Sedunova v. City of New York, 652 F. App'x 29

652 F. App'x 29

2d Cir.

2016

Natasha SEDUNOVA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, Matthew Collins, Michael Hopkins, Defendants-Appellees, Chris Andy Grary, Angela Myers, John and Jane Does 1-10, (the names of John and Jane Doe being fictitious as the true names are presently unknown), Johne Doe 1-2, John or Jane Doe 3-7, Charles Hynes, Ed Purce, Defendants.

15-681

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

June 15, 2016

Corrected June 29, 2016

For substantially the reasons discussed above, and those explained in the district court‘s opinion, the ALJ‘s RFC finding was supported by substantial evidence, including: Dr. Kamin‘s opinion; Dr. Dawood‘s treatment notes; the treatment notes of Ms. Goodrich; Camille‘s daily activity reports; and Camille‘s credible testimony.⁵

For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in Camille‘s other arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

15-681

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

June 15, 2016

Corrected June 29, 2016

ported by extensive X-ray evidence, hospital reports, and treatment notes over an 18-month period; and may have been altered by review of the additional medical records containing clinical findings confirming treating physicians’ diagnosis), limited by regulation as stated in Schisler v. Sullivan, 3 F.3d 563 (2d Cir. 1993). While a bit more detailed, Dr. Dawood‘s June 2011 and August 2012 opinions do not differ materially from the October 2011 opinion, which Dr. Kamin did review: all three opined that Camille had limitations related to concentration, persistence, social interaction, and adaption, and that he was unable to work. R. at 290-91, 376-78, 385-87.

For Appellant: J. Andrew Kent, on the brief, Lincoln Square Legal Services at Fordham Law School, New York, New York. William J. Harrington, Goodwin Procter LLP, New York, New York.

For Appellees: Ingrid R. Gustafson (with Richard Dearing and Devin Slack on the brief), for Zachary W. Carter, New York City Corporation Counsel, New York, New York.

PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, BARRINGTON D. PARKER, REENA RAGGI, Circuit Judges.

SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff Natasha Sedunova appeals from the judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Johnson, J.), dismissing her complaint for failure to state a claim. The complaint alleges, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that NYPD detectives Matthew Collins and Michael Hopkins, and seven John Doe defendants (collectively, the “defendants“) violated her civil rights, specifically, (1) that she was denied a fair trial because her confession was fabricated, and (2) that the knowing use of fabricated evidence constituted a malicious prosecution.

We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim, and we accept all factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. N.J. Carpenters Health Fund v. Royal Bank of Scot. Grp., PLC, 709 F.3d 109, 119 (2d Cir. 2013). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.

1. The plaintiff claims that her confession was fabricated because it was produced as the result of coercive interrogation techniques. When a police officer creates false information likely to influence a jury‘s decision and forwards that information to prosecutors, the accused‘s constitutional right to a fair trial is violated. See Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 124 F.3d 123, 130 (2d Cir. 1997).¹ Failure to administer Miranda warnings alone cannot serve as the basis of a § 1983 action; however, a § 1983 claim may arise if coercion was applied to obtain inculpatory statements, and the statements thereby obtained were used against the plaintiff in a criminal proceeding. Deshawn E. by Charlotte E. v. Safir, 156 F.3d 340, 346 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Weaver v. Brenner, 40 F.3d 527, 535 (2d Cir. 1994)); see also Jocks v. Tavernier, 316 F.3d 128, 138 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Miranda violations, absent coercion, do not rise to the level of constitutional violations actionable under § 1983.“).

A plaintiff alleging coercion must allege more than that police told her she was a suspect, suggested that it would be to her benefit to cooperate, or promised leniency in exchange for cooperation. See United States v. Ruggles, 70 F.3d 262, 265 (2d Cir. 1995). A plaintiff must point to circumstances indicating that she could not make a knowing and voluntary decision. See United States v. Taylor, 745 F.3d 15, 24 (2d Cir. 2014).

The factual allegations in this case, even accepted as true and viewed in the light most favorable to Sedunova, do not amount to coercion sufficient to sustain a § 1983 claim. The salient allegations are that John Does 1 and 2 tried to “convince” her that it would be “better for her” and “good for her” if she confessed to the murder and claimed self-defense, and that she was told that she would be “free to leave” if she confessed. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 32-35. None of the allegations amount to circumstances under which the plaintiff could not make a knowing and voluntary decision.

2. The complaint also alleges that the knowing use of the fabricated confession constituted a malicious prosecution. See Jocks, 316 F.3d at 138. However, as discussed above, the fabrication claim is rejected because the confession was not coerced. The use of the confession therefore was not the use of fabricated evidence.

For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in the plaintiff‘s other arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

Notes

Although Sedunova attempts to plead a fabrication claim, she has not alleged that her confession was forged (she acknowledges that she made the videotaped confession and adopted the written confession), nor has she alleged any other circumstances that lead to a reasonable inference that any defendant knew her confession was false when made. See . Accordingly, we analyze her claim as one alleging violations of the Fifth Amendment under § 1983.

The ALJ used Dr. Kamin‘s opinion as the basis for the RFC but incorporated additional limitations based on, inter alia, the testimony of Camille that she credited. An ALJ may accept parts of a doctor‘s opinion and reject others. ; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2) (“Although we consider opinions from medical sources on issues such as ... your residual functional capacity ... the final responsibility for deciding these issues is reserved to the Commissioner.“).

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