Alf. T. Brackey, deceased, and at the same time be permitted to defeat the recovery by said estate of a valid claim against him. It seems to me that to permit him to do so would be unjust to the estate. I have no hesitancy in concluding that so far as Albert A. Brackey would derive any benefit from the personal estate of Alf. T. Brackey, deceased, the estate would properly offset in its favor any claim against Albert A. Brackey, and in principle I can see no reason why the same rule should not apply to the realty. The evidence shows that a certain tract of real estate which belonged to Alf. T. Brackey at the time of his death was sold by regular partition proceedings in court, and the portion of the proceeds thereof which would have belonged to Albert A. Brackey, but for the claim of said estate against him, was paid to the defendant
It follows that in my opinion the claim' of plaintiff should be and the same is hereby, together with the costs of this proceedings, decreed to be prior and superior to the claims of said defendants and each of them by reason of any and all mortgages made by Albert A. Brackey upon the real estate in question, or any interest therein; that plaintiff has a prior lien upon any and all moneys or personal property of every kind and nature coming, directly or indirectly, to Albert A. Brackey or his assigns from the estate of Alf. T. Brackey, deceased, except that the amount heretofore paid to John A. Senneff by reason of said partition proceedings is hereby decreed to be the property of said Senneff. The claim of plaintiff is also hereby decreed to be prior and superior to the right of the defendant trustee in bankruptcy. The costs of this action are hereby taxed to defendant Albert A. Brackey, and judgment is entered accordingly.
And in the action brought by Senneff to foreclose his mortgages the court entered the following decree:
jBy this proceeding plaintiff asks the foreclosure of certain mortgages executed by Albert A. Brackey. T. A. King-land, special administrator, asks that a certain judgment rendered in his favor be decreed to be superior to plaintiff’s claims. The decree entered on this date in case No. 4772, T. A. Kingland, Special Administrator, v. Albert A. Brackey et al., determines the respective rights of the parties, and plaintiff’s said mortgages are hereby decreed to be junior and inferior to said judgment and, subject to the rights of said Kingland as special administrator of the estate of Alf. T. Brackey, deceased, as determined in the decree entered in said case No. 4772, judgment and decree of foreclosure as prayed is entered for plaintiff. Clerk assess. Judgment against Albert A. Brackey for costs, including a reasonable attorney’s fee to be taxed by the clerk.
The general rule as to personal property is that, as against a bequest to one 'who is already indebted to the estate, the amount of this indebtedness may be set off or detained against the legacy. And this may be done, as we understand it, whether the legatee be solvent or insolvent. Finch v. Garrett, 102 Iowa, 381; West v. Beck, 95 Iowa, 520; Bowen v. Evans, 70 Iowa, 368; Pinckney v. Pinckney, 114 Iowa, 441; Garrett v. Pierson, 29 Iowa, 304. On the other hand, it is the general rule that as against devises of real estate, either general or specific, there is no right to offset a mere debt oí the devisee, although such amounts if advancements, and doubtless if mere debts, should be brought into hotchpol
In the Bussell case, supra, it was said, however: “There may be eases where, on account of the insolvency of the debtor, or some other cause, equity will interfere for the protection of the estate.” This was perhaps dictum, and yet it was announced for the purpose of saving an exception to the general rule, if any such exception exists. As a matter of fact, many courts, and doubtless a majority, numerically, recognize and enforce the exception. Streety v. McCurdy, 104 Ala, 493 (16 South, 686); Oxsheer v. Nave, 90 Tex. 568 (40 S. W. 7, 37 L. R. A. 98); In re Dickinson Estate, 148 Pa. 142 (23 Atl. 1053; Towles v. Towles, 1 Head (Tenn.) 601; Fiscus v. Fiscus, 127 Ind. 283 (26 N. E. 831); Fiscus v. Moore, 121 Ind. 547 (23 N. E. 362, 7 L. R. A. 235); Nelson v. Murfee, 69 Ala. 598; Head v. Spier, 66 Kan. 386 (71 Pac. 833); Cowen v. Adams, 78 Fed. 536 (24 C. C. A. 198); Hopkins v. Thompson, 73 Mo. App. 401; Gosnell v. Flack, 76 Md. 423 (25 Atl. 411, 18 L. R. A. 158); Webb v. Fuller, 85 Me. 443 (27 Atl. 346, 22 L. R. A. 177); New v. New, 127 Ind. 576 (27 N. E. 154); Smith v. Smith, 13 N. J. Eq. 164; Brown v. Mattingly, 91 Ky. 275 (15 S. W. 353); Ex parte Wilson, 84 S. C. 444 (66 S. E. 675); In re Esmond’s Estate, 154 Ill. App. 357; Koons v. Mollett, 121 Ind. 185 (23 N. E. 95, 7 L. R. A. 231; Keever v. Hunter, 62 Ohio St. 616 (57 N. E. 454); 2 Woerner’s Am. Law of Administration (2d Ed.) pages 1071-1168, 1237, and section 564, where there is a full discussion of the subject. See, also, case note to Marvin v. Bowlby, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 189. Cases from other states have not recognized any exception to the general rule, although in some of these the question of the insolvency of the devisee did not appear. Vide, Marvin v. Bowlby, supra; La Foy v. La Foy, 43 N. J. Eq. 206 (10 Atl. 266, 3 Am. St. Rep. 302). • No attention was paid, however, to Smith v. Smith, supra, from the same state, and it did not appear
The opinion in Brown v. Mattingly, supra, is really not in point because the right of detention was recognized. The writer of the note in 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 190, states the two doctrines as follows:
The authorities are not in harmony on the question of an heir’s indebtedness to the estate as forming a counterclaim or set-off against the debtor heir’s distributive share arising from the sale of real property. Some of the leading cases on this subject are cited and discussed by the court in its opinion and need not be commented on in this note. The authorities which do not accept the doctrine of retainer or set-off are based on the theory that the real estate of the intestate descends directly to the heirs upon the death of the ancestor, and vests in them, subject only to the debts of the estate; and, if the real property comes to them by will, the general rule applied is that, if the testator intends to do so, he may charge the estate devised with the duty of paying any debt which may be due from the devisee to the testator, and his omission to impose such a condition evinces an intention to make the devise unconditional The eases in which the opposite doctrine finds support are based on statutory provision, or proceed on the theory that an heir who is a debtor to the estate stands in the attitude of having received so much from the estate, and, if his distributive share in the personal prop
The rationale of the latter rule will better appear from this quotation from Marvin v. Bowlby, 142 Mich. 251 (105 N. W. 753, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) pages 194 and 195, 113 Am. St. Rep. 574, 7 Ann. Cas. 559):
The Texas court said: ‘Under our statutes, the real and personal estate of an intestate descend alike to the heirs, charged with the payment of debts, and subject to administration for that purpose. Both the real and personal property, when administered, are subject to distribution among the heirs in one proceeding. The debt of one of the heirs to the estate is a part of the general mass of property subject to distribution, and, if such heir fail to pay it, if more than his share, so much of it as amounts to the value of his share should be set apart to him; if less than his1 share, it should be taken by him in satisfaction of that share so far as it will go. The principle was applied In Re Akerman (1891) 3 Ch. 212.’ In this case the court, in answer to the argument that the rule would not apply to real estate of a debtor heir which had not been converted into money, said: ‘We apprehend that this makes no difference in principle, for the reason that the equity of requiring the debtor distributee is the same whether the mass to be distributed consists of property or money; and it is within the power of courts of equity to enforce the equity as well in the one ease as in the other. Under our statutes in relation to the estates of deceased persons, a cohversion of the property, both real and personal, may become necessary upon either of two contingencies: (1) For the payment of debts; and (2) in order to bring about equality in the final distribution. In principle we perceive no sound'distinction between the two cases.’ Donaldson Estate, 158 Pa. 292 (27 Atl. 959), was an appeal from a decree dismissing exceptions to an auditor’s report in partition of an estate. The court held that the equity of payment of an heir ’s debt to an estate runs with the land, and the amount of the heir’s indebtedness may be charged upon his share as against an execution creditor with notice that the same would be charged against said share as for an advancement. In Gosnell v. Flack, 76 Md. 423 (25 Atl. 411, 18 L. R. A. 158),
Aside from our own cases, already cited there is none other save McCormick v. Hanks et al., 105 Iowa, 639. But the decision there was apparently made to turn first upon an abandonment of any claim against the devisee, and, second, upon the failure of the executor to assert it before the liensof other creditors attached.
In view of the provisions of the will of Brackey whereby he devised but a life estate in certain lands to Albert A. Brackey, with remainder over to his (Albert A.’s) children, and the remainder of his entire estate, both real and personal, to all his lawful children, including Albert A. Brackey, share and share alike; of the fact that Albert A. was not indebted to his father at the time the will was made and was not indebted at the time of his death save that he had been intrusted with the sum of $3,260 which he (the son) refused to turn over after the death of his father; of the further fact that he (Albert A.) has been insolvent since the father’s death and was both unwilling and unable to turn over the property held by him, belonging to the estate — we think it would be most inequitable to allow him to take his full share of the real estate devised to him, and of the real estate and personal property passing by the will to his brothers and sisters, share and share alike, without any diminution because of the fact that he already holds nearly $3,400 belonging to the estate, and either he or his assignee has already received for his
In this regard we think the case is ruled by the authorities already cited, from some of which we have quoted. In addition thereto, the following extract from Streety v. McCurdy, 104 Ala. 493 (16 South. 686) is quite in point:
And where an heir or distributee was indebted to the ancestor in his lifetime and continues indebted- to his estate, this debt to, this chose in action held by, the estate, is assets in the hands of the administrator both for the payment of the debt of the decedent and for the purpose of distribution; and both personalty and realty, including in the case supposed — the debt of a distributee to the estate, being a common fund for equal distribution, either by allotment of a sale and division of proceeds among all the distributees, those not indebted to the estate are entitled to have the sum due from one who is so indebted collected from him, or, failing this, they have a right to share in the assets as if such collection had been made; and the debtor distributee shares in the estate only upon the like assumption of payment by him. So that if his debt is equal to or greater than the value of one
In Brown v. Mattingly, supra, the Kentucky court said:
It is clear that the distributee’s interest in the real estate should be extinguished to the extent of the amount he has received from the ancestor, so far as it exceeds his interest in the personal estate. He stands in the attitude of having received so much from the estate, and, if his distributive share in the personal estate is not equal to the amount thus received, the real estate ought to be held to be charged with the payment of the remainder in the division, and he to receive that much less. This is the only equitable rule. Were it otherwise, the one heir might virtually get a double or a treble portion.
The Indiana court said, in Fiscus v. Moore, supra:
If it were possible for an heir, immediately upon the death of his ancestor, to- convey or incumber his interest in the real estate, so that, after paying the debts of the ancestor, his grantee or mortgagee might participate in the surplus equally with other heirs who had received or who owed the ancestor, nothing, the most manifest injustice and inequality would result. The law always presumes that an ancestor meant that his heirs should share equally in his estate.
And in addition to the cases already cited, see Boden v. Mier, 71 Neb. 191 (98 N. W. 701; Donaldson’s Estate, 158 Pa. 292 (27 Atl. 959); Wallace v. Keyser, 51 Pa. 498.
Of the cases holding to a contrary doctrine, some of them proceed upon the theory that, if the testator had intended that a debt due him by one of the devisees should
Other cases holding to the contrary proceed upon the old ecclesiastical and common-law rule that the real estate of one deceased passes either by will or descends to his devisees or heirs free from any debts of the deceased. . In other words, the real estate passes directly upon the death of the owner, either to his devisees, or heirs, and cannot, under any circumstances, be charged with his debts, nor has his executor or administrator any power or authority over the real estate for any purpose whatever. The Massachusetts and Michigan courts seem to base their conclusions largely upon this rule, although in Michigan thé common-law rule was changed by statute, and is now similar to our own, with reference to the payment of debts due the deceased. So far as we have noticed, the majority of the courts holding with the Massachusetts doctrine permit an administrator to offset against the distributive share of an heir in personal property the amount of his indebtedness, particularly when the heir is insolvent. Or what is the same thing, in effect, they bring the debt into hotchpot and require the one distributee to account to all the others for their proportion of the amount he is owing the estate.
Our statute treats real estate and personal property as the same for many purposes. After exhausting the personal
None of the mortgagees, unless it be Senneff individually, is an innocent holder for value, for they took their mortgages for pre-existing debts of the mortgagor. Koon v. Tramel, 71 Iowa, 132; Chadwick v. Devore, 69 Iowa, 637; Phelps v. Fockler, 61 Iowa, 340.
Our position simmers down to this, that that property was not charged with any lien of the estate in favor of the estate, and latest authorities on the question are with us in that position. So as well as on the question whether he was insolvent, the question of whether we knew it or not, either one or both questions, we took those mortgages as we had a right to do as if we were taking them for actual obligations, obligations actually owing us, and it became a race amongst creditors in which the administrator’s interests are not paramount to ours. These notes were given to me by Albert Brackey on June 1, 1911, and the mortgage securing the same, and were given to me for the services which had been rendered and to be rendered in the submission of the case of the contest of the will of Alf. T. Brackey. At the time these notes were given, the ease had been tried in the district court, and there was some money still owing us for our services. These two notes, Exhibit A and Exhibit B, which were given to me, were taken by me as fees, and I accounted to the firm of Senneff & Bliss for the amount of those notes or $1,500, which was the amount that was owing by Mr. Brackey to the firm of Senneff & Bliss at that time. Of course, I was a member of the firm of Senneff & Bliss. Now at the time that I took this $1,500 mortgage I say that I was not aware that Albert Brackey was insolvent. There was a claim which had been made against him by the administrator. Mr. Brackey always told me, and still does, that he did not owe his father any money and he did not have any money belonging to his father at the time that I took the mortgage he told me then; and I had no reason to disbelieve it and I did not disbelieve it. I knew at that time that if that judgment was lodged against .Albert Brackey that he would be insolvent. I knew that if that claim would be established against him that he would not have property enough to pay it and that was— With that thought in mind I took that
In this connection, it should be stated that Senneif also has a chattel mortgage upon the property of Albert A. Braekey to pay his claims, and the amount and value of the property covered thereby does not clearly appear, although Senneif stated in a general way that it would not be sufficient, he thought, to pay his claim. What the rule would be against a good-faith purchaser from Braekey, knowing nothing of the claim made against him by the representative of his father’s estate, we have no occasion to determine. It is enough to say that under the record Senneif was not a good-faith purchaser without notice.
These cases are in equity, and they are both peculiar in their facts; so peculiar as to introduce exceptions to general rules, and this opinion is not to be taken as a precedent for more than is actually decided. The general rules are as appellant’s counsel claim them; but, in view of the peculiar facts shown by this record, the equities are so strongly with the representative of the estate that we are constrained to follow the authorities above cited, which introduce exceptions to the general rules, thus meting out full justice to all of the parties.
The decree of the court below must be, and it is— Affirmed.