92 Ct. Cl. 210 | Ct. Cl. | 1940
delivered the opinion of the court.
The plaintiff seeks to recover from the defendant just compensation for the alleged taking by the defendant of a portion of its lands embraced within the Wewoka townsite.
By an act of the General Council of the Seminole Nation, approved April 23,1897, a townsite commission was created, which, in the exercise of the authority conferred by that act, acquired a tract of approximately 640 acres, divided it into lots, blocks, streets, and alleys, and proceeded to sell the lots. By February 12, 1900, 7 lots had been disposed of. On that date the balance of some 3,132 lots were disposed of to John. F. Brown, the Principal Chief of the Nation, for $12,000. This sale was not in accordance with the act of the Seminole Nation, in that it relieved John F. Brown of the requirement to erect a building or buildings on the lots purchased within six months thereafter. The sale, however, was ratified and confirmed by the Seminole General Council on April 18, 1900, and on March 3, 1905, the Congress of the United States ratified and confirmed this resolution of the Seminole National Council. (33 Stat. 1048, 1068.)
On June 6, 1901, prior to the ratification by the Congress, the lots had been conveyed to the Wewoka Realty and Trust Company, a company controlled by John F. Brown and his brother, which proceeded to sell them at prices averaging, according to one witness, from $80.00 to $100.00, and according to another one, from $150.00 to $200.00 a lot. Also prior to the passage of the act, a communication had been directed to the Attorney General questioning the legality and the bona fides of the sale to Brown. The Assistant Attorney General for the Interior Department held that the sale was
The plaintiff says that the price was grossly inadequate, that the sale was a fraud on plaintiff’s rights, and that it was made in violation of the Seminole agreement between the United States and the plaintiff, and that its ratification by the Congress under these circumstances amounts to a taking of plaintiff’s land by the United States. We think this position is clearly untenable.
The United States did not appropriate the land for its own benefit, nor did it appropriate it for the benefit of another, unless the sale to Brown was fradulent and the United States was a party to the fraud. If the United States participated in any fraud that may have been committed, it did so in the passage of the act of March 3, 1905. Is it to be supposed that Congress, in the passage of the act conferring jurisdiction on this court in this case, intended to confer jurisdiction on us to inquire if one of its former acts was fraudulent ? Undoubtedly it did not. Such an intention would have to be manifested by the clearest and most explicit language. Jurisdiction to render judgment “in any and all legal and equitable claims” certainly cannot be construed to embrace a claim founded upon an allegation that a former act of Congress was fraudulent. Klamath Indians v. United States (No. E-346), 81 C. Cls. 79; 296 U. S. 244, 254, 255.
To show fraud the plaintiff relies solely on the alleged inadequacy of the price paid and the fact that the purchaser was the Principal Chief of the Seminole Nation, and
For the reasons stated, plaintiff’s petition will be dismissed. It is so ordered.