614 A.2d 1189 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1992
This is an appeal from the Order of February 12, 1991 directing defendant/appellant Martin Seman to pay the monthly sums of $520 in spousal support for plaintiff/appellee Darlene Seman and $300 in child support for the parties’ minor child, Chad, born August 8, 1974. The Order was made retroactive to April 24, 1990, the date on which appellee filed her complaint in support. The Order credited appellant for $4,000 in support payments made directly to appellee. The Order further directed appellant shall be responsible for maintaining his employer’s hospitalization and medical insurance coverage for appellee and Chad, as well as one-half of all medical expenses not covered by insurance. Finally, the
Appellant now claims the trial court failed to determine correctly his spousal and child support obligation in accord with the applicable statutes, guidelines and case law. In essence, appellant argues the trial court erred in not “deviat[ing] significantly from the [support] guidelines” (Brief of Appellant at 11). It is well settled this Court’s standard of review for support awards is a narrow one based upon abuse of discretion. Marshall v. Marshall, 404 Pa.Super. 628, 591 A.2d 1060 (1991). Abuse of discretion in these matters requires more than mere error of judgment, rather it requires an overriding or misapplication of the law or a manifestly unreasonable exercise of judgment. Caplan v. Caplan, 400 Pa.Super. 352, 583 A.2d 823 (1990).
The area of support has been clouded needlessly over recent years through varied attempts to reconcile the Melzer
Appellant contends the court erred in not deviating from the guidelines and individualizing the support award to the specific conditions of the parties. While the Ball Court
Appellant also claims the court abused its discretion in ordering appellant to be responsible for one-half of those medical expenses for appellee or Chad not covered by insurance without explicitly making appellee responsible for the other half. Appellant argues this requirement, provided for in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4324, is allowable only for “reasonable and necessary” health care expenses. The first aspect of appellant’s claim is without merit, as appellee correctly points out, because as long as appellant meets his requirements, he will suffer no economic harm or injustice, and no other explicit language was necessary in the Order, as no one but appellee could be responsible for the other half of noncovered medical expenses.
As to the claim concerning “reasonable and necessary” expenses, we feel certain this language is implicit in the trial court’s Order, but out of an abundance of caution, we now make it explicit, modifying the February 12, 1991 Order only to reflect that appellant is responsible for one-half of all reasonable and necessary medical expenses for appellee and Chad not covered by insurance.
Order affirmed as modified.
Jurisdiction relinquished.