46 Iowa 37 | Iowa | 1877
Lead Opinion
I. Jacob Freeman and Andrew Oberly, original parties hereto, resided in the State of Pennsylvania. Oberly became indebted to Freeman in the sum of about $3,000, .and to other parties in large amounts, and in 1836 he removed to Stark county, Ohio, leaving said indebtedness unpaid. In 1837 Freeman recovered judgment in the State of Ohio against Oberly for $3169.61. In'1840 Oberly removed with his family to Lee county, Iowa, and on the 31st day of March, 1857, he held the legal title to certain lands in said county, a part of which is the land now in controversy. On the last mentioned day Freeman, with others, went to the house of Oberly and demanded payment of his judgment and interest. No payment was made, and on the same day or the night following Oberly conveyed all his real estate to his son, Daniel Oberly. On the next day Freeman sued out of the Lee District Court an attachment and levied the same on all of the said real estate, and afterward recovered judgment in said court for nearly $7,000. This suit was commenced on the 25th day of April, 1857, to subject the said lands to the payment of said claim.
The defense on this branch of the case is, that the land in question was purchased with the money of Daniel Oberly, and that Andrew Oberly had no real interest therein, and that the conveyances to Daniel were not fraudulent. The evidence on this branch of the case satisfactorily shows that Andrew Oberly, while residing in Pennsylvania, was a very improvident man; indeed, it seems that he lived principally by borrowing. In his youth he lost his right arm by an accident, and was thus in a manner incapacitated for manual labor. He left Pennsylvania with an old wagon and an indifferent team and less than $100 in money. When he arrived at Fort Madison, in this State, he had but little or no property, and aside from the real estate in controversy he never afterward accumulated anything. At the time óf his removal to this State he was 51 years old. Daniel Oberly, the son of Andrew, in the year 1841 came to Iowa and took up his home with his father. Daniel was then 26 years old and unmarried. In 1846 the family bought settlers’ claims on the land in con
Without reviewing the evidence here as to the payments made for the settlers’ claims, we will say that if it were not that Daniel Oberly permitted the title to remain in his father for several years, and allowed him to convey away a part of the land to other parties without objection, and only took title in himself wdien the Freeman claim was presented, we would be strongly inclined to hold that Daniel had a complete equity in these lands, and that they were never subject to the payment of Andrew’s debts. However that may be, as we dispose of the case on another ground more satisfactory to ourselves, we will proceed to consider the claims of the plaintiff as against the appellant, L. S. Coyne.
The deed of trust on the 160 acres was foreclosed by notice, and sold in 1862 to one O. P. Birge for $1,600, being the amount due thereon, and in March, 1866, Birge conveyed 120 acres to said L. S. Coyne by quitclaim deed, and on the same day conveyed to Susannah Oberly, widow of Andrew, 40 acres for the period of her natural life, and after her decase to said
It is urged by counsel for appellee, and was held by the court below, that the purchase by Birge and Miller, and their conveyances to L. S. Coyne, were fraudulent as against the plaintiff herein, being the result of a combination made with Andrew Oberly to prevent the plaintiff from subjecting the land to the payment of the Freeman judgment. In this conclusion we cannot concur. The only possible theory upon which this position can be maintained is that the money paid to Miller and Birge belonged to Andrew Oberly. It is argued that the land was in equity the property of Andrew, and that Miller and Birge were paid from the proceeds of the land. This is assumed from the fact that L. S. Coyne and Daniel Oberly continued to live on the land and cultivate it. The referee reports that he cannot find how much land is in cultivation, and the record before us contains no evidence on that subject. We are unable to ascertain what its rental value was; whether it was more than sufficient to compensate the son and daughter for the support of their aged and infirm parents, we are unable to say. It cannot be claimed that as between the plaintiff and Daniel Oberly and L. S. Coyne, they were compelled to pay off these trust deeds for the plaintiff’s benefit. We know of no equitable principle which would compel them to do so. It is claimed that the pendency of this suit precluded L. S. Coyne from acquiring any interest in the land adverse to plaintiff’s claim. This would be true if she were claiming title under Andrew or Daniel Oberly; but her title is adverse to them, based on the foreclosure of the trust deeds. Her title is based on a lien superior to any claim which is or can be made by the plaintiff, and cannot be held to be fraudulent unless it be shown that
The holders of the trust deeds had the light to foreclose, and we must presume that the plaintiff knew the condition of the record title. If he desired to avail himself of Andrew Oberly’s interest in the land, it was his right to redeem, or make the holders of the superior liens parties to this suit. Having failed to do this, and allowed the trust deeds to be foreclosed and title to be acquired thereunder, the only way he can set aside and avoid the title thus acquired is to show that they were acquired with the money of Andrew Oberly.
Eeversbd
Rehearing
ON REHEARING.
After the filing of the foregoing opinion, a petition for rehearing was filed by appellee, which we have considered.
The argument of the petition is mainly directed to the proposition that, as before the foreclosure of the trust deeds the land was the property of Andrew Oberly, and L. S. Coyne
As L. S. Ooyne holds her title under the trust deed, it was incumbent on the plaintiff to show that she acquired her title with the money of Andrew Oberly. The mere fact of her residence on the land falls very far short of making such showing, especially where it is not shown how much of the land was in cultivation, and as a consequence no estimate of rents and profits can be made.
It is further claimed, in a supplement to the petition for rehearing, that because the plaintiff redeemed the land from tax sale, he should recover not only the amount paid for such redemption and interest, but also the costs of this action.
The redemption from tax sale was made pending the suit. The whole controversy was as to the right of plaintiff to subject the land to the payment of his debt. The defendant L. S. Coyne is the successful party on that issue. We are unable to find that any costs were made upon the claim for reimbursement of the amount paid for the redemption from tax sale. Under these circumstances we do not think plaintiff is entitled to costs.
Reversed.