after stating tbe case: Tbe defendant contended in this Court, at tbe hearing, tbat tbe certificate of stock tendered by tbe plaintiffs in this suit under the judgment in' tbe other case was not for shares of tbe original issue of $150,000, described in tbe agreement of the parties to the judgment. If this position is open to tbe defendants, in tbe present state of tbe pleadings, proofs, findings, and judgment of tbe court, we would bold against him, in tbe absence of further proof showing tbat it was not a part of tbat issue of stock, for we think tbat tbe proof, as it now stands, tends to show tbat tbe stock is of tbat character. But if there is any doubt of it, tbe most tbat we can say for tbe defendant is tbat it is a controverted question and one for tbe jury to decide, ux3on tbe evidence, at tbe final bearing, tbe usual rule being tbat in such a case tbe injunction, if it is tbe main relief demanded, will be continued to tbe bearing, when tbe truth of tbe matter can be ascertained and justice more certainly and fully administered. Where it will not barm tbe defendant to continue tbe injunction, and may cause great injury to tbe plaintiff, if it is dissolved, tbe court generally
*16
will restrain tlie party until tbe bearing.
McCorkle v. Brem,
As to the other matter, we are of the opinion that the time within which the delivery or tender of the stock was required to be made should be counted, at the earliest, from the signing of the judgment. That was plainly the intention of the parties. The provision is that the stock should be issued to the defendant in this action “within sixty days after final judgment,” and if not done, he should recover the $7,500. There was no final judgment until the judge signed it under the agreement of the parties, although it was to be filed and recorded as of September
*17
term. This is usually inserted in such judgments, but it was not intended thereby to shorten the time within which the tender could be made. The time elapsing between 8 September and 29 September, 1916, cannot be counted against the plaintiffs herein, because there was no judgment during that time, but merely an agreement that a judgment should be entered after the court had adjourned, the terms of which were not even fixed. If the judge had signed the judgment on the sixtieth day after the adjournment, there would have been, under defendant’s contention, no time left for the tender, and it cannot be supposed that it was the purpose to destroy the plaintiffs’ right of tender by the mere fiction of having the judgment filed and recorded as of the term. Besides, the provision for the delivery of the stock was inserted in the judgment signed on 29 September, 1916, and it would not be a reasonable view that it was intended to deduct twenty-three days already past from the sixty days then allowed in the judgment. It was easy to say that the tender should be made within sixty days after the adjournment of court, if that was the agreement, and the other expression was used to indicate that the running time should start from the actual date of signing the judgment instead of the fictitious date by relation to the September term of court. This is the fair and equitable view, we think, and is the natural and reasonable construction of the stipulation in the judgment. The object in having the judgment filed and recorded as of the term was to give it the form of regularity, rather than to curtail the stipulated time for tendering the stock. “The rendition of a judgment is the judicial act of the court in pronouncing the sentence of the law upon the facts in controversy as ascertained by the pleadings and verdict, the entry of it being a ministerial act which consists in spreading it upon the record.” 23 Cyc., 835. The distinction between the rendition of a final judgment and the recording of it is clearly stated and applied in
Uhe v. R. R.,
The result is that there was no error in the decision of the court.
Affirmed.