16 A.2d 754 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1940
Argued October 31, 1940.
While in the course of his employment, the claimant in this workmen's compensation case sustained, on August 27, 1937, an accidental injury to his left eye which resulted in the permanent loss of the use of that member. Under the provisions of Section 306(c) of our Workmen's Compensation Act of June 2, 1915, *472
P.L. 736, as amended April 13, 1927, P.L. 186,
By Section 315 of the statute,
It was not until September 21, 1938, nearly thirteen months after the accident, that claimant filed his formal claim-petition with the board. This petition was dismissed by the referee upon the ground that its consideration was barred by the limitation of one year contained in Section 315.
Claimant thereupon appealed to the board, contending that by reason of certain legislative enactments which became effective during the year succeeding the date of his accident the time within which he was required to file his claim-petition had been extended to "two years after the accident."
The legislation invoked by claimant is the Act of June 4, 1937, P.L. 1552, re-enacting and amending the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1915, supra. By this Act of 1937, Section 315 of the former act, above cited, *473
was re-enacted and amended (also as Section 315 of the new act, P.L. 1573,
The board, agreeing with the contention of claimant, reversed the action of the referee and entered an award in favor of claimant for compensation at the rate of $15 per week for a period of 125 weeks.
Upon the appeal of the employer and its insurance carrier to the common pleas, the opinion of the board was adopted by that court; defendants' exceptions were dismissed and judgment entered upon the award; the present appeal by defendants from that judgment followed.
The question with which we are confronted is whether the amendment relates to and affects the substantive rights and obligations of the parties under their contract of hiring, or only the procedure for their enforcement — their rights or merely their remedies.
The fundamental test was defined by our Supreme Court in Kucav. Lehigh Valley Coal Co.,
Upon the question whether the amendment applied to the case then pending, it was said: "The section in question affects the procedure; it does not disturb vested rights, or impair contract obligations. Procedure is a matter of statutory regulation, and, unless *474
prevented by the Constitution, the legislature may alter it at will, provided the obligations of contracts are not impaired; but where the remedy is not entirely taken away, and the scope of the powers or duties of the hearing tribunals are merely enlarged, no contract is impaired. Legislation which affects rights will not be construed to be retroactive unless it is declared so in the act. But where it concerns merely the mode of procedure, it is applied, as of course, to litigation existing at the time of its passage: Kille v. Reading Iron Works,
It is true there was no litigation actually pending in the case at bar on the date upon which the amendment became effective, but on that date claimant had a full and complete right of action and the period within which he was required to assert it, under the legislation in force at the time of the injury, had not expired.
We have held with respect to other limitations in various sections of the statute that they were procedural and therefore applied to existing proceedings and pending claims. For instance, in DeJoseph v. Standard Steel Car Co. et al.,
In the course of the opinion KELLER, J., (now President Judge) said: "We agree with the learned court below that the Act of April 13, 1927, in so far as it amends Section 413 of the Act of 1919 relates to procedure *475
and applies to pending cases and is not confined to accidents which occur after its passage and approval." Similarly in Marchukv. Pittsburgh Terminal Coal Corporation,
Reference has been made by appellants, inter alia, to several prior decisions of this court — Ratto et al. v. PennsylvaniaCoal Company,
In the Rowles case, the claim-petition in question had not been filed within one year after the accident. In discussing the limitation PARKER, J., said: "The limitation contained in § 315 is a special statutory limitation qualifying a given right and is not a pure statute of limitations."
In the absence of clear proof of fraud, coercion, or such other improper conduct as would estop an employer or carrier from invoking the limitation, the right is forever lost unless the claim is made within the statutory period.
In the Ratto case reference was made to the limitation in Section 315 as analogous to that contained in the Act of April 26, 1855, P.L. 309, 12 Pa.C.S.A. § 1602-1603, which created a right to recover damages for wrongful death which did not exist at common law, and it was noted that neither limitation is a pure statute of limitations in the sense that it may operate only when pleaded. Although, by origin, an incident of a new substantive right created by statute, the period of limitation in both cases deals merely with the exercise of that substantive right and is so basically procedural that it may be altered from time to time.
Rosenzweig, Admrx., v. Heller,
Another indication that the change in the limitation period was intended to be applicable to existing causes *477 of action is the fact that although the Act of 1937 was approved on June 4, 1937, it did not become effective until January 1, 1938. As stated in 37 C.J. 697 § 15: "The fact that a statute of limitations is postponed in its operation, and is not to take effect from its passage, has been held to be a circumstance showing that the statute was intended to be retrospective in its operation and therefore applicable to existing, as well as prospective, causes of action. . . . . ." As we have already indicated, changes in procedure may properly have a retroactive as well as prospective application and this rule is quite generally applied to statutes of limitation, aside from the question of postponement of the operation of the statute. See 37 C.J. 695, § 12, where it is said: ". . . . . . the rule is frequently laid down that inasmuch as statutes of limitation affect the remedy only, the statute in force at the time of suitbrought governs the case and operates, in the absence of saving clauses, on causes of action accruing prior to its passage, especially if the statute extends, instead of shortens, the pre-existing limitation period. . . . . ." (Italics ours).
The case of Russell v. Ralston et al.,
Here, as above indicated, the happening of the accident created in claimant a full and complete cause of action. Claimant, in addition to contending he had two years within which to file his petition, asserted, and introduced evidence for the purpose of showing, that the insurance carrier had estopped itself from raising as a defense the bar of the limitation in the section by reason of its assurances to him that compensation would be paid, i.e., claimant endeavored to bring himself within such cases asGuy v. Stoecklein Baking Co. et al.,
In view of the conclusion we have reached on the main branch of the case, it is unnecessary to consider the question of estoppel and we express no opinion upon it.
Judgment affirmed. *479