Hypertrophy is the pathologic “overgrowth ... of an organ or part ... resulting from unusually steady or severe use_” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1114 (1981). Metaphor-ists seem to find the condition irresistible. Thus, hypertrophy has been used as a partial explanation for the collapse of entire intellectual systems, e.g., Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2d ed. 1970), and detailed mechanical intellectual artifacts, e.g., Posner, Goodbye to the Bluebook, 54 U.Chi.L.Rev. 1343 (1986). We succumb today to the same temptation, for we find the metaphor especially apt in discussing the rampant growth of the civil docket in the United States.
We need not belabor the point. Increased resort to the courts, and the consequent tumefaction of already-swollen court calendars, have received considerable attention, see, e.g., Heydebrand & Seron, The Rising Demand For Court Services, 11 Just.Sys.J. 303 (1986); Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 Md.L. Rev. 3 (1986); Lieberman, The Litigation Society (1981), so we merely note the phenomenon and do not comment further upon it. We focus instead on arbitration, a contractual device that relieves some of the organic pressure by operating as a shunt, allowing parties to resolve disputes outside of the legal system. Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA or Act), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982), to help legitimate arbitration and make it more readily useful to disputants. The hope has long been that the Act could serve as a therapy for the ailment of the crowded docket. As might be expected, there is a rub: the patient, and others in interest, often resist the treatment.
I
We are asked to decide today if certain regulations, Mass.Regs.Code tit. 950, §§ 12.204(G)(l)(a)-(c) (Regulations), set forth in the appendix hereto, are preempted by the FAA. The Regulations are part of a set which governs the conduct of those who sell securities in the Commonwealth. The provisions at issue were promulgated at one time. Neither party suggested to the district court that any of the provisions might be severable, so we treat them as a unit for purposes of our preemption analysis.
See Clauson v. Smith,
The contracts to which the Regulations apply implicate interstate and international commerce, as well as the instrumentalities of that commerce, thus subjecting them to the reach of the FAA.
See
9 U.S.C. § 1;
see generally Societe Generale de Surveillance, S.A. v. Raytheon European Management and Systems Co.,
*1117 The Regulations not only regulate; they do so in a manner patently inhospitable to arbitration. They (i) bar firms from requiring individuals to enter PDAAs as a nonnegotiable condition precedent to account relationships, § 12.204(G)(1)(a); (ii) order the prohibition brought “conspicuously” to the attention of prospective customers, § 12.204(G)(1)(b); and (iii) demand full written disclosure of “the legal effect of the pre-dispute arbitration contract or clause,” § 12.204(G)(1)(c).
In Massachusetts, regulation of securities falls within the province of the Secretary of State, who superintends the Securities Division. Immediately upon adoption of the Regulations in September 1988, the Securities Industry Association and ten brokerage firms affiliated with it
1
sued in federal district court seeking a declaration that the Regulations were unconstitutional because they conflicted with the provisions and policies of the FAA. SIA also sought a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the Regulations. The suit named the Secretary of State and the director of the Securities Division (appellants before us) as defendants. Claiming that the Commonwealth had power to issue the Regulations as part of its concurrent authority to regulate securities transactions,
see
Mass. Gen.L. ch. 110A, §§ 201, 204 (1984) (governing registration of broker-dealers), appellants stood their ground. Cross-motions for summary judgment were eventually filed. In due’ course, the district court granted declaratory and injunctive relief in appellees’ favor.
Securities Indus. Ass’n v. Connolly,
II
A
The Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the federal Constitution prevents the states from impinging overmuch on federal law and policy.
See Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC,
We have acknowledged before that “[t]he concept of implied preemption has a certain protean quality,” a circumstance which tends to defeat courts’ efforts to establish tidy creedal subcategories.
French,
Whatever labels may be affixed, the pivot upon which our inquiry turns remains constant: where Congress has failed explicitly to detail the dimensions of displacement, courts must decide if “the state law disturbs too much the congressionally declared scheme....”
Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
B
Here, then, the critical inquiry is whether the FAA is an enactment which Congress meant to remain relatively unfettered; and if so, whether the Regulations intrude impermissibly. We approach our task mindful both that interpretation of a statute’s meaning must start with the text itself,
United States v. James,
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2. The language sweeps broadly and brooks little reservation. We must, therefore, be chary of a narrowing construction, lest such an interpretive modality clog the channel Congress has opened.
See Volt,
Reluctance to shrink the scope of section 2 seems particularly well advised given the Supreme Court’s resounding endorsement of the “ordinary language” technique in construing the FAA.
See, e.g., Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.,
C
Because the language of the Act seems clear, and its meaning plain, we are not obliged to plumb the Congress’s collective consciousness to ascertain legislative intent.
James,
In recent decades, the Supreme Court has faced a number of disputes involving the FAA. In case after case, the Justices have read the Act’s legislative history with an avuncular eye; as the court below perspicaciously observed, “[r]ecent history has found the Supreme Court offering endorsements of the arbitration process by expansive statements of the intent of Congress in passing the Federal Arbitration Act.”
Congress, we are told, enacted the FAA to relieve parties from what, even two-thirds of a century ago, was characterized as “ ‘the costliness and delays of litigation.’ ”
Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd,
In sum, the legislative history of the FAA, like its text, indicates that the courts must receive the Act hospitably and defend its mechanisms vigilantly and with some fervor.
D
The metaphors used to describe the Court’s interpretations are somewhat varied, but their common denominator is a principle of rigorous equality under 9 U.S.C. § 2.
3
Given this interpretive model,
*1120
and the statute’s twofold use of the term “any” — it is, after all, “difficult to imagine broader language,”
James,
Appellants conceded before the district court,
In creating a body of substantive law covering arbitration, Congress barred the states from making determinations about arbitration contracts that the states remained free to make about, say, used car sales.
Perry,
That is not to say that a state can do nothing about a perceived problem. The Commonwealth’s powers remain great, so long as used evenhandedly. The FAA does not prohibit judicial relief from arbitration contracts which are shown to result from fraud or enormous (unfair) economic imbalance of the sort sufficient to avoid con
*1121
tracts of all types.
5
Rodriguez de Quijas,
E
Appellants also urge us to find that, notwithstanding the general rule, Congress carved out an exception to the Act by permitting states concurrently to regulate securities transactions. We need not linger long over this asseveration. The Court has recently addressed the theoretical overlap between securities regulation and the FAA, holding that claims under section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §
77l
(2), could be the subjects of arbitration.
Rodriguez de Quijas,
Starting with the premise that the FAA was intended to have the full breadth apparent from its plain language, the Court noted that the 1934 Act “provides no basis for disfavoring agreements to arbitrate statutory claims by skewing the otherwise hospitable inquiry into arbitrability.”
McMahon,
Simply put, nothing in the Securities Act, the Exchange Act, or the grant of concurrent power to the states to regulate securities manifests a congressional intent to limit or prohibit waiver of a judicial forum for a particular claim, or to abridge the sweep of the FAA.
Rodriguez de Quijas,
Nor are we willing to infer implicit congressional approval of the Commonwealth’s policy simply because the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) has adopted rules,
see
17 C.F.R. § 180.3 (1988), not dissimilar in spirit from the Massachusetts regulations. The same holds true of recent Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) activities, including the SEC’s approval of rules submitted by three self-regulatory organizations requiring brokers to discuss customers’ rights under mandatory arbitration agreements and to include language in arbitration clauses informing customers that they are waiving judicial fora.
See
Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes, 54 Fed.Reg. 21,144 (1989). Both CFTC’s rulemaking and the SEC’s acquiescence are products of federal, not state, authority. That is a critical distinction.
See McMahon,
We go one extra step. If Congress meant to exempt the regulation of securities from the FAA’s sphere of influence, “such an intent ‘will be deducible from [the statute’s] text or legislative history,’ or from an inherent conflict between arbitration and the statute’s underlying purpose.”
McMahon,
The long and short of it is that we can find no evidence of a clear congressional command to override the unambiguous proarbitration mandate of the FAA in the securities field.
Ill
A
Ordinarily, our determination that the Regulations conflict with the requirement that arbitration contracts be treated on a par with contracts generally would end the matter. Here, however, there is a further wrinkle. On their face, the Regulations do not govern PDAAs at all. Rather, they purport to address broker-dealers who would require customers to sign PDAAs. This difference, appellants tell us, is determinative.
The dialectic is too clever by half. Even if we grant the claim that a contract made in the face of such an ethical order to a contracting party would be enforceable — a claim open to considerable doubt, and upon
*1123
which we express no opinion
7
— the Regulations would still be preempted. Without recognizing it, appellants appear to have trapped themselves in a trick box. As the district court noted and documented, uncon-scionability is the standard for voluntariness in Massachusetts.
State law need not clash head on with a federal enactment in order to be preempted. If state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purpose and objectives of Congress,” it must topple.
Sckneidewind,
In this instance, we conclude as a matter of law that the Regulations actually conflict with the FAA and the federal policy embedded therein. The Regulations leave no room for speculation: it is unarguable from their wording that they derive their essential meaning from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue. As the district court noted, the Commonwealth’s wistful assertion that the Regulations are not addressed to the validity and enforceability of PDAAs “can be maintained only by assuming that no provision of state law other than one directly governing contract validity or enforceability comes within the preemptive reach of the Arbitration Act.”
The Regulations must also fall because they are at odds with the policy which infuses the FAA. The power to suspend a license is much more than a shift in costs; it is the economic equivalent of the death penalty. The worry that requiring a PDAA might forfeit a firm’s ability to function as a broker-dealer at all is an obstacle of greater proportions even than the chance that, in a given dispute, an arbitration agreement might be declared void. To the extent that the substantive state policy to foster “ethical” broker-dealers, embodied in the Regulations here at issue, conflicts with the federal policy to “favor[] arbitration agreements,”
Moses Cone,
B
A policy designed to prevent one party from enforcing an arbitration contract or provision by visiting a penalty on that party is, without much question, contrary to the policies of the FAA. But, there is at least one other way in which the Massachusetts policy would erode the goals of the Act. The Regulations are aimed at nonnegotiable “standard-form” PDAAs. Arbitration is a positive good in the eyes of courts and Congress not just because it relieves crowded calendars, but because it relieves an often unnecessary elaboration of social practices. As the Court has stated, resort to arbitration “trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.”
Mitsubishi Motors,
IV
The Commonwealth may well be correct that PDAAs ought to be arrived at with greater negotiation and disclosure between broker-dealers and customers than currently takes place. That judgment, however, is not the Commonwealth’s to make, at least in its current embodiment, for it singles out arbitration in an impermissible way. The states are forbidden from critical scrutiny expressed in a fashion which might mask historic hostility toward arbitration. Congress sought to avoid having that possibility come to fruition, choosing instead to emphasize and endorse arbitral efficiencies. That value judgment was within the congressional domain — and only Congress, not the states, may create exceptions to it.
That is not to say, of course, that a state must permit broker-dealers to sail as close to the wind as their consciences (or lack thereof) might permit. Massachusetts has a plenitude of lawful weapons in its ethical armamentarium to preserve the integrity of the securities business as conducted in the Commonwealth and to protect consumers. Cf
., e.g., Volt,
*1125 We need go no further. 10 The judgment of the district court must be
Affirmed.
APPENDIX
12.204: Denial, Revocation, Suspension, Cancellation, and Withdrawal of Registration
[(a)(1) through (a)(2)(F): Reserved]
(G) Dishonest or unethical practices in the securities business.
1. Broker-dealers. Each broker-dealer shall observe high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade in the conduct of its business. Act and practices, including but not limited to the following, are considered contrary to such standards and constitute dishonest or unethical practices which are grounds for denial, suspension or revocation of registration or such other action authorized by law:
a. Requiring on or after January 1, 1989, that a customer located in Massachusetts, other than a customer that is an institutional investor or financial institution specified in950 CMR 14 .-401(e), execute either a mandatory pre-dispute arbitration contract or a customer agreement containing a mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clause that is a non-negotiable precondition to effecting transactions in securities for the account of the customer or opening a securities cash account or margin account by the customer with such broker-dealer;
b. Requesting on or after January 1, 1989, that a customer located in Massachusetts execute either a mandatory pre-dispute arbitration contract or a customer account agreement containing a pre-dispute arbitration clause where the contract or agreement fails to conspicuously disclose that the execution of the contract or agreement cannot be made a non-negotiable precondition to the opening by the customer of a securities account with the broker-dealer;
c. Requesting on or after January 1, 1989, that a customer located in Massachusetts execute either a mandatory pre-dispute arbitration contract or a customer account agreement containing a pre-dispute arbitration clause without fully disclosing to the customer in writing the legal effect of the pre-dispute arbitration contract or clause;
d. Being found by a court of competent jurisdiction to have violated M.G.L. c. 93A in connection with the sale of securities; and
e. Being temporarily or permanently enjoined by any court of competent jurisdiction from violating M.G.L. c. 93A in connection with the sale of securities.
Notes
. The ten houses comprise Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Securities Corp., Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., Fidelity Brokerage Services, Inc., Kidder Peabody & Co., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., Paine Webber Inc., Prudential-Bache Securities Inc., Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., and Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co. We refer to them and the trade association plaintiff, collectively, as "SIA.” or “appellees.”
. We think that the Court, by taking the formidable step of overruling its own precedent, has demonstrated how tightly impulses hostile to arbitration must be constrained in order to remain faithful to Congress’s mandate.
See Rodriguez de Quijas,
.
Volt
is not to the contrary. There, the Court ruled that “interpreting a choice-of-law clause to make applicable state rules governing the conduct of arbitration — rules which are manifestly designed to encourage resort to the arbitral process — simply does not offend the rule of liberal construction ... nor does it offend any other policy embodied in the FAA.”
. That the restriction is administrative rather than legislative or judge-made in no way validates appellants’ maneuver. The gravamen of the FAA is to preserve the arbitral bargain against external onslaughts manifesting hostility to arbitration, whatever their genesis. The only excepted areas are those where Congress (expressly, by fair implication, or by delegation) has itself exhibited a preference for some other forum or rule.
See McMahon,
. Although any fraudulent, adhesive, or economically coerced agreement to arbitrate would be challengeable, the Supreme Court has suggested that such challenges must not only be brought on grounds common to contracts generally, but must also be proven on the facts of the individual case, not automatically shunted to one side according to practices governing the formation of arbitration agreements as a class of contracts.
See Rodriguez de Quijas,
.
McMahon
adequately evinces the point. There, only a dissenter, not the Court's majority, felt that arbitration could fail to protect an investor’s substantive rights.
. It is hornbook law that one who violates a licensing statute — which, as here, is not a revenue measure, but a public-protection statute — is generally not allowed to enforce the contract. The usual case arises where an unlicensed party performs services requiring a license.
See, e.g., Shinberg v. Bruk,
. Technically, as appellants are quick to note, the statements of the Perry Court contained in footnote 9 of its opinion are dicta. But, we find them to be considered dicta, reflective of the applicable rule of law.
. The Court has not seen fit to question use of standard-form contracts in circumstances where parties having apparently unequal bargaining power have agreed to arbitrate.
See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijos,
. We do not address appellants’ contention that the district court erred in denying their motion to defer
brevis
disposition pending further discovery.
See
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f). According to a supporting affidavit, appellants sought the delay to "assess the impact of the regulations on broker and customer behavior.” The motion was not directed at discovery of any facts material to the legal question — whether the FAA preempts the Regulations — which we, like the lower court, have found determinative. Thus, the Rule 56(f) motion is, for our purposes, beside the point.
See Paterson-Leitch Co. v. Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Elec. Co.,
