Sеlvidge was tried on three counts of theft by receiving. The counts charged him with receiving stolen goods from, respectively, a
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hardware store known as Hayes Truck and Tractor, Malcolm’s Grocery, and a convenience store known as Pop Breedlove’s. Selvidge was granted a directed verdict on the Malcolm’s Grocery count, but was convicted on the remaining counts. Selvidge appealеd, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the two convictions.
Selvidge v. State,
A basic rule of our criminal law is that in a felony case the uncorroborated testimony оf an accomplice is insufficient to support a conviction. OCGA § 24-4-8 (Code Ann. § 38-121);
Kesler v. State,
Although we agree that the general rule is that a thief and his receiver are not accomplices within the meaning of OCGA § 24-4-8 (Code Ann. § 38-121), we find that, in light of the evil which § 24-4-8 (Code Ann. § 38-121) is designed to remedy, an exception to this generаl rule is justified where there is evidence that the thief and the receiver have engaged in a common criminal enterprise. See 53 ALR2d 817, 838-846; Wilsоn v. Commonwealth,
For this reason, we now hold that, if a thief and a receiver of stolen goods have acted рursuant to a common criminal enterprise, they are to be considered accomplices within the meaning of OCGA § 24-4-8 (Code Ann. § 38-121). Accоrdingly, the Court of Appeals’ decision in the instant case and the other cases cited above which have held that the thief and reсeiver are not accomplices of each other are hereby disapproved to the extent they are inconsistеnt with this opinion. We emphasize, however, that many cases involving a thief and a receiver of stolen goods will fall outside the ambit of the above exception, in that there will have been no connection between the thief and the receiver other than the рassing of stolen goods from one to the other. In those instances, the thief and receiver are not accomplices, and nо corroboration is necessary.
In the instant case, there is some evidence that Grant and Selvidge were involved in a common criminal enterprise. There was evidence that Selvidge drove Grant and Flowers to Breedlove’s, where he dropped them off and lеft the scene. Grant’s testimony shows that, when Selvidge returned close to midnight and picked them up in front of the store, they loaded goods stolen from Breedlove’s into Selvidge’s car. Moreover, the record shows that Grant, Selvidge, and Flowers aided each other in transporting thе goods to Selvidge’s trailer and in consuming and disposing of the stolen goods. Under these circumstances, we find that Grant should be considered an accomplice of Selvidge for the purposes of the evidentiary rule of OCGA § 24-4-8 (Code Ann. § 38-121).
It being determined that Grant was an accоmplice of Selvidge, it follows that his testimony as to Selvidge’s identity and participation in the crime of receiving stolen goods had to bе corroborated, and that that corroboration had to be independent of Grant’s testimony.
Kesler v. State,
We find that there was sufficient independent evidence corroborating Grant’s testimony. First, the two walkie-talkies found at Selvidge’s mobile home were identifiеd by Ms. Breedlove as the ones stolen during the burglary. She testified that a chipped corner near the battery compartment of one walkie-talkie, and slightly bent and broken antennas on both, identified the walkietalkies as the ones stolen from the store. Although Selvidge offered an explanation that he thought the walkie-talkies were left at the trailer by his brother or grandparents, the jury was authorized to resolve this conflicting evidence against Selvidge. See
Ladson v. State,
Accordingly, although we disagree with the Court of Appeals’ holding that Grant’s tеstimony did not have to be corroborated, we uphold its affirmance of Selvidge’s conviction on the Breedlove’s count because of our finding that Grant’s testimony was sufficiently corroborated.
Judgment affirmed.