62 Pa. Commw. 5 | Pa. Commw. Ct. | 1981
Opinion by
Claimant appeals to this Court to remand to the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Board) its
Claimant suffered a work-related injury, described in the Notice of Compensation Payable as fractures of both wrists, a fractured nose, loss of teeth, and a laceration of the forehead. Some twenty months later, in January, 1979, the employer filed a Termination Petition, alleging that the claimant was able to return to work. In October, 1979, the claimant filed a Modification Petition containing allegations of disfigurement.
Pursuant to the hearing on the Termination Petition, the referee accepted the deposition testimony of respondent’s medical expert and a report from the claimant’s treating medical practitioner. Both doctors’ opinions are referred to in the decision issued by the referee, who obviously chose to weave threads from each party’s evidence into the fabric of his decision. In his Order, he terminated benefits, awarded fifteen weeks of compensation for the disfigurement, and granted the defendant carrier a credit for overpayment of compensation made.
Claimant appealed to the Board, averring that the facial disfigurement award was inadequate, and also that the referee committed an error of law in terminating benefits. The Board heard argument on the appeal, and subsequently issued an Order in which it affirmed the referee’s decision, noting particularly that the claimant had appeared before the Board “and the asserted disfigurement was observed.”
Upon appeal to this Court, the claimant requests that we remand to the Board for a determination of whether the referee had sufficient competent evidence
Our scope of review in a workmen’s compensation case encompasses a determination of whether any constitutional rights were violated, an error of law was committed, or whether any necessary finding of fact was unsupported by substantial evidence, always bearing in mind that issues of evidentiary weight and credibility are within the province of the referee’s adjudicative powers. City of Williamsport v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 55 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 618, 423 A.2d 817 (1980). Neither this Court nor the Board can substitute its discretion for that of the referee in the face of facts based upon substantial evidence. American Refrigerator Equipment Company v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 31 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 590, 377 A.2d 1007 (1977). Substantial evidence has been repeatedly defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the conclusion reached therefrom. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board v. Auto Express, Inc., 21 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 559, 346 A.2d 829 (1975).
As the party who wished to modify the status quo, the employer in this case had the burden of demonstrating that the disability had terminated, and to that end it presented the telephone deposition of its medical witness, Dr. Maroon, which was accepted into evidence. The claimant entered a disability claim form completed by P. Adelaide Perrand, D.O., who had treated the claimant, as well as his own testimony concerning his present condition. Claimant, as of the date of the hearing, had been employed at the same type of work, for greater financial compensation than his preinjury rate, for a period of over two months.
Turning to claimant’s second issue in this appeal, that the case should be remanded because the Board did not address the question of the termination of disability benefits, we note that claimant has presented no cases to substantiate his contention, nor can this Court. To do so, we would have to pronounce that the Board cannot simply affirm the decision of the referee,
We therefore affirm the order of the Board.
Order
And Now, this 22nd day of September, 1981, the decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal
In the same decision the referee dismissed the Modification Petition since the matters at issue in it were resolved by the decision issued pursuant to the Termination Petition.
Cf. Fitzpatrick v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 13 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 1, 317 A.2d 337 (1974).