26 A. 257 | R.I. | 1893
The plaintiff sued in trespass and ejectment for a piece of land, occupied by the defendant as tenant under Samuel G. Babcock, claiming title under a deed from the heirs of Rowse Babcock, dated October 1, 1887, conveying to him the Dixon House estate, so called, in Westerly. At that time a solid brick wall stood upon the easterly line of the piece of land in question, separating it from the hotel estate, but said piece of land was owned by the plaintiff's grantors, at the time of their deed to him, subject to a right of way over it, previously granted by deed to Joseph H. Lewis, a predecessor in title of the defendant. On the west of said piece of land was a lot which said Lewis owned in fee. The description in the plaintiff's deed, so far as it relates to this case, is as follows: "Thence northerly bounded westerly by land of Joseph H. Lewis, land of Edward W. Babcock and land of the grantors to point and place of beginning." If this is a straight line from point to point, it excludes the land sued for and the plaintiff has no title to it; if it goes to the land owned by Joseph H. Lewis, by the necessary angles, the plaintiff has title and has the right to recover:
The plaintiff claimed that the words "bounded westerly by the land of Joseph H. Lewis," should be construed to mean *204 land owned by Lewis in fee; while the defendant claimed that the course being northerly the line should be straight; and, also that the deed being ambiguous, because it might refer to land in possession of Lewis as well as to land owned by him, the intention of the parties could be proved by parol. The court below construed the deed to carry all the grantors' land up to the land owned by Lewis and refused to admit parol evidence of intention, rendering judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant now petitions for a new trial upon the ground that these rulings were erroneous.
The line referred to as "northerly" does not run due north but northeasterly. Evidently then it was only used as a line of general direction. Such a line must always yield to a visible monument or to any other description which locates it with reasonable certainty. Irwin v. Towne,
The plain meaning of the words "land of," is land belongingto or owned by the person named. It is hardly conceivable that men would use these words, either colloquially or technically, in relation to land over which one simply had an easement of way. The description in the deed therefore is definite and unambiguous and parol evidence cannot be admitted to give it a different meaning. Ames v. Hilton,
The cases cited by the defendant do not controvert this rule. Aside from those relating to contracts, they all agree that references to monuments, which are certain, must control in the construction of a deed as the surest indication of the intention of the parties and that resort can be had to parol testimony only when such monuments are uncertain or ambiguous in applying the deed to the land. Thus, Atkinson's Lessee v. Cummins, 9 How. U.S. 479; Owen v. Bartholomew, 9 Pick. 520; Stone v.Clark, 1 Metc. 378; Frost v. Spaulding, 19 Pick. 445;Clark v. Munyan, 22 Pick. 410; and Macdonald v. Morrill,
Petition dismissed.