*1 in case arguments cen- The district court that it While determined need accrual, directly argument on which not address this tered more we because the length original in “fails opin- at our claim as a matter of addressed UCSPA law in ion, Supreme majority opin- light undisputed Court’s facts before the Riggs suggested implication ion in PID by Court.” 133-34. begins of action the cause accrue We do doubt the district court accident, at the time of the different discovery have correct had would been majority than the conclusion reached yielded only the facts when it before

when we first this case. considered We this claim. But dismissed the district court of that believe further consideration Myerses never develop allowed by Supreme issue is best addressed circumstances, case. Under these re-we Court, since lan- especially verse the dismissal of claim the UCSPA guage issue this case is the same proceedings. and remand for further Supreme language the Court considered in Riggs.

Id. *2 n.4.

E. Kentucky Court unpublished,

Albeit on Hensley Appeals’ reversal remand Kentucky Supreme weighs strongly affirming district favor INSURANCE COMPANY SELECTIVE Myerses’ breach- court’s dismissal CAROLINA, OF SOUTH Plaintiff- particular, rely of-contract we claim. Appellee, Riggs, that court’s determination that implication, any argument forecloses Thus, affirm

accrual be tolled. SULLIVAN; Sullivan; Davida A. Curtis court as the breach-of-contract district Sullivan; Sharon and Omni Custom claim. Meats, Defendant-Appellants, Inc. Kentucky’s II. Claim Under Unfair

Claims Settlement Practices Act3 Blake, Intervenor-Appellant. James motion dismiss Defendants’ asserted No. 15-6187 v. Allstate Insurance Smith that under Appeals, United Court of States 2005), F.3d Circuit. Sixth limita- insurance contract’s twelve-month Filed June applied to provision tions the UCSPA well, the claim claim as since accrued

the date loss and was tolled. UCSPA, (5) Ky. Failing § deny affirm or Rev. Stat. Ann. 304.12- part: provides pertinent proof after claims within reasonable time completed; of loss have been statements practice It is an claims unfair settlement any person perform or of the to commit (14) Failing promptly provide a reason- following acts omissions: (3) explanation able the insur- adopt basis Failing implement reason- appli- investigation in relation to facts prompt able standards arising policies; or for the cable for denial a claim claims law settlement.,.. compromise offer of a *2 Chesnut, James Michael

Pamela Adams Inman, Green, Lexing- Hughes, & Chesnut ton, KY, Plaintiff-Appellee Clark, L. Gregory Matthew William Schuetze, Bidart Bentley, Shernoff Steven Claremont, CA, Bentley, Echeverría Matt McGill, McGill, Bowling M. Lowder & Green, KY, Intervenor-Appellant STRANCH, BEFORE: WHITE MICHELSON, Judges; Circuit * benefits, salary and, District Judge. starting given permission by Omni to use the MICHELSON, Judge. District *3 dispute This from a insurance arose 2011, January In out of “[ran] involving automobile accident Davida Davida, stopped work” for and she work- and Blake. Davida collided Sullivan James (R. 69-11, 915.) for company. PID driving with Blake’s vehicle while Omni provided a package, on an policy which, listed insurance according to deposition Curtis’s tes- Company insurance, that Selective Insurance timony, included health dental insurance, insurance, had issued permission South Carolina Omni Custom and Meats, keep using to question presented Inc. in this Mercedes. The insured, appeal is named 2011, January Between May and Davida Mercedes from “borrow[ed]” jewelry clothing started a and business owners, (Davi- Sharon Curtis and Sullivan so, California. Even was driving Davida parents), as that term is da’s permission with Omni’s Nor policy. hold that Omni did We not. date accident. expectations does the reasonable doctrine Selective issued the to relevant

require provide coverage. Selective 27, Omni on Policy provid- June 2007. The Therefore, will opinion district court’s ed certain Liability, Commercial General be affirmed. Automobile, Business Commercial and Liability Umbrella coverages. Busi- I. Policy ness Automobile provides, “We will pay all sums an legally pay ‘insured’ must injuries James in an Blake sustained damages ‘bodily injury1 on May 2011. Davi- automobile accident damage’ ‘property this insurance which driving a Mer- da Sullivan 1999 C230 applies, by an caused and result- ‘accident’ Angeles, she Los California when ing from the ownership, maintenance shop- made a left turn to sudden enter a (R. 69-2, a covered PID ‘auto.’” lot ping parking center collided 844.) Liability The Commercial Umbrella investigator Blake’s vehicle. The crash site Policy provides, pay “We will behalf of acci- determined that Davida caused the the insured the loss’ in excess ‘ultimate net (R. by “making dent an unsafe left turn[.]” of the ‘retained limit’ that the insured be- 69-7, 894.) PID obligated legally damages comes pay parents, Curtis and Davida’s Sharon ‘bodily injury1 because of ... which this Sullivan, owned the Mercedes. (R. 855.) applies.” 69-2, PID they Kentucky meatpacking allowed their Business Auto and Commercial Umbrella Meats, company, Omni Custom Inc. to use Liability coverages provide identical defini- (R. purposes.” “business tions of An “Who Is Insured.”1 917.) PID 855.) appeal, PID both Critical working state, began Davida Omni in a. following “The are You ‘insureds’: ‘auto’, performed mostly work She “back for any Anyone office” covered b. else while your from her using home California. She earned a covered * Michelson, found, parties The Honorable Laurie J. do United The district court appeal, dispute on the Commercial Judge States for the Eastern District District Liability Policy provide cov- General Michigan, by designation. sitting 1006.) (R. erage. PID own, (R. Policy at time of the accident hire or 69- you

'auto' borrow....” 863.) therefore, duty provide It that the undisputed “you” coverage. to Omni. refers Policy equally undisputed that the It is appeal This followed. in- expressly name as an did not Davida initial application requested sured. Omni’s II. drivers, two Curtis and coverage for Sullivan, vehicles, and four none Sharon novo the district review de court’s “We June were the On which grant declaratory a motion decision to the Pol- the Mercedes was added Flowers, Ins. Co. v. judgment.” Scottsdale *4 icy by endorsement endorsement. 2008). (6th 546, F.3d Cir. “In a 563 drivers, any nor did additional list diversity involving an con- action insurance location vehicle. On garage list a tract, applies federal court substan- 2008, up- requested an May Selective state,” tive law the forum here Ken- of policy as list drivers dated tucky. Farm Fire Talley v. State & Cas. advised But no one Selective renewal. Co., 2000). F.3d driving the Mer- that Davida would California, or that had a Davida III. driving on her record. DUI infraction Nonetheless, asserts Davida is Blake A. an under Omni’s insurance insured “borrow[ed]” applying Kentucky “In law we fol must from Curtis and Sharon and Davida of highest low the decisions the state’s “permission.” car with Omni’s court court has when that addressed the relevant issue. the issue has not When 2012, Blake suit in Cali- In filed March addressed, must directly been antici against fornia Curtis and Sharon highest pate how state’s relevant Sullivan, Davida Selective and Sullivan. by are would rule in the case and bound agreed defense to Omni and provide of that court.” controlling decisions Scotts action, sub- the California Sullivans (citations Ins. at 563 dale 513 F.3d rights an ject pending reservation omitted). marks In quotation and internal Omni, Curtis, investigation. March Kentucky, legal “the and ef construction Cali- dismissed from the Sharon were and [generally] of an contract is fect prejudice, leaving with Davi- fornia action matter of law for the court.” Coleman v. purports only defendant. Blake da as the Serv., Inc., Bee Line Courier S.W.3d rights assignee be the Davida’s 2009) (quoting 125 (Ky. Bituminous the Policy. under an “insured” Inc., Contracting, Corp. Kenway Cas. Meanwhile, having de- October 2007)). (Ky. The Ken S.W.3d termined that the accident was not covered held, recently tucky Supreme Court policy, the terms Omni’s Any ambiguities in insurance contract complaint in the Dis- an filed United States insured, in favor District of must be resolved trict Court the Western construction cer- Kentucky, declaratory judgment but this rule strict seeking tainly every not mean doubt rights respect does duties against court ulti- resolved insurer and action. The district must be California the rule not interfere with mately found that Davida was does Sullivan must reasonable inter- meaning an receive “insured” within plain pretation consistent with row” “to means receive with implied meaning or expressed contract. intention of returning the equivalent.” same or an Merriam-Webster Horn, Ins. Tower Co. New York v. Dictionary, http!//www.merriam- Online 2015) (Ky. (citing Ky. S.W.3d (12 nothing webster.com June But Ctys. Ass’n All Lines Fund Trust v. indicates that Omni’s use McClendon, (Ky. S.W.3d temporary, was that Omni received 2005)). implied or expressed Policy, coverage Under the is avail Rather, returning intention of it. Curtis’s “all legally able for sums an must ‘insured’ testimony suggests that Davida’s sever pay damages ... caused an ‘acci thus, package, Omni’s use of the resulting ownership, dent’ and purpose, Mercedes for that set end maintenance use of ‘auto.’” a covered “gave permission date: Omni Davida (R. 69-2, 843.) PID To issue of resolve the drive the [the after she Mercedes] coverage, we must decide whether Davida employment left with the company” Policy. “insured” An under the did not mention set end for that date “Anyone “insured” includes while us else 915.) permission. *5 your ing permission ‘auto’ with a covered own, you hire or borrow....” Blake directs us to of adopt definition 843.) Again, “you” “your” refers “borrow” from the cases we considered is It named insured. Young, Insurance Co. v. 12- No. Westfield disputed (6th that the 6523, “covered” 9, 2013). Mercedes was slip op. Sept. That “per or that Davida it used with Omni’s case also a Kentucky involved business only us mission.” The issue before purporting pro “borrow[ed]” “[a]nyone coverage vide else while us Curtis at and Sharon Sullivan ing with [the named insured’s] accident. time a covered ‘auto’ [the insured] named hire[s], own[s], Id. at 3. borrow[s].” Policy The does not term define community college There a program had a Kentucky “borrow.” Nor does case law—at participate which students could in live least in context of an insur- automobile 2- repair projects. classroom vehicle Id. at meanings policy. urges ance Blake several A employer 3. student’s allowed the which, term. if We need not decide inoperative use his truck for one any, proper is the “borrow” definition of projects. these at 2. the repair Id. After Omni meets none them. completed, was tasked student First, urges adopt Blake dic returning en the vehicle. Id. While sure, tionary definition of beTo “borrow.” planned stop girlfriend’s route at his helpful dictionaries can ascrib aids house, the student another collided that are definitions contract vehicle, ultimately causing the death not defined Auto contract. See family other Id. The driver. decedent’s Foreign Ins. Co. -Owners v. Veterans of sought damages college’s under the insur (Ky. Post Wars S.W.3d here, As policy. dispositive Id. “the 2009). dictionary App. Ct. But none of the coverage issue ... [was] wheth help definitions we have Blake. reviewed College par er the ‘borrowed’ [the third Black’s Law Dictionary “borrow” defines ty’s] Id. truck.” 3. as “To take something temporary Dictionary use.” Black’s Law ed. first considered Travelers Indemni We 2014). says Swearinger, And ty App. Merriam-Webster “bor v. Co. Cal. 3d (Cal. 1985). Further, Swearinger formulation App. Ct. The Cal.Rptr. 383 support finding Appeals

California found that the “borrow” does susceptible Swearinger to two rea court term “borrow” was here. Even in the of an interpretations context implies “temporary sonable stated that “borrow” court automobile insurance contract. The App. Swearinger, use.” 169 Cal. 3d at require that “borrow” acknowledged could Although Davida’s Cal.Rptr. 383. sev borrower, dis purported a school record, part is not package erance trict, and control” over exercise “dominion that it testimony Curtis’ indicates included 785-86, Cal.Rptr. Id. at vehicle. Thus, even indefinite thought possible It also if use of of Davida’s the Mercedes “borrowed” the school district purpose package was business gain[ed] when it the use of “properly 33), the (Appellant Br. at fact that vehicle,” regardless third of wheth party’s indefinite defeats the idea package was the vehi er district had dominion over that Omni “borrowed” Cal.Rptr. cle. Id. at purpose. this characterized district Westfield other case we considered West- “eonfer[ing] of “borrow” as definition Supervi- v. Board was Schroeder field regardless possession. of actual benefit” University, sors Louisiana State Young, Ins. Co. Westfield 1991). (La. That court So. 2d (E.D. *2 Ky. Nov. WL interpreted to mean “not “borrow” bor- the benefit of the one receives start, in Westfield, To we noted even use, rowed that the bor- object’s but also rejected Swearinger California courts have temporary possession, rower do- receives *6 minority jurisdic is a view other minion, thing.” or of the use control the 12-6523, Westfield, slip op. tions. No. at 3. insured, definition, Under this the named instance, For in American International not “borrow” an automobile university, did Insurance Co. American Underwriters got when a an driv- student into accident Co., Liability Guarantee and Insurance ing a to run an errand for a fellow student 616, 629-30, 105 181 Cal. 4th Cal. App. school Id. at 344. situa- administrator. (Cal. 2010), Rptr.3d App. the Cali Ct. tion, stated, similar to the court was commented, “In Appeals fornia Court of pick pre- to person “usfing] up his auto view, Swearinger our the decision is based ” scription for sick friend”—the driver inadequate an of ‘borrow’ definition “may significant confer benefit not opinion because the did address invalid, say but no that one would requirement prior Supreme California bedridden friend borrowed the had that the “exer decisions borrower Similarly Id. at 346. the errand.” requisite cised control dominion and here, honoring while been Omni have over Id. [vehicle] ‘borrower’[.]” its the benefit from the package, severance (citing King, Co. v. Cal. Home Indem. accident Mercedes’s use at time 803, 813-14, Cal.Rptr. 3d 670 P.2d herself, (Cal. only accrued was to Davida who 1983)); City Ange see Los but running personal errand California at App. les v. 4th Allianz Ins. Cal. (Cal. Westfield, the time of See No. the accident. App. Cal.Rptr.3d Ct. (“The 12-6523, 2004) College re- slip op. at 4 (suggesting that “the use of the vehi ... ceived a from truck cle for benefit purposes insured’s] [the] the [named aid, in its teaching transporta- use as a not constituted the exercise [named insured’s] vehicle”). College.”). tion dominion and control over the and from the Additionally, analy subsequent under the Schroeder have users sis, “temporary posses Omni did not have the initial borrower use the Id. vehicle.” sion, dominion, or control of the use of’ the at 65.

Mercedes at the time of the accident. Omni problem with Mitchell is that headquartered Kentucky, while Davi policy at issue not contain the same entirely da’s use occurred “own, hire, or borrow” language as the using in California. Davida was Mer policy here does. The in Mitchell personal as her Davida vehicle. was as, defined “insured person” longer employed at the by Omni time of 1. any relative; Any You and resident Instead, the accident. she started her in, on, person other or getting while into clothing jewelry own business out of an your insured auto with permis- point. suggests And no record evidence sion; person Any other legally who is package any included entitled to of bodily recover because in- Mercedes, limiting her terms use of or relative, jury you, an your resident allowing demand the occupant your insured auto your argument return Blake’s vehicle. permission. con Omni remained “constructive “right contrast, trol” of had the By Id. at n.l. Omni’s (Appellant direct use of the vehicle” as: defined “You for “insured” cov ‘auto’, 34) is unpersuasive. Br. at See therefore Anyone using ered b. else while (find Westfield, op. slip own, your permission you a covered ‘auto’ College “did have the or borrow....” hire right to direct the truck ... [the] use added).) Thus, (emphasis per the initial did not have an offi [because] may apply permissive mission doctrine policy regarding transportation cial owned, hired, cars that Omni live-project vehicles to and Col But, discussed, borrowed. lege”). such a car. purported Blake seeks to extend Omni’s short, or not pro- Blake’s during as a

status borrower Davida’s em- posed definitions of “borrow” are reason- Kentucky’s ployment through per- “initial able, satisfy the facts of this case do not *7 mission” doctrine. That doctrine deter- any of not a them. Omni was “borrower” mines a use of a “whether non-owner’s the Mercedes at time of the the accident. scope vehicle the exceeds Therefore, is not coverage available under given person.” to that Mitchell v. Allstate Policy. the Co., 2008). (Ky. 244 Ins. 65 It S.W.3d if coverage “allows the use the even B. contemplation vehicle ‘not within the argues Kentucky’s Blake also that parties limita- was outside sup expectations” “reasonable doctrine placed upon grant per- tions initial the finding coverage. a ports gist “The (citing mission.’” Id. at 62 46 In- C.J.S. the is entitled § the doctrine is insured (1993)). that adopting surance 1053 In the reasonably doctrine, all he to the Supreme the Kentucky held, expect provided policy.” to be “as the long initially as permission is vehicle, v. Indiana Ins. given person a a Brown S.W.3d to to insur- 2005). (Ky. Generally, coverage may subsequent princi to extend “pertains ambiguities through language ple alleged users to within the the id., directs, [Policy’s] policy,” a long omnibus as those “[w]here clause as the WHITE, Judge, IIELENE N. Circuit policy, a paid premium has a person to technically should not be read the dissenting. benefits,” Ky. Emp’rs’ paying Mut. avoid only respectfully I issue dissent. (Ky. Ellington, v.

Ins. 459 S.W.3d coverage is Omni was 2015) (citing & Sur. Co. Aetna Cas. v. borrowing the Mercedes from Sulli- Commonwealth, (Ky. S.W.3d 2006)). time of the accident. Curtis expec- vans at the “The doctrine reasonable in conjunction is with the tations testimony estab- uncontroverted Sullivan’s re- ambiguities that should be principle he lishes that and Sharon loaned Mer- cir- to against the order solved drafter specifi- to Omni Omni then technical, com- legalistic cumvent cally a scheduled listed as limit benefits to plex contract which Policy, paying on the Co., 724 Simon v. Cont’l Ins. the insured.” to sub- premium do so. Curtis additional 1986) (quoting R.H. (Ky. S.W.2d Kentucky Registra- Certificate mitted Liability Insurance Long, The Law of disclosing agent, to Selective’s that tion 5.10B). § owned the Curtis and Sharon emphasizes specifical- that “Omni Blake 587.) (PID pre- paying After the additional Selec- ly listed the provid- years, for two Omni mium Policy as automobile” and tive covered the Mer- permission Davida drive ed premium with that “paid commensurate company, Davida left the cedes. Once 36.) But listing[.]” (Appellant Br. at paying premium additional still Omni fact, although going aspect equity Mercedes, allowing on the continued doctrine, does not show another met; to use as that Davida requirement of doctrine is ambiguous. True term “borrow” is v. package. these circum- Under 2003), Raines, (Ky. as S.W.3d stances, jury could find that reasonable 2, 2003) (“The (Apr. amended reasonable borrowing the Mercedes Omni was prem- on the expectation doctrine based ‘is time of the accident. Sullivans policy language ise will construed majority upon by relied cases laymen applies would understand it’ and ambiguous distinguishable. terms— policies Westfield, are (2) susceptible e.g., when is two for a live class- student borrowed truck (cita- interpretations.” reasonable more al- project, and truck’s room owner omitted)). even if we were tions And student to the truck lowed the drive did, find, Swearinger college. Co. Ins. Westfield subject to two reasonable term “borrow” Young, slip op. triggering the interpretations, thus reason- Sept. occurred after The accident doctrine, based *8 expectations able project completed, was the classroom and given, interpre- already there is no reasons of college’s thus after the the vehicle given of “borrow” that have tation could project classroom ended. Id. for the had expectation to a reasonable that Selec- rise that (explaining the “did have coverage tive extend to Davida’s accident. of Nelson’s right the direct the use Thus, expectations the reasonable doctrine project the live was truck after classroom argument. not save Blake’s does Here, jury completed”). a reasonable could IV. find, testimony, that based Curtis’s gained of Omni the use foregoing For the reasons we affirm the when it the Mer- purposes court’s order. its borrowed district Sullivans, Davida, and that Omni the of the Mercedes from return pur- subject any to use the Mercedes for its claims breach of the continued driving agreement. was it as an poses while Davida severance employee employment and after Davida’s jury reasonable could a find Because her package. severance ended that borrowing Omni the Mercedes Schroeder, the the at the court held that the Sullivans time Davida’s university’s receipt accident, a alone was I benefit reverse the district would it not sufficient to that judgment show had borrowed court’s favor Selective. However, given specificity a vehicle from student who was retriev the lack of re- ing faculty ice a school function at garding pack- severance request, point age, at no discovery responses member’s because Omni’s and indi- dominion, possession, over, university have it no control cating and that had control, from, or right to control the use received no benefit Davida’s use accident,1 the vehicle. u Bd. Supervi Schroeder at the time of the Univ., sors La. State So.2d find that Omni jury reasonable could also (La. Here, jury reasonable borrowing could was not the Mercedes at the right find that Omni to control I Accordingly, time of the accident. would proceedings. Mercedes because Davida’s use of the for further remand pursuant to permissive Mercedes was that, if argues also even Selective package that provided Omni coverage, Policy Policy provides condi- Further, paid premium Davida. state-required tions limit such indicating on the vehicle exercised minimum limits Omni failed to degree of some dominion and control over regarding disclose information the loca- recognized some responsi vehicle and tion, driver, and use of the Mercedes. bility. Policy provides that Business Auto Moreover, agree I although Form Coverage any that borrow- “in case of void I temporary, agree must be do not by any fraud time” and “if [Omni] testimony ‘insured’, time, lack of specific or other [Omni] intentionally end date for Davida’s use misrepresents] or conceal[s] fact borrowing means that Omni was concerning ... the covered material ‘auto;’ ‘borrowing’ may an be for [or Omni’s] covered “[A] interest 193-94.) (PID period of time fact indefinite ‘auto.’” This condition is last until to pro- either insured decides later amended an endorsement concealment, return the or the re- in the automobile lender vide that event of mis- fraud, quests representation, 8A on Ins. return.” Couch will Selective § (citing provide coverage up 118:50 Am. Ins. Indem. Co. the minimum limits (PID Corp., liability required Kentucky. Code Elec. P.2d Ariz. (Ct. 1988)). However, 200-01.) App. points Given Curtis’s to no Selective testimony that misrepresentation unrebutted he evidence and Sharon intentional concealment; nothing lent Mercedes to a reasonable the record es- jury requested up- could the Sullivans find could tablishes time, at any have its return list or location after garage demanded dated drivers began using that Omni likewise could have in Cali- demanded Davida *9 meaning drive discovery responses of Omni’s decisions where and how open interpretation, may merely Mercedes and no benefit from her derived trip. shopping mean that control it had over Davida’s sup- Accordingly, fornia. Selective has not grant summary judgment

ported basis.

this reasons,

For I these would reverse judgment in favor of

grant summary proceed- remand further

ings. GARCIA-MORQUECHO,

Blanca

Petitioner, SESSIONS, III, Attorney

Jefferson B.

General, Respondent. Bittner, Amy Melissa Muchnicki & Bitt- 16-4219 Columbus, OH, ner, for Petitioner Appeals, States Court United Stanton, of Immi- John Frederick Office Sixth Circuit. gration Immigration Litigation, Office DC, Litigation, Washington, Respon- 23, 2017 Filed June dent SILER, McKEAGUE, and

BEFORE: WHITE, Judges. Circuit PER CURIAM. Garcia-Morquecho petitions Blanca of an for review order Board (BIA) Immigration Appeals dismissing applica- her denial of her appeal removal, tions asylum, withholding protection Convention (CAT). below, Against set forth Torture As Garcia-Morquecho’s petition for deny review. and citizen

Garcia-Morquecho, native Ecuador, States entered United