27 Cal. 163 | Cal. | 1865
The appellant denominates this action “a bill in equity, brought to repeal and vacate a patent issued by the United States, to Thomas 0. Larkin and John S. Missroon for the Jimeno grant,” or, as he states in another portion of his brief, and which amounts to the same thing in substance, a bill “to quiet the title to the Colus grant by vacating the Jimeno grant.”
He states in his complaint that the Colus grant was granted to John Bidwell; that Bidwell conveyed the grant to the appellant; that in 1855 the title was finally confirmed to him; that the survey of the grant was approved by the United States District Court in January, 1860; that he has sold divers lots and tracts of the grant, and that he now is in possession of the unsold part of the grant. He further states that prior to November, 1844, certain Governors of the Californias granted to Manuel Jimeno Casarin two ranchos—called “ Sal si Puedes ” and “ Santa Paula y Saticoy ”—containing in the aggregate twelve Spanish leagues of land; that “ the said Manuel Jimeno Casarin, well knowing that he had actually received, as donations from the Mexican nation, twelve square leagues of land within the Californias, and, well knowing that
The respondents demurred to the complaint on several grounds, two of which were that the Court had no jurisdiction of the subject of the action, and that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action,- and the demurrers were sustained, and the plaintiff failing to amend, judgment was rendered dismissing the action.-
The object of the action is to impeach and set aside the patent for the Jimeno grant, or to avoid so much of it as covers lands within the Colus grant, and the ground of invalidity alleged against the patent is, that Larkin and Missroon procured it to be issued by “ false suggestions, fraudulent concealments and by misrepresentations but the acts of fraud and misrepresentation on which the general charge is based, are not specified, and for that reason the complaint is defective in not stating the requisite facts; But we do not intend to ’ rest our decision on that ground. It is charged that Jimeno committed a fraud upon the Mexican Government in procuring
The Court will take judicial notice that, according to the provisions of the Act of Congress of March 3, 1851, every person claiming lands in California, by virtue of any right or title derived from the Spanish or Mexican Government, should present his petition for the confirmation of his title to the Board of Land Commissioners, and that such proceedings must be had thereupon, before said Board or the District or Supreme Court of the United States, that a final decree confirming the title of the claimant to the land must be entered before the patent fdr the land could'be issued. A patent could not be issued,for the land claimed under a Mexican grant, unless such proceedings were first had for the confirmation; and it is not pretended that they were not had in respect to the Jimeno grant. The patent was issued only in pursuance of the decree of confirmation, and for the purpose of carrying it into effect.
The Board or the Court, in passing upon the claim and confirming it, must of necessity have found as a fact, not only that Jimeno was the grantee of the Mexican Government, but also that he was competent to take the grant. True, this may not have been done in direct terms, as in the case of United States v. Beading, 18 How. 1, and United States v. Hartnell's Executors, 22 How. 286, and other cases; but the fact must have been ascertained, at least by implication. The fact is as necessary to the confirmation of the grant as the fact that the land granted was situated within California, and must have been and was judicially determined by the Court that pronounced the decree ; otherwise, we would have the case of a grant without a grantee. The only forum in which this fact can be found, or the questions relating to it investigated, during the series of proceedings that end with the patent, is the Board of Land Commissioners or the United States District or Supreme Court. Their jurisdiction of all the matters touching the claim of the petitioner to the land and of proceedidgs for final confirmation is plenary and exclusive. The appellant seeks to set aside the patent on the ground that the decree, in pursuance of which it was issued, was rendered in confirmation of a grant that had no legal existence—that was made by the Governor of California contrary to law; and the
The old and very general rule on this subject is stated by Mr. Chief Justice de Grey in Duchess of Kingston's Case, 11 Har. State Trials, 262 : “ But if it (the judgment) was a direct and decisive sentence upon the point, and as it stands, to be admitted as conclusive evidence upon the Court, and not to be impeached from within, yet like all other acts of the highest judicial authority, it is impeached from without. Although it is not permitted to show that the Court was mistaken, it may be shown that they were misled. Fraud is an extrinsic collateral act, which vitiates the most solemn proceedings of Courts of justice.” Although the strictness of the rule has been in many cases modified, and parties have been permitted to obtain relief in equity against judgments and decrees obtained by fraud and imposition, yet if it appear that the defendant had knowledge of the fraud in time to have availed himself of it in his defense, and neglected to do so, or if by reasonable diligence he could have ascertained and proven the true state of the facts, in respect to which the fraud is alleged, and neglected to make the proof, the Court will not grant him relief. (Le Guen v. Governeur and Kemble, 1 J. Cases, 465; Marine Ins. Company v. Hodgson, 7 Crunch. 332; Will. Eq. 160.) It not only does not appear that the United States did not know of the grants made to Jirneno prior to the making of the Jimeno grant, but from the fact that they succeeded the Mexican Government in California, and came into possession of the archives of the former Government, every presumption is in favor of their having knowledge of the prior grants, and no fact is stated to
Admitting that relief might be granted in a proper case with the proper parties, can the Courts of this State set aside, or indirectly review the decisions of the Federal Courts? This is not an open question. In Peck et al. v. Jenness et al., 7 How. 624, Mr. Justice Grier, in delivering the opinion of the Court, says: “ It is a doctrine of the law too long established to require citation of authorities that when a Court has jurisdiction it has a right to decide every question which occurs in the cause; and whether its decision be correct or otherwise, its judgment, till reversed, is regarded as binding in every Court; and when the jurisdiction of a Court and the right of a plaintiff to prosecute his suit in it have once attached, the right cannot be arrested or taken away by proceedings in another Court.” (See also United States v. Peters, 5 Cranch. 115 ; Freeman v. Howe, 24 How. 450 ; United States v. Booth, 21 How. 506 ; Mott v. Smith, 16 Cal. 533.)
The decision in this case does not in any degree impair the jurisdiction of the State Courts to pass upon and determine the rights of parties claiming under conflicting patents issued by the General Government in pursuance of decrees of confirmation, but the jurisdiction is denied to them to attack or collaterally review the decisions of the Courts of the United States, made in matters of which they have the acknowledged jurisdiction.
Judgment affirmed.
Sawyer, J., concurring specially :
I concur in the judgment.