637 N.Y.S.2d 897 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1996
—Order insofar as appealed from unanimously reversed on the law without costs and motion denied in part. Memorandum: Supreme Court granted the motion of petitioner, Karen Seekings, individually and as parent and natural guardian of her daughter, Christina, to file a late notice of claim. Respondents contend that the court erred with
To commence a tort action against a school district, a notice of claim must be served within 90 days after the claim accrues (Education Law § 3813 [2]; General Municipal Law § 50-e [1]). A court may extend the 90-day period, but such extension "shall not exceed the time limited for the commencement of an action by the claimant” (Education Law § 3813 [2-a]; General Municipal Law § 50-e [5]; Peek v Williamsville Bd. of Educ., 221 AD2d 919). The time limited for commencement of a tort action against a school district is one year and 90 days after the claim accrues (General Municipal Law § 50-i [1]). CPLR 214-c (3) provides that a claim or action for personal injuries caused by the latent effects of exposure to any substance is “deemed to have accrued on the date of discovery of the injury * * * or on the date when through the exercise of reasonable diligence the injury should have been discovered, whichever is earlier.” " '[Discovery of the injury’ does not depend upon discovery of the cause of the injury” (Johnson v Ashland Oil, 195 AD2d 980, 981). Thus, “[i]t is not necessary that the plaintiff be informed that his injury was caused by a particular chemical before the limitations’ period begins to run” (Crossman v Harding Indus. Tool, 222 AD2d 1081, 1082; see, Sweeney v General Print., 210 AD2d 865, lv denied 85 NY2d 808).
Because Christina exhibited the symptoms in September 1992, which were ultimately diagnosed as "environmentally