46 Ind. App. 212 | Ind. Ct. App. | 1910
Appellant is a life insurance company, organized under the laws of the State of New York, and having its principal offices in said state.
Having complied with the laws of this State, authorizing it to do life insurance business here, appellant and appellee Prankel, on September 6, 1902, entered into a contract, whereby said Prankel was appointed as the company’s general agent to solicit and effect insurance for it in this State, and he was thereby invested with power to appoint sub-agents throughout the State, and was authorized, upon the approval by the company of applications secured by him, to collect the first premiums therefor, and deliver policies to the insured on behalf of the company. By the terms of this contract, all moneys received or collected by Prankel were to be remitted to the company, as often as required by it, and it was his duty to turn the money over to the company or any authorized officer or agent thereof, whenever required in writing so to do.
The contract provided that appellee Prankel was to have
The contract provided that the failure or neglect of Prankel to make reports or to pay over on demand the money in his hands belonging tov'the company, according to the rules and regulations governing agents, should terminate the agency. It also provided that either party might, for just and reasonable cause, terminate the contract, by giving thirty days’ notice to the other.
At the same time, by a supplemental agreement between the parties, it was provided that if at the expiration of one year from the date of the contract Prankel so desired, the company would appoint him its collector for the State of Indiana, and for his services in collecting premiums would pay him three per cent of the premiums collected. Subsequently, on July 28, 1903, Prankel was appointed by appellant as its collector, and authorized to collect and receive annual premiums upon its policies outstanding in this State, for which he was to receive the designated compensation, which appointment, by its terms, was revocable at the pleasure of the company.
Subsequently, by agreement, the original contract between the parties was modified, so that the territory covered was limited to certain counties in the State. Under this contract, appellee Prankel entered upon the duties of his agency, and continued in appellant’s service thereunder until his author
The terms of the contract also required appellee Frankel to give bond to appellant’s approval, to secure the faithful performance of the duties of his agency; and, in compliance with this provision of the contract, Frankel and appellee American Surety Company of New York executed their bond, in the penalty of $1,000, to appellant, conditioned for the faithful discharge by Frankel of the obligations imposed upon him by the contract.
This action was brought by appellant against appellees on the bond, to recover for money charged to have been received by Frankel, as appellant’s said agent, and which he failed and refused to pay over to the company on demand. To appellant’s complaint, the surety company answered by a general denial. Appellee Frankel filed a counterclaim, in which he charged that appellant wrongfully revoked his authority as such agent, and thereby violated the terms of the contract. He claimed damages for the breach.
Appellant’s demurrer to the first paragraph of this counterclaim was overruled. It answered in four paragraphs, to which said appellee replied in two paragraphs, appellant’s demurrer to the second paragraph of the reply being overruled. A trial was had, and upon request the court made a special finding of facts, and stated conclusions of law thereon, 'to each of which appellant excepted. Appellant’s motion for a new trial being overruled, judgment was rendered on the finding in favor of appellees.
A reversal is claimed in this court on the ground, among other things, that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain the special finding of facts made by the court.
It appears from the evidence and the special findings that in March, 1903, the president of appellant company authorized, so far as he had power so to do, appellee Frankel to take notes payable to himself for the first year’s premiums on policies issued by the-company upon applications pro
It appears that at the time this demand was received by Frankel, the check for $750 drawn by him in favor of the company, and forwarded with his report, as before stated, had not been presented to the bank for payment; that for the purpose of preventing its payment Frankel drew from the bank upon which it was drawn his funds on deposit therein, and the payment of the check w;as, for this reason, protested. He failed and refused either to make a report to the company, or pay over to it the funds in his hands belonging to it, as demanded.
It further appears that at the time Frankel made his report, dated May 10, 1905, and at the time of receiving this demand from the company for a report and for the payment of funds belonging to the company, the extent of uncollected notes taken by Frankel for premiums on policies issued by the company amounted to $664.71; that the company was indebted to Frankel in the sum of $231.54 on account of other matters; that, upon 'the failure of Frankel to comply, with the company’s demand that he make a report to it and pay over funds belonging to it, as aforesaid, on July 12,
“Whenever the insurance in force to the credit of this contract * * * equals $100,000, then upon second and subsequent years’ premiums, as collected by the party of the first part, under the terms of this contract, there will be allowed and paid to the party of the second part a renewal commission of seven per cent on said participating policies, such commissions to continue so long as $100,000 insurance upon participating policies written under the terms and conditions of this contract remain in force. ’ ’
The theory upon which it is apparent the court based its finding, that the company was indebted to Frankel on ae-„ count of future premiums, was that the company had wrongfully revoked Frankel’s authority to act as its agent, and that it was competent to consider the present worth of the sums contracted to be paid to Frankel in the future,' out of the renewal premiums, in estimating damages for such breach of the contract.
The judgment of the court below is reversed, and a new trial ordered.