255 Pa. 11 | Pa. | 1916
Opinion by
In this action of trespass, Louis Seeherman and Eosie Seeherman, his wife, sought to recover from The Wilkes-Barre Company, a corporation engaged in' the manufacture and sale of electricity, damages for tfye death of their son, Isidor Seeherman, which it was alleged re-suited from the negligence of defendant.
It appears from the evidence that a barn on the premises of plaintiffs was lighted by electricity furnished by defendant. A lamp in the middle of the building, hung from the ceiling, and a switch beside the door controlled the light. On the evening of July 21, 1913, about half-past seven, plaintiffs’ son, Isidor, who was then fifteen years old, went to the barn, accompanied by a younger brother, for the purpose of attending to the horses. They turned on the light as they went in. The brother came out first and as Isidor attempted to turn the switch, to extinguish the light, he received a shock which killed him. It was alleged that the accident was due to the unsafe condition of a transformer, an instrument attached to a pole near plaintiffs’ premises, the purpose of which was to reduce the dangerous current of electricity passing through the main wire, to a safe current to be introduced into houses and all places for lighting purposes, —the reduction being from a voltage of 2,300 to 110. Plaintiffs- relied, however, on the doctrine of res ipsa
The sixth assignment of error is to the refusal of the trial judge to withdraw a juror and continue the case on account of alleged improper remarks of plaintiffs’ counsel in his closing speech to the jury. He admits that he said that defendant’s negligence “might have justified a verdict of manslaughter in a prosecution (against the officers of defendant company) for criminal neglect.” There was no warrant for making such a statement, and its only purpose must have been to excite the prejudice of the jury. When the remark was brought to the attention of the court, counsel not only failed to withdraw it, but said: “I reiterate it now.” The very least that
Complaint is also made that the instructions to the jury as to the measure of damages, were not sufficiently definite. In the general charge the trial judge did not limit the jury to the present worth of the sum at which the son’s services were valued. But when his attention was called to the omission he gave further instructions that, in estimating the value of future services, the jury could allow only the present worth of the sum which they might find to be the value of those services. This was practically all that was required, although the instructions might well have been more explicit in defining the elements to be considered. As an example of such definition, in Hockenberry v. New Castle Electric Co., 251 Pa. 394, Mr. Justice Stewart said (p. 399) : “What the wife would have received out of the wages of her husband was, of course, an element to be considered and determined, but only as basis for capitalization in a'sum which would represent present value, She could have received a share in the wages only as the wages were earned; the verdict would be for a demand presently payable, the exact equivalent of the anticipated sum.” In the present case, had the son lived, his earnings would have come in from year to year during his minority. In order to ascertain the equivalent of these amounts, in
The fourth, fifth, and sixth assignments of error are sustained, and the judgment is reversed, with a venire facias de novo.