MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) brings this action against Defendants Elek Straub, Andras Balogh, and Tamas Morvai (collectively, “Defendants”) — executives of the Hungarian telecommunications company Magyar Telekom, Pic. (“Magyar”)- — arising out of alleged violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l, et seq. (the “FCPA”). Before the Court is Defendants’ joint motion to dismiss the Complaint in this action on the grounds that: (1) the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendants; (2) the SEC’s claims are time barred; and (3) the Complaint fails to state claims for certain of its causes of action. For the reasons that follow, the Court denies Defendants’ motion in its entirety.
I. Background
The SEC alleges that Defendants engaged in two related schemes involving the bribery of public officials in Macedonia and Montenegro. However, the SEC has advised the Court that the Complaint’s anti-bribery claims “are based solely on the allegations involving Macedonia.” (Opp’n 3 n. 2.) Accordingly, for the purpose of resolving the instant motion, the facts below relate almost entirely to Defendants’ alleged Macedonian scheme.
A. Facts
In early 2005, the Macedonian Parliament enacted a new Electronic Communications Law, which “liberalized the telecommunications market [in Macedonia] in a manner that would have been unfavorable to Magyar.” (Compl. ¶ 20.) Specifically, the legislation increased frequency fees, imposed regulatory burdens, and authorized the licensing of a third mobile telephone operator in direct competition with Makedonski Telekommunikacii A.D. Skop
In furtherance of the alleged scheme, Magyar’s Macedonian subsidiaries retained a Greek intermediary to facilitate negotiations with Macedonian government officials on Magyar’s behalf. (Id. ¶22.) The negotiations resulted in a “secret agreement” with those officials entitled the “Protocol of Cooperation” (the “Protocol”), which set a framework whereby the Macedonian officials would mitigate certain adverse effects of the new law in return for the Macedonian government receiving a €95 million dividend payment from MakTel and Macedonian officials receiving undisclosed bribe payments from Magyar. (Id.) On or about May 25, 2005, Straub approved the Protocol on behalf of Magyar, and approximately two days later, Balogh and a senior Macedonian government official signed and countersigned the document. (Id. ¶ 23.)
On or about August 31, 2005, Straub allegedly entered into a second, nearly-identical version of the Protocol with a senior Macedonian government official belonging to the minority political party in the governing coalition. (Id. ¶ 30.) Prior to the execution of this version of the Protocol, Defendants internally confirmed in writing that officials within the minority party would “torpedo [or wreck] the agreement within [two] months if we don’t pay bribes to those officials.” (Id. ¶ 27 (internal quotation marks omitted).) To induce members of the minority political party to sign the Protocol, Defendants allegedly offered “to have [Magyar’s] Macedonian subsidiary construct a mobile telecommunications infrastructure in a neighboring country and allow a designee of the minority political party to operate [it] using the company’s network backbone.” (Id. ¶ 29.) On or about August 30, 2005 — one day prior to signing the second Protocol with a senior official within the minority political party— Straub executed a Letter of Intent, which identified the prospective business party only as “a company to be named by the [minority political p]arty.” (Id.)
According to the Complaint, neither Magyar nor Deutsche Telekom — a company that had a controlling interest in Magyar — kept signed copies of the two Protocols, and the senior Macedonian government officials who signed the documents failed to record them as official government documents, as required under Macedonian law. (Id. ¶¶ 24-25, 30.) Only the Greek intermediary allegedly kept the original signed Protocols. (Id. ¶ 30; see Reply Ex. 1 (unsigned copy of the Protocol).)
To obtain the government official’s consent to the Protocols, Defendants allegedly offered up to €10 million in bribes, in three installments. (Compl. ¶ 26.) Defendants authorized MakTel and other Magyar subsidiaries to make the first installment (totaling €4.875 million) to government officials via the Greek intermediary under purported “sham ‘success[-]fee[-]based’ contracts for ‘consulting’ or ‘marketing services.’ ” (Id.) According to the SEC, the contracts “served no legitimate business purpose, and no bona fide services were rendered under them. Instead, the contracts were used to channel corrupt payments indirectly to government officials in a manner that would not be detected.” (Id. ¶ 32.) Moreover, they were al
Defendants allegedly referred to the routing of payments through such contracts using the code “logistics,” and in an untitled document prepared by Balogh on or about June 1, 2005, Balogh proposed to structure the payments as “success[-]fee Hbased” contracts and volunteered to “be present when signing the contracts or meet[] with the representatives of both sides and inform[ ] them about the source of the money.” (Id. ¶¶ 31-33.) On June 16, 2005, Balogh also asked representatives of the Greek intermediary to provide “feedback, after the transaction, from high[-]level representatives of both sides acknowledging that they received what we promised.” (Id. ¶34.) Additionally, Defendants allegedly discussed various options for structuring bribe payments to the minority political party. (Id. ¶ 28.) As a result of the allegedly corrupt payments, the Macedonian government purportedly delayed the introduction of a third mobile telephone competitor until 2007 — when a new administration came to power — and reduced the frequency-fee tariffs imposed on MakTel. (Id. ¶ 38.)
During and before the time of the alleged conduct, both Magyar’s and Deutsche Telekom’s securities were publicly traded through American Depository Receipts (“ADRs”) listed on the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) and were registered with the SEC pursuant to Section 12(b) of the Exchange Act. (Compl. ¶¶ 14-15.) As executives of a publicly filed company, Defendants were required to make certifications to Magyar’s auditors regarding the accuracy of the company’s financial statements and the adequacy of its internal controls. However, the Complaint alleges that, to cover up the alleged bribery scheme, Defendants falsified their certifications in connection with the company’s 2005 financial statements. (Id. ¶¶ 62-64.) Specifically, between July 2005 and January 2006, Straub signed management representation letters to Magyar’s auditors, allegedly misrepresenting that: (1) “we have made available to you all financial records and related data”; (2) “we are not aware of any accounts, transactions or material agreement not fairly described and properly recorded in the financial and accounting records and underlying the financial statements”; and (3) “we are not aware of any violations or possible violations of laws or regulations.” (Id. ¶ 63.)
For their part, Balogh and Morvai signed management sub-representation letters
For all of these reasons, the Complaint alleges that the payments made under the sham marketing and consulting contracts were recorded on Magyar’s books and records “in a manner that did not reflect the true purpose of the contracts.” (Id. ¶ 40.) The alleged false records were then subsequently consolidated into Deutsche Telekom’s financial statements. (Id.) According to the Complaint, had Magyar auditors known these facts, “they would not have accepted the management representation letters and other representations provided by Straub[, n]or would the auditors have provided an unqualified audit opinion to accompany Magyar’s] annual report [to the SEC] on Form 20-F.” (Id. ¶ 70.)
During the pendency of the alleged Macedonian bribery scheme, Magyar filed seven quarterly reports on Form 6-K with the SEC, one of which Straub signed on August 10, 2006.
B. Procedural History
The SEC initiated this action on December 29, 2011 by filing its Complaint. On July 11, 2012, the action was transferred to the Honorable Ronnie Abrams, United States District Judge; however, Judge Abrams recused herself and subsequently transferred the case back to the undersigned’s docket. On November 5, 2012, Defendants filed the instant joint-motion, arguing that the Complaint should be dismissed because: (1) the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over them; (2) the SEC’s claims are time barred; and (3) the Complaint fails to state a claim as to the SEC’s first, second, and fifth causes of action. The motion was fully submitted as of December 19, 2012, and, on January 17, 2013, the Court heard oral argument on the motion.
II. Discussion
A. Personal Jurisdiction
On a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the “plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the court has jurisdiction over the defendant.” In re Magnetic Audiotape Antitrust Litig.,
Under this standard, the plaintiff “must plead facts which, if true, are sufficient in themselves to establish jurisdiction” as to each defendant. Bellepointe, Inc. v. Kohl’s Dep’t Stores, Inc.,
In securities cases like this one involving securities listed on domestic exchanges, Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (the “Exchange Act”), establishes the exclusive basis for personal jurisdiction. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell,
“The due process test for personal jurisdiction has two related components: the ‘minimum contacts inquiry’ and the ‘reasonableness’ inquiry. The [C]ourt must first determine whether the defendant has sufficient contacts with the forum state to justify the court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction.” Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp.,
1. Minimum Contacts
In judging minimum contacts under the standard set forth in International Shoe
Even though a defendant’s contacts with the entire United States in such cases are determinative of the “minimum contacts” inquiry, because the language of the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause is identical to that of the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, the same general principles guide the minimum contacts analysis. Thus, a court may exercise “specific jurisdiction” over a defendant where the suit “aris[es] out of or relate[s] to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.” Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,
Notably, the Supreme Court has recently emphasized that “it is the defendant’s actions, not his expectations, that empower a [forum’s] courts to subject him to judgment.” J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, — U.S. -,
Where an executive of a foreign securities issuer, wherever located, participates in a fraud directed to deceiving United States shareholders in violation of federal regulations requiring disclosure of accurate information to holders of securities traded in the United States, such direct consequences have occurred. SEC regulations would be meaningless as applied to foreign issuers of U.S.traded securities if the United States courts lacked jurisdiction over executives abroad who violate those regulations. The complaint here alleges that [the defendant executive] conceived and implemented a strategy for entering a sham transaction and specifically intended that his work would result in false statements by [his company] in its publicly-filed financial statements in the United States. At least to the extent that this allegation states a claim for violation of the United States securities laws, this Court has jurisdiction over the persons alleged to have committed that violation.
SEC v. Stanard, No. 06 Civ. 7736(GEL) (S.D.N.Y May 16, 2007) (unpublished transcript of ruling, Opp’n Ex. 2, Tr. 3:2-18.)
Here, based on the standards discussed above, the Court finds that the SEC has met its burden of proving a prima facie case of jurisdiction sufficient to withstand a jurisdictional challenge at this early stage of the litigation. Like the defendants in Stanard, the Defendants here allegedly engaged in conduct that was designed to violate United States securities regulations and was thus necessarily directed toward the United States, even if not principally directed there. As noted above, during and before the time of the alleged violations, both Magyar’s and Deutsche Telekom’s securities were publicly traded through ADRs listed on the NYSE and were registered with the SEC pursuant to Section 12(b) of the Exchange Act. (Compl. ¶¶ 14-15.) Because these companies made regular quarterly and annual consolidated filings during that time (id. ¶ 6), Defendants knew or had reason to know that any false or misleading financial reports would be given to prospective American purchasers of those securities. Cf. Leasco,
Indeed, during the period of the alleged violations, Straub allegedly signed false management representation letters to Magyar’s auditors, and Balogh and Morvai
Holding that Defendants have sufficient minimum contacts would not only be consistent with Judge Lynch’s opinion in Stanard but also with a host of other cases within this Circuit that Defendants unconvincingly attempt to distinguish. (See Reply 9 n. 7.) For example, in In re Parmalat Securities Litigation, the court upheld jurisdiction over an Italian auditor in connection with Parmalat’s misleading financial statements filed with the SEC where the complaint alleged that Parmalat “traded actively in the United States, that Parmalat made note offerings [there], and that company documents including [statutory [b]oard reports were posted on company web sites in English.”
However, Defendants’ argument is beside the point for several reasons. First, the SEC does not bear the burden of alleging that investors relied to their detriment on the concealment of Defendant’s bribery scheme. SEC v. KPMG LLP,
Third, the SEC need not, as Defendants contend, demonstrate that the trading harm caused by Defendants’ conduct, was demonstrable, let alone “significant.” {See Mem. 15-16.) Indeed, the series of insider trading cases that Defendants cite for their position are inapposite because the SEC here premises Defendants’ liability on allegedly fraudulent filings rather than on harm to investors. Furthermore, even if these cases were on point, they would not support Defendants’ argument. Indeed, in only one case — SEC v. Alexander — did the court find personal jurisdiction to be lacking, and it did so only where the Italian defendant in question placed a single order with her Italian broker to sell shares in an Italian company without knowing “that the sale of stock would be accomplished by sale of [the company’s] ADRs listed on the [NYSE].”
Defendants also argue that, should the Court exercise jurisdiction over them, it would automatically imply that “any individual director, officer, or employee of an issuer in any FCPA case” would also be subject to personal jurisdiction. (Mem. 10.) However, Defendants’ concerns are overblown. In holding that Defendants have met their burden of demonstrating a prima facie case for jurisdiction at this early stage, the Court does not create a per se rule regarding employees of an issuer but rather bases its decision on a fact-based inquiry — namely, an analysis of the SEC’s specific allegations regarding the Defendants’ bribery scheme, Defendants’ falsification of Magyar’s books and records, and Defendants’ personal involvement in making representations and sub-representations with respect to and in anticipation of Magyar’s SEC filings. Although Defendants’ alleged bribes may
Lastly, Defendants also cite Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., — U.S. -,
Accordingly, the Court finds that the SEC has established a prima' facie case that Defendants had the requisite minimum contacts with the United States to support personal jurisdiction.
2. Reasonableness
“Once it has been decided that a defendant purposefully established minimum contacts within the forum ..., these contacts may be considered in light of other factors to determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with ‘fair play and substantial justice,’ ” Burger King,
(1) the burden that the exercise of jurisdiction will impose on the defendant; (2) the interests of the forum state in adjudicating the case; (3) the plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief; (4) the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of the controversy; and (5) the shared interest of the states in furthering substantive social policies.
Metro. Life Ins.,
“While the exercise of jurisdiction is favored where the plaintiff has made a threshold showing of minimum contacts at the first stage of the inquiry, it may be defeated where the defendant presents ‘a compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable.’ ” Id. (citing Burger King,
Like each and every court in this Circuit to have applied the reasonableness standard after determining that a given defendant has the requisite minimum contacts, this Court finds that this is not the rare case where the reasonableness analysis defeats the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Although it might not be convenient for Defendants to defend this action in the United States, Defendants have not made a particular showing that the burden on them would be “severe” or “gravely difficult.” Indeed, as the SEC rightly notes, unlike in a private diversity action, here there is no alternative forum available for the government. (Opp’n 22.) Thus, if the SEC could not enforce the FCPA against Defendants in federal courts in the United States, Defendants could potentially evade liability altogether. Additionally, because this case was brought under federal law, the judicial system has a strong federal interest in resolving this issue here. The Court therefore finds that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Defendants is not unreasonable.
Accordingly, because the SEC has established that Defendants have minimum contacts with the United States and that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Defendants would not be unreasonable, the Court finds that the SEC has met its burden at this stage of establishing a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction over Defendants.
B. Time Bar
A statute of limitations is normally an affirmative defense; however, if the allegations “show that relief is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, the complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim.” Jones v. Bock,
Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, an action, suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, shall not be entertained unless commenced within five years from the date when the claim first accrued if, within the same period, the offender or the property is found within the United States in order that proper sewice may be made thereon.
28 U.S.C. § 2462 (emphasis added).
It is undisputed that more than five years have elapsed since the SEC’s claims first accrued. {See Opp’n 23-24; Reply 10.) The parties nevertheless disagree as to the plain meaning of § 2462 and, given that Defendants were not physically located within the United States during the
Statutory interpretation begins with the text and, where the meaning of a statutory provision is unambiguous, a court should proceed no further. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Ala. Dep’t of Revenue, — U.S. -,
First, Defendants conflate § 2462’s operative language — “if, within the same period, the offender ... is found within the United States” — with the provision’s statement of purpose — “in order that proper service may be made thereon.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2462; see also Dist. of Columbia v. Heller,
Here, the operative language in § 2462 requires, by its plain terms, that an offender must be physically present in the United States for the statute of limitations to run. In arguing otherwise, Defendants essentially seek to amend the statute to run against a defendant if he is either “found within the United States” or subject to service of process elsewhere by some alternative means. Such a reading would be a dramatic restatement of the statutory language and would render the clause “if ... found within the United States” mere surplusage. Colasuonno,
Additionally, reading the statute to require a defendant’s physical presence in the United States is not inconsistent with § 2462’s statement of purpose, as was originally understood. See Heller, 554
Accordingly, the Court finds that the statute of limitations within § 2462 has not run on the SEC’s claims.
C. Failure to State a Claim Finally, Defendants assert that the Complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(6).
1. Legal Standard
In order to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must “provide the grounds upon which [its] claim rests.” ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd.,
2. Whether the Complaint Adequately Alleges that Defendants Made Use of United States Interstate Commerce
Defendants argue that the Complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to show that Defendants “ma[de] use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance of any offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any money ... or ... anything of value” to “any foreign official.” 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a); (see Mem. 22-25; Reply 14-17). The Complaint alleges that Balogh used emails in furtherance of the bribe scheme by attaching drafts of the Protocols, the Letter of Intent, and copies of consulting contracts with third-party intermediaries (Compl. ¶ 39) — all of which were the alleged means by which Defendants concealed the true nature of the payments offered to the Macedonian government officials (id. ¶¶ 19, 31-32, 35). The Complaint further alleges that the emails were “sent from locations outside the United States, but were routed through and/or stored on network servers located within the United States.” (Id. ¶ 39.)
As an initial matter, it is undisputed that the use of the Internet is an “instrumentality of interstate commerce.” (Reply 15-16; Tr. 30:13-14); see, e.g., United States v. MacEwan,
The issue of whether § 78dd-l(a) requires that a defendant intend to use “the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce” is a matter of first impression in the FCPA context. Section 78dd-l(a) is not a model of precision in legislative drafting: its text does not make immediately clear whether “corruptly” modifies the phrase “make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce” or the phrase “any offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any money ... or ... anything of value.” See CSX Transp.,
The word “corruptly” is used in order to make clear that the offer, payment, promise, or gift, must be intended to induce the recipient to misuse his official position in order to wrongfully direct business to the payor or his client, or to obtain preferential legislation or a favorable regulation. The word “corruptly” connotes an evil motive or purpose, an intent to wrongfully influence the recipient.
S.Rep. No. 95-114, at 10 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4108; see Colasuonno,
Such a reading is consistent with the way that courts have interpreted similar provisions in other statutes. For instance, courts have held that the use of interstate commerce in furtherance of violations of the securities laws, the mail and wire fraud statutes, and money laundering statutes is a jurisdictional element of those offenses. See United States v. Blackmon,
Defendants nonetheless argue that the mail and wire fraud and money laundering statutes are distinguishable because, unlike the FCPA — which applies to individuals who “make use of ... any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce,” 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a) — these statutes cover individuals who, respectively, “deposit[ ] or cause[ ] to be deposited” or “cause[ ] to be delivered by mail,” 18 U.S.C. § 1341, or “transmit[ ] or eause[ ] to be transmitted” by the wires, 18 U.S.C. § 1343. (Reply 15 n. 14.) Similarly, Defendants argue that Rule 10b-5 is distinguishable from the FCPA because it applies to “direct[] or indirect[ ]” use of an instrumentality of interstate commerce. (Reply 17 n. 17 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5).) Thus, according to Defendants, the scope of those statutes is broader and applies even when a defendant does not personally use an instrumentality of interstate commerce. However, Defendants’ argument is strained and appears intended to create a meaningful distinction where none exists. The difference between “causes to” and “uses” is not so great as to enable the Court to divine a congressional intent to impart a different meaning to one statutory provision and not to another. Moreover, the mere fact that § 78dd-l(a) does not include the phrase “directly or indirectly” does not indicate that the requirement “make use” implies that a defendant must have made direct use.
Therefore, the Court finds that the Complaint sufficiently pleads that Defendants used the means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce, pursuant to the FCPA.
Defendants argue that the Complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to establish that their intended bribe recipients were “foreign officials” under the FCPA. (See Mem. 27-28; Reply 17-18.) As noted above, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a), the recipient of an unlawful bribe must be a “foreign official,” which the statute defines as “any officer or employee of a foreign government or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof ..., or any person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of any such government or department, agency, or instrumentality, or for or on behalf of any such public international organization.” 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(1)(A).
By its plain terms, “[t]he language of the statute does not appear to require that the identity of the foreign official involved be pled with specificity.” SEC v. Jackson,
[I]t would be perverse to read into the statute a requirement that a defendant know precisely which government official, or which level of government official, would be targeted by his agent; a defendant could simply avoid liability by ensuring that his agent never told him which official was being targeted and what precise action the official took in exchange for the bribe.
Jackson,
In light of the fact that there is no requirement that the “foreign official” be specifically named and that reading such a requirement into the FCPA would be contrary to the statutory scheme, the Court finds that the Complaint satisfies Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Specifically, the Complaint alleges, inter alia, that: (1) Magyar’s subsidiaries retained an intermediary to facilitate negotiations with “Macedonian government officials” on Magyar’s behalf; (2) the Protocols were signed by specific senior Macedonian officials from the majority and minority political parties of the governing coalition; (3) the Proto
Accordingly, the Court finds that the SEC has satisfied its pleading obligations under Iqbal and Twombly with regard to the term “foreign official” in the FCPA.
4. Claim Pursuant to Exchange Act Rule 13b2-2
Defendants next argue that the Complaint fails to allege false statements to investors, in violation of Exchange Act Rule 13b2-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2, in connection with the management and sub-management letters prepared for the audit of Magyar’s 2005 financial statements. A plaintiff pleading a violation of Rule 13b2-2 must sufficiently allege that (1) the individual is a director or an officer of an issuer (2) who “directly or indirectly” made or caused to be made “a materially false or misleading statement” or omission to an accountant (3) in connection with an SEC filing or audit. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2(a). The parties do not dispute that the heightened pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) applies to this claim. (See Mem. 29; Opp’n 35-36.) Pursuant to Rule 9(b), a party alleging fraud or mistake “must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). In order to satisfy Rule 9(b), a plaintiff must: “(1) specify the statements that the plaintiff contends were fraudulent, (2) identify the speaker, (3) state where and when the statements were made, and (4) explain why the statements were fraudulent.” Rombach v. Chang,
As a preliminary matter, the Court rejects Defendants’ argument that the Complaint impermissibly relies on the group pleading doctrine. The Complaint identifies the specific statements that were misleading, why they were misleading, which Defendant said them, and the SEC filings or audits for which they were made. For instance, the Complaint alleges that Straub stated in the management representation letters he signed between July 2005 and January 2006 that “we have made available to you all financial records and related data”; “we are not aware of any accounts, transactions or material agreement not fairly described and properly recorded in the financial and accounting records underlying the financial state
As for Balogh and Morvai, the Complaint alleges that they made misstatements by signing sub-representation letters for quarterly and annual reporting periods in 2005, allegedly falsely certifying that “all material information related to my area was disclosed accurately and in full (actual and accruals) and in agreement with the subject matter of the management representation letter.” (Id. ¶ 64.) At the time that they made these representations, Balogh and Morvai allegedly possessed the same knowledge that Straub had when he signed the management representations. (Id. ¶¶ 65-69.)
Based upon these allegations, the Court has little difficulty finding that, rather than lumping Defendants together, the Complaint states with particularity the circumstances constituting the alleged fraud as to each Defendant. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). As the SEC rightly notes, “that all [Djefendants were aware of the same set of underlying facts, and that it was this common set of facts that made their statements to Magyar’s auditors misleading, does not equate to the impermissible use of ‘group pleading.’ ” (Opp’n 37.)
Although the Complaint satisfies the heightened pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), the question remains whether each Defendant’s alleged misstatements were “material” pursuant to Rule 13b2-2. The traditional definition of materiality under the securities laws is “[w]hether the defendants’ representations, taken together and in context, would have misled a reasonable investor.” In re Morgan Stanley Info. Fund Sec. Litig.,
The Second Circuit has not addressed this precise question. (See Reply 19.) However, the other courts to have addressed the issue have held that, for purposes of Rulel3b2-2, a statement is material if “ ‘a reasonable auditor would conclude that it would significantly alter the total mix of information available to him.’ ” SEC v. Patel, No. 07 Civ. 39(SM),
Here, the Complaint alleges that “[h]ad Magyar’s] auditors known [the facts alleged in the Complaint regarding the alleged bribery scheme], they would not have accepted the management representation letters and other representations provided by Straub[, n]or would the auditors have provided an unqualified auditor opinion to accompany Magyar[’s] annual report on Form 20-F.” (Compl. ¶ 70.) In light of the SEC’s allegations noted above and the fact that the materiality of the misstatements made to the auditors is “a mixed question of law and fact that generally should be presented to a jury,” see Press v. Chem. Inv. Serv. Corp.,
Accordingly, the Court finds that the SEC’s Rule 13b2-2 claim survives Defendants’ motion.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Defendants’ motion in its entirety. Specifically, the Court finds that: (1) it has personal jurisdiction over Defendants; (2) the SEC’s claims are not time barred; and (3) the Complaint states claims as to the causes of action that Defendants challenge
In light of the Court’s ruling, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parties shall appear for a status conference on April 3, 2013 at 4:00 p.m. in Courtroom 905 of the Thurgood Marshall U.S. Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, New York, New York 10007.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, by March 25, 2013 at 4:00 p.m., the parties shall submit to the Court a proposed case management plan and scheduling order. A template for the order is available at http://nysd.uscourts.gov/cases/show.php? db=judge_info&id=347.
SO ORDERED.
Notes
. The following facts are taken from the Complaint ("Compl."). In connection with the instant motion, the Court also considers Defendants’ opening brief ("Mem.”), the SEC's opposition brief ("Opp’n”), Defendants’ reply brief ("Reply”), and, where appropriate, the exhibits attached to those documents. The Court also considers the transcript of oral argument proceedings before the Court on January 17, 2013 ("Tr.").
. At oral argument, the SEC referred to these letters alternatively as "Sarbanes-Oxley certifications.” (See, e.g., Tr. 40:2-3, 41:24-42:9.)
. The Court may take judicial notice of relevant SEC filings during the period in question (2005 to 2006) even though the filings in question may not be referenced in the Complaint. See Kramer v. Time Warner Inc.,
. Although Defendants argue that the applicable long-arm statute is the N.Y. C.P.L.R.— specifically, sections 301 and 302 — the Court need not discuss die statute’s applicability because "Congress meant [Section] 27 to extend personal jurisdiction to the full reach permitted by the due process clause," and the N.Y. C.P.L.R. "could reach no further.” Leasco,
. The SEC concedes that its case is premised on an assertion of specific, rather than general, jurisdiction. (Opp’n 14.)
. At oral argument, Defendants repeatedly misrepresented this standard, indicating that a defendant’s contact must "proximately cause[]” a "substantial injury” in the forum. (See, e.g., Tr. 6:24-7:9.) As an initial matter, the Supreme Court in Burger King stated that a defendant's personal actions needed to proximately cause a defendant’s contacts, not that a defendant’s personal actions need to have proximately caused the injury in the forum. Burger King,
. Defendants argue that courts apply a "heightened causation standard when evaluating the constitutionality of asserting jurisdiction under an 'effects' theory like the one
. At the initial status and pre-motion conference, the SEC indicated that its jurisdictional theory "may be breaking new ground." (Tr. of Oct. 12, 2012 Pre-Motion and Initial Status Conference at 10.) In their motion papers, Defendants attempt to use that statement as a proverbial albatross to hang around the SEC's neck. Given the precedent cited above, however, the Court finds that it is not breaking new ground by exercising personal jurisdiction over the Defendants. Thus, the Court declines to dismiss the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction merely because of an errant, isolated statement made prior to full briefing on the instant motion.
. The SEC does not rely on Balogh’s emails as a basis for the Court’s jurisdiction over him; rather, it relies on those messages to satisfy the "interstate commerce” element of the SEC’s bribery charges under 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l. (See Opp’n 18.) Therefore, while the Court addresses those emails infra Part H.C.2., it does not address them here.
. Defendants unconvincingly try to distinguish Heller by arguing that it was a "constitutional case” and that its analysis "applied only to 'legal documents of the founding era[.]’" (Reply 11 n. 10 (quoting Heller,
. The Court also rejects Defendants’ argument that the Hague Service Convention alters the effect of § 2462. Section 2462 explicitly contemplates that its terms can be modified by subsequent act of Congress. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (“Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress ....”). According to Defendants, by ratifying the Hague Service Convention and providing for service on the global stage, Congress essentially modified § 2462. (See Mem. 19; Reply 12-13.) However, such an argument is unavailing because, even assuming that Defendants were amenable to service via the Hague Service Convention in the six years prior to actual service, Defendants nevertheless could not be “found within the United States.” Moreover, as Defendants acknowledge, the Hague Service Convention does not contain a more specific statute of limitations (Tr. 22:24-23:3) and, therefore, is not the type of congressional act contemplated by § 2462’s introductory phrase.
. This is not to say that a defendant need know that he is violating the FCPA by bribing an official — only that he intends to wrongfully influence that official. See Stichting Ter Behartiging Van de Belangen Van Oudaandeelhouders in Het Kapitaal Van Saybolt Int'l B.V. v. Schreiber,
. The Court also rejects two of Defendants' additional arguments. First, the Court rejects Defendants' argument that the SEC has failed to allege that there was any "use” whatsoever of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce. (Tr. 31:18-19.) As noted above, the Complaint specifically alleges that Balogh emailed, on behalf of Defendants, drafts of the Protocols, the Letter of Intent, and copies of consulting contracts to third-party intermediaries, and that the emails were "routed through and/or stored on network servers located within the United States.” (Compl. ¶ 39.) The mere fact that Defendants may not have had personal knowledge that their emails would be routed through or stored in the United States does not mean that they did not, in fact, use an instrument of interstate commerce sufficient for purposes of conferring jurisdiction. Second, the Court rejects Defendants’ argument that it was not foreseeable that emails sent over the Internet in a foreign country would touch servers located elsewhere. The Court does not disagree with Defendants that "[t]he [Ijnternet is a huge, complex, gossamer web” (Tr. 35:5-6), but that is all the more reason why it should be foreseeable to a defendant that Internet traffic will not necessarily be entirely local in nature.
. Defendants also assert that the Complaint fails to sufficiently allege that Defendants used the means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce "in furtherance” of their FCPA violations. (Mem. 24-25.) Specifically, they argue that the Complaint alleges only that Defendants executed a “scheme” to bribe Macedonian government officials and not that they made an " 'offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value.’ " {Id. at 24 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l).) However, Defendants ignore the fact that the Complaint specifically alleges that Defendants sent the Protocols and Letter of Intent, which were essentially their offers to pay or promises to pay the alleged bribes, to Macedonian government officials. {See Compl. ¶¶ 21-23, 25-26, 29-30.) These emails also included reference to the alleged “sham” contracts used to conceal the true nature of Defendants' bribes. {See id. ¶¶ 19, 31-32, 35.) Accordingly, such allegations are sufficient to satisfy the
. Defendants argue that the Complaint does not indicate how many management letters are alleged to have been signed by Defendants. (Reply 18-19.) However, the Court finds that while Defendants' argument is technically true, it is irrelevant. The Complaint alleges that Straub signed management representation letters "[b]etween July 2005 and January 2006” and that Balogh and Morvai signed management sub-representation letters for quarterly and annual reporting periods in 2005. (Compl. ¶¶ 63-64.) Because the number of quarterly and annual reporting periods is finite, the allegations as pled are sufficient to place Defendants on notice of which management representation letters contain the alleged fraudulent misstatements.
. According to Defendants, the Complaint fails to sufficiently plead materiality under Rule 13b2-2 because: (1) the allegedly fraudulent representation and sub-representation letters were submitted in connection with the auditor’s review of Magyar’s 2005 financial
