233 F. 514 | 9th Cir. | 1916
Lead Opinion
(after stating the facts as above). The appellant contends that the court erred in sustaining the exceptions of the defendants: To the finding of the special master that the deed of trust operated to enable the Staats Company to obtain a preference; to the finding that the deed of trust was executed to secure an antecedent debt, and that the transaction between the Stilson Company, bankrupt, and the Staats Company, was not a single transaction; to the finding that the 60 shares of stock had been hypothecated by the bankrupt prior to the execution of the trust deed; and to the finding that the Staats Company, at the time of the execution >of the deed of trust, had reasonable cause to believe that a preference was intended.
The history of the transaction involved, as gathered from the evidence, is in accord with the findings of the special master, and may be briefly stated as follows: The Stilson Company was adjudged a bankrupt on October 24, 1912, upon an involuntary-petition filed on July 2, 1912. The particular act which was made the basis of the adjudication in bankruptcy was that about March 14, 1912, while the Stilson Company was insolvent, it conveyed certain of its real property in Los Angeles to the William R. Staats Company with intent to hinder and delay the creditors of the Stilson Company, and with intent to prefer the Staats Company over other creditors of the bankrupt. In due course of proceedings in the bankruptcy court, it was there found that on March 15, 1912, the Stilson Company was indebted in the sum of more than $250,000, and that it had at that time assets of no greater value than $215,000, and that on the 19th of March, when insolvent, the Stilson Company had conveyed the realty heretofore referred to to the Staats Company, then a creditor of the Stilson Company, with intent to prefer the Staats Company over its other creditors, and that the effect of the transfer was to enable the Staats Company to receive payment of a greater percentage of its debt than any other unsecured creditor of the bankrupt.
In the present suit it was found by the special master, and the evidence well sustains the finding, that on March 15, 1912, the Stilson Company, in due course of business, bought from the Staats Company 200 shares of Amalgamated Oil Company stock at $64.50 per share. The Staats Company delivered certificates representing 60 shares, and gave a broker’s duebill for 140 shares for subsequent delivery. On that day, March 15th, the bankrupt, to pay for the shares, gave its check for $12,900 to the Staats Company, payable at the Citizens’ National Bank of Los Angeles, but on presentation of the check to the bank it was rejected for want of funds and was returned. On March 16th, Mr. Jardine, vice president of the Staats Company, had a talk with Mr. F. J. Stilson, president of the Stilson Company, concerning the rejected check, and was told by Stilson .that the check would be made good, and Stilson asked that it be put through the bank again. On Monday, March 18th, the check was again presented at the bank, but rejected, and thereafter, again, on the 18th of March, Stilson, of the Stilson Company, asked an officer of the Staats Company to put it through the bank once more; but again it was rejected by the bank for want of funds to the credit of the
The evidence also sustains the finding to the effect that the ducbill for the 140 shares which had been given by the Staats Company to the Stilson Company, and the 60 shares also, had been hypothecated by the Stilson Company, and there is no evidence to show that, when the Staats Company agreed to give the Stilson Company time to obtain the money wherewith to meet its obligations, there was any 'suggestion of holding onto the stock which the Staats Company had sold to the S'tilson Company. The Staats Company, with full knowledge of the rejection of the check, and without any then apparent thought of retaining a lien on the shares, expressly agreed with the Stilson Company to wait and again to put the check through the bank, and did so twice after it had first been rejected.
We agree with the special master in holding that, when the Staats Company accepted the mortgage, it was in lieu of cash, and that the transaction became one where the debtor, to secure an existing antecedent debt due by it to the creditor, gave security, and the creditor, confirming the sale, accepted the security. We do not think that the transaction can be looked upon as a new and present advancement to the Stilson Company; it was a sale and delivery of the 60 shares of stock, and they became part of the general assets of the Stilson Company. The evidence shows that the effect of the enforcement of the mortgage given by the Stilson Company when insolvent would be to give to the defendant the Staats Company a greater percentage of its claim against the bankrupt than other creditors of the same class, and under the facts the bankrupt must be held to have given a preference by the giving of such security to the Staats Company.
Our further view is the evidence sustains the finding of the special master to the effect that, when the S'taats Company received the trust deed from the Stilson Company, it had reasonable cause to believe that it was intended to give a preference. There is ample evidence to show that the Staats Company must have known of the
Finally, we believe that the Staats Company became a general creditor of the bankrupt, and that the transaction was broken in its continuity when the Staats Company agreed to wait for' its money and .to send the check through the bank the second and third time, and when it agreed to wait to see whether the bankrupt would obtain money which its agents said was expected from the sale of certain other* property, no effort having been made by the Staats Company to prevent the shares of stock which had been sold and delivered to the Stilson Company from passing out of the hands of the Stilson Company. That part of the argument made by tire appellee in support of the action of the District Court wherein the point is made that the giving of the check by the Stilson Company was a representation that that corporation had sufficient funds to meet the check, and that, such representation not being true, a fraud was perpetrated on the Staats Company, and that title remained in the Staats Company, and did not pass until the note and deed of trust were accepted, has received our careful consideration. But whatever right of rescission existed because of misrepresentation by the Stilson Company in giving the check was abandoned by the position taken when security was accepted for the purchase money. Joslin v. Cowee, 52 N. Y. 90; Amer v. Hightower, 70 Cal. 440, 11 Pac. 697; Wendling Lumber Company v. Glenwood Lumber Company, 153 Cal. 411, 95 Pac. 1029.
The order of the District Court, sustaining the exceptions to the report of the special master and dismissing the bill, is reversed, and the cause is remanded, with directions to overrule the exceptions to the report of the master and to enter a judgment in favor of the complainant.
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Rehearing
On Motion for Rehearing.
We have given attentive examination to the appellees’ motipn and brief for rehearing. Stress is laid by the appellees upon the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Bailey, Trustee, v. Baker Ice Machine Company, 239 U. S. 268, 36 Sup. Ct. 50, 60 L. Ed. 275. But the facts of that case are very different from those here involved. The statement by Justice Van Devanter shows that
Motion for rehearing is denied.
