127 Minn. 416 | Minn. | 1914
Lead Opinion
Action to determine adverse claims to four lots in -St. Paul. Defendant Young answered, setting up tbe pendency of a former action for tbe same cause, and alleging ownership in berself. Tbe trial •court sustained tbe defense of former action pending, and dismissed tbe case. Plaintiff moved for findings on tbe merits. Tbe motion was denied, and judgment of dismissal entered. Plaintiff appealed.
Plaintiff contends: (1) Tbat there was no evidence to sustain tbe finding tbat tbe former action, which was a proceeding by Young to register her title under tbe Torrens Act, was ever instituted; (2) tbat tbe evidence did not show tbat tbe proceeding was still pending; (3) tbat tbe pendency of a registration proceeding does not in any event operate to abate a subsequent action by a party thereto to determine adverse claims.
Tbe facts necessary to an understanding of tbe points involved are as follows: Tbe present action was commenced July 12, 1913. On tbe trial plaintiff introduced evidence making a prima facie case of title in himself. Defendant offered no evidence tending to show any title, but did offer in evidence “No. 1122 of tbe registration files of this (district) court, being tbe application of Margaret Young to register tbe title to the lots in question.” There was an objection on tbe ground tbat tbe offered evidence did not show another action pending between tbe same parties. Upon an examination of tbe files offered it appeared tbat tbe application was filed October 25, 1910, tbat tbe proceeding was referred to tbe examiner of titles, who reported tbat tbe title of tbe applicant was proper for registration and recommended tbat Eobert Seeger, plaintiff herein, and certain others be made parties. A petition for summons and an order directing tbe issuance of tbe same, dated November 29, 1910, appeared in tbe files, all in due form. There also appeared an answer of Eobert Seeger filed May 12, 1913, in
In Merriam v. Baker, 9 Minn. 28, 31 (40), this court expounded tbe principle underlying tbe rule of abatement for another suit pending as follows:
“The great end to be subserved by tbe rule which recognizes tbe plea of another action pending between tbe same parties, for tbe same cause of action, as a good defense, is to prevent a party from being barrassed by a multiplicity of suits for tbe same cause of action, and that be may not be compelled to maintain tbe issues on bis part in any action so long as they are in possession of another tribunal competent to determine such issues, where they may be disposed of. We believe tbe true test in such cases (where there is no question as to tbe identity of tbe issues involved) is tbe existence of such an action in any court or tribunal having jurisdiction*420 of tbe subject-matter of the controversy; and that the plea is maintained if such court or other tribunal have authority to entertain such a cause of action.”
In full accord with the above the rule itself was declared in Disbrow Mnfg. Co. v. Creamery Package Mnfg. Co. 115 Minn. 434, 132 N. W. 913:
“But the ultimate inquiry,” said the present Chief Justice, at page 437, after alluding to lack of harmony in the authorities, “seems to be whether a judgment in the first, if one he rendered, would be conclusive upon the parties, in respect to the matters involved in the second action. If so, a plea in abatement should be sustained.”
And again, at page 438:
“Whether it comes within the language of the rule in such cases as technically expressed in the books, the fact that a recovery in the former suit will finally determine the principal issue in both actions, the present action should be abated. * * * It is not essential that the same specific relief be demanded in each action. It is 1 sufficient that the subject-matter of the actions are the same.”
With this authoritative declaration of the rule and, the comprehensive statement of its basic principle, we need only to analyze the proceeding and the action here involved in order to determine the ' point in controversy. The purpose of the Torrens Act is to provide a speedy and summary remedy to settle the title to land (Reed v. Siddall, 94 Minn. 216, 102 N. W. 453; Peters v. City of Duluth, 119 Minn. 96, 106, 137 N. W. 390, 41 L.R.A.[N.S.] 1044); the adverse claims statute has the same object (Dunnell, Minn. PI. § 898), and, though the former is more comprehensive in some respects, the general rules of procedure apply in both (Owsley v. Johnson, 95 Minn. 168, 103 N. W. 903), and, as between applicant and any defendant who subsequently brings action against him to determine the adverse claim of the former against the latter, the issues are identical. Hence a judgment registering applicant’s title, if such should be rendered, would unquestionably “be conclusive upon the parties, in respect to the matters involved in the second action;” and this, regardless of the reversal of the position of the parties in the latter (Disbrow Mnfg. Co. v. Creamery Package Mnfg. Co.
“If the court shall find after hearing that the applicant has not a title proper for registration, an order shall' be entered dismissing the application which may be made without prejudice. The applicant may upon motion dismiss the application at any time before the final decree is entered upon such terms as shall be fixed by the court.”
Undoubtedly, under this section, the court may, in a proper case, dismiss or allow dismissal without prejudice, as in any other action, and must, furthermore, dismiss where applicant fails to establish title, whether because a defendant has established title in himself or otherwise; but what court would, after trial on the merits of a
This conclusion, however, does not determine the appeal, for we must still inquire whether the court erred in applying the rule under the particular circumstances of the case. As we have seen, the reason of the rule is prevention of vexatious litigation. 1 R. C. L. p. 10, § 1. Hence the rule itself “is not one of unbending rigor or of universal application, nor is it a principle of absolute law,” but is “rather a rule of justice and equity, generally applicable, and always so where the two suits are virtually alike and in the same jurisdiction.” 1 Cyc. 22. Moreover, the pendency of the
We hold that the court did not err in abating the action.
Judgment affirmed.
Concurrence Opinion
We concur in the views expressed in the opinion save the conclusion that the action to determine adverse claims should be abated.
Our view of the question is that full and adequate relief cannot be granted a defendant in the Torrens proceeding, and he should not therefore be barred from the right to institute an independent action to determine his title to the property. No judgment affirming title in a defendant can be rendered in that proceeding, and for this reason the remedy is not full and complete. While it is true as stated in the opinion that findings should be made in the Torrens proceeding which, if to the effect that a defendant owns the property, would estop the applicant in another action, or subsequent Torrens proceeding, the defendant in whose favor such finding is made is not entitled to judgment thereon, and, to give effect to the findings, and the resulting estoppel, he must bring a subsequent action in which such judgment may be rendered. He is entitled to a final judgment but cannot get it in the Torrens proceeding. That proceeding should not therefore be held a bar to the second action in which the relief may be granted. Koch v. Peters, 97 Wis. 492, 73 N. W. 25; Carr v. Lyle, 126 Mich. 655, 86 N. W. 145; Reis v. Applebaum, 170 Mich. 506, 136 N. W. 393; Pratt v. Howard, 109 Iowa, 504, 80 N. W. 546. The proper practice in such case would seem a stay of the second action until the final determination of the Torrens proceeding, and not an absolute abatement.