66 So. 460 | Ala. | 1914
Repeated decisions in this court have established the doctrine that it is essential to the effectual creation of a mortgage on crops to be grown— “that its subject-matter should have a potential existence, as distinguished from a mere possibility, or expectancy on the part of the contracting parties, that it will come into being. While the thing itself need not have identity, or separate entity, yet it must at least be the product, or growth, or increase of property, which has at the time a corporeal existence, and in which the mortgagor has a present interest, not a mere belief, hope, or expectation that he will in future acquire such
This is an action by the assignee of a mortgage against the purchaser of cotton from a tenant, and grounds the complaint upon the destruction of the asserted lien of the mortgage; the instrument having been, previous to the purchase, seasonably, recorded in the county wherein the wrong alleged was committed. The contention of the defendants is that at the time the mortgage in question was executed the mortgagor had no such interest in the lands mentioned therein as could render the subject of mortgage the crops to be grown thereon. The court below approved this contention, which conclusion cast the result against the plaintiffs (appellants). Our view is that the ruling of the trial court was Avell made. The evidence bearing on this inquiry is as follows:
James McBride, witness for the plaintiff, being duly sworn, testified as follows: “My name is James McBride, and I reside in Elmore county, Ala., on a part of what is known as the ‘Smith Place’ in Elmore county, Ala. I lived on this same land during the year 1912 and worked said land on shares with one Robert Wilson, who rented said lands from Mr. Smith, the owner of said Smith Place. Some time in December, 1912, I went to said Robert Wilson who had rented said lands for the year 1913 from said Mr. Smith, and I told said Robert Wilson that I wanted to subrent from him for the year 1913 the lands that I had been working on shares with him for the year 1912. He told me that he would subrent me said lands if I would furnish a mule and make arrangements with some one for advances to make my crop for the year 1913. I then secured a mule,
It is clear from this' evidence that at the time of the execution of the mortgage, viz., December 27, 1912, no contract or binding engagement existed between McBride and Wilson, for the renting, by the former from the latter, of land which the latter had rented from Smith. Up to February 1, 1913, the matter rested, at most, in negotiation. McBride proposed to rent from
The insistence for appellant cannot be accorded support by Hurst v. Bell, 72 Ala. 336, 340-341. In Fields v. Karter, 121 Ala. 329, 333, 25 South. 800, the pertinent feature of Hurst v. Bell, supra, was pointedly criticized; and, when the presently pertinent observations in Hurst v. Bell are considered in connection with earlier and later decisions on the subject, they appear to be distinctly out of line. The decision of the court of appeals in Young v. Hall, 4 Ala. App. 603, 58 South. 789, expressed no departure from the doctrine of the cases first cited in this opinion.
The mortgagor not having had, on December 27, 1912, such an interest, as the result of rental contract, in the land then rented by Wilson as would afford subject-mat-t'er for the mortgage in question, it was a nullity, and, in consequence, fixed no lien in favor of Goodman or his assignee, the appellant, that could be the subject of wrongful destruction by the appellees.
The judgment is therefore affirmed.
Affirmed.