Sebastian Wells Atryzek v. State of Rhode Island.
No. 2019-215-M.P. (PM 15-4499)
Supreme Court of Rhode Island
February 11, 2022
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or Email: opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.
Justice Goldberg, for the Court. This case came before the Supreme Court on October 7, 2021, following the grant of the state‘s petition for writ of certiorari seeking review of a decision by the Superior Court that granted an application for postconviction relief by the applicant, Sebastian Atryzek (Atryzek), and vacated four criminal convictions for failure to register as a sexual offender in violation of
On February 18, 1993, seventeen-year-old Atryzek entered a plea of guilty to the rape and abuse of a child in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, in violation of
On October 14, 2015, Atryzek filed an application for postconviction relief in the Superior Court seeking to vacate all four convictions because, he contended, he was not under an obligation to register as a sex offender at the time of the charged offenses and therefore was being wrongfully detained at the ACI. In response, the state maintained that the 1992 version of
Atryzek filed a petition for writ of certiorari to obtain review of the Superior Court‘s denial of his application for postconviction relief, which petition we granted. See Atryzek I, 197 A.3d at 335. While Atryzek I was pending, this Court decided State v. Gibson, 182 A.3d 540 (R.I. 2018), which resolved the question of which statute applied to the duration of a sex offender‘s duty to register that arose under the former statute,
After Gibson was decided, the state and Atryzek submitted supplemental memoranda to address Gibson‘s effect, if any, on the issues pending in Atryzek I. Atryzek I, 197 A.3d at 336. The state changed course from its original argument that Atryzek‘s lifetime duty to register arose from
This Court held that the issues in Atryzek I “fit[] squarely within the ambit of our holding in Gibson[,]” and, thus, like Gibson, Atryzek‘s duty to register was governed by
Significantly, in Atryzek I, because the state consistently maintained in the Superior Court that Atryzek‘s lifetime duty to register stemmed from the now-repealed and replaced
On remand in Superior Court, the parties submitted supplemental memoranda. Atryzek argued that he had no duty to register as a sex offender when he entered pleas of nolo contendere in the 2012 and 2013 cases; he also sought a declaration that he was no longer required to register as a sexual offender and the dismissal of any related pending felony charges.5 The state, on remand, again asserted that Atryzek has a lifetime duty to register and, in the alternative, that his three convictions in 2012 constituted new offenses that gave rise to a new duty to register, independent of the underlying 1993 Massachusetts conviction. However, the trial justice determined that the state‘s arguments were beyond the scope of this Court‘s remand. In addition, the Superior Court justice found that Atryzek‘s obligation to register as a sex offender expired on June 19, 2010, and that the convictions in 2012 and 2013 for the four failure-to-register charges occurred after Atryzek‘s duty to register had expired. As a result, the trial justice vacated Atryzek‘s convictions for all four offenses. An order entered on June 21, 2019, memorializing the trial justice‘s decision, and judgment in favor of Atryzek entered on that same date. The state filed a petition for writ of certiorari seeking review of the trial justice‘s determinations, which this Court granted on January 21, 2020.6
Standard of Review
A party aggrieved by a final judgment entered in response to a postconviction-relief application may seek review “by filing a petition for writ of certiorari * * *.”
Discussion
Before this Court, the state first argues that the trial justice erred in vacating the
I
The 2009 and 2010 Offenses
On remand, the trial justice vacated Atryzek‘s four convictions for failure-to-register offenses that were alleged to have occurred in 2009, 2010, 2012, and 2013. With respect to the 2009 and 2010 offenses, the trial justice found that, because Atryzek‘s duty to register had expired on June 19, 2010, and Atryzek‘s pleas of nolo contendere for those cases were entered on February 2, 2012—after his registration requirement expired—“when those convictions did enter, there was no duty to register.” The state argues that the trial justice erred in vacating the 2009 and 2010 convictions based on his finding that Atryzek had no obligation to register when he pled guilty and was convicted on February 2, 2012. Rather, as the state contends, “the correct inquiry * * * is whether Atryzek had a duty to register when he failed to register,” in 2009 and 2010, prior to the expiration of his registration requirement on June 19, 2010. (Emphasis added.) We agree.
“We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo.” State v. Brown, 140 A.3d 768, 775 (R.I. 2016) (brackets omitted) (quoting State v. Hazard, 68 A.3d 479, 485 (R.I. 2013)). “When the statute expresses a clear and unambiguous meaning, the task of interpretation is at an end and this Court will apply the plain and ordinary meaning of the words set forth in the statute.” State v. Marsich, 10 A.3d 435, 440 (R.I. 2010) (brackets omitted) (quoting State v. Smith, 766 A.2d 913, 924 (R.I. 2001)).
Pursuant to
“The existence of a legal duty is purely a question of law,” Kuzniar v. Keach, 709 A.2d 1050, 1055 (R.I. 1998), which this Court reviews de novo. See, e.g., Haviland v. Simmons, 45 A.3d 1246, 1256 (R.I. 2012); State v. Lopez-Navor, 951 A.2d 508, 510-11 (R.I. 2008). Having determined that Atryzek was convicted in 1993 and that his registration mandate ran for “ten (10) years from the expiration of sentence for th[at] offense[,]” we remanded the case for a limited purpose and directed the trial justice to determine when his Massachusetts sentence expired. Atryzek I, 197 A.3d at 338.
Thus, the trial justice was tasked with determining (1) the expiration of Atryzek‘s sentence and correlating termination of his duty to register; and (2)
The offenses of failure to register were alleged to have occurred on May 22, 2009, and January 28, 2010, respectively. Because the prosecution for those crimes commenced before June 19, 2010, the offenses occurred while Atryzek still had a duty to register. Accordingly, the trial justice erred when he vacated the convictions based on the finding that Atryzek had no duty to register when he was convicted in 2012, rather than focusing on the dates the offenses occurred. Consequently, we quash that portion of the trial justice‘s June 21, 2019 order and judgment that vacated Atryzek‘s convictions in P2/09-2042A and P2/10-740A.
II
New Independent Duty to Register
The trial justice also declined to entertain the state‘s argument that Atryzek‘s convictions in 2012, for the 2009 and 2010 offenses, gave rise to a new duty to register, and determined that “the duration of the new offenses are beyond the scope” of this Court‘s remand. Atryzek argues before this Court that the state did not raise the claim that he had a new independent duty to register in the initial postconviction relief proceedings and, thus, the claim should be deemed waived. For its part, the state contends that, in Atryzek I, this Court contemplated that the question of whether Atryzek had a new duty to register, independent of the 1993 conviction, would be addressed on remand. The state advances the theory that, because Atryzek was convicted in 2012 for the charges of failure to register filed in 2009 and 2010, the statutes then in effect provided that the 2012 convictions triggered an entirely new requirement to register for a period of ten years—in addition to the registration requirement from the 1993 conviction, which requirement ended in June 2010.10 According to the state, the 2009 and 2010 cases created a new duty to register that arose as a result of Atryzek‘s pleas of nolo contendere in 2012, and, the state argues, this theory could serve as the basis for Atryzek‘s conviction in the 2013 case.11 We reject this contention.
It is well established that, absent narrow exceptions, “a litigant cannot
In 1993, when Atryzek was convicted of statutory rape in Massachusetts, this state‘s law mandated that any person who was “convicted in another state of first degree sexual assault which if committed in this state would constitute a violation of [chapter 37 of title 11] shall * * * register” as a sex offender upon moving to Rhode Island.
Specifically, in 2008, the General Assembly amended the definition of “[c]riminal offense against a victim who is a minor” as contained in
However, the statutory definition of the crime or criminal offense against a victim who is a minor was amended in 2008 to include a conviction for failing to register in violation of
Although the state has valiantly attempted to persuade this Court of the correctness of its argument, we are not convinced. While Atryzek I was pending in this Court, and after our decision in Gibson, the state attempted to assert new theories justifying a continuing registration requirement, including that, because the definition of the criminal offense of sexual offense against a minor had been amended in 2008, as set forth supra, Atryzek‘s failure-to-register convictions triggered an obligation to register.14 We reject these arguments under our well-settled raise-or-waive jurisprudence.
Notably, in the initial postconviction-relief proceedings, the state never raised the argument that the 2008 statutory changes, providing that the failure to register was a “[c]riminal offense against a victim who is a minor[,]” could serve to amend the definition of Atryzek‘s criminal offense for which he was convicted in 1993. In Atryzek I, the trial court and this Court were faced with the state‘s claims that Atryzek‘s registration requirements arose from his underlying 1993 conviction. In Atryzek I, this Court was unable to determine the duration of Atryzek‘s initial requirement or whether failing to register “further extended Atryzek‘s duty [under the initial requirement] to register” beyond the ten years from the expiration of his sentence for the 1993 conviction. Atryzek I, 197 A.3d at 338 (emphasis added).
and
“Applying the plain language of R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 11-37.1-3(a), 11-37.1-2(e)(7), and 11-37.1-10 in effect at the time, Atryzek‘s February 2, 2012, convictions for failing to register as a sex offender triggered or gave rise to a duty to register as a sex offender independent of his Massachusetts conviction[,] * * * [the duration of which] runs for ten years from the expiration of the * * * sentences [for failing to register imposed in 2012] or until February 2, 2027.”
Neither this Court nor the trial court contemplated an entirely new registration requirement that was not based on Atryzek‘s original offense.15
Court that Atryzek was advised at the time of the pleas that his convictions would give rise to new registration requirements for an additional ten years.
Nevertheless, in its papers before this Court, the state has articulated a laundry list of statutes that it deems applicable to its new duty-to-register theory.16 The state now submits that, applying
The determination of whether Atryzek had a new and independent registration requirement that arose not from the actual sexual-assault conviction in 1993, but rather from the convictions for failure to register in 2009 and 2010, is a significant question of law that was neither advanced before the trial court in the initial postconviction-relief proceedings, nor properly advanced before this Court. See Kuzniar, 709 A.2d at 1055 (“The existence of a legal duty is purely a question of
law, and the court alone is required to make this determination.“). Based on the record before this Court, a new duty to register was not set forth in the criminal informations, the plea forms, the plea proceedings, or the judgments of conviction. Further, there is no suggestion that this circumstance was explained to the accused at the time of the plea. Thus, the state‘s opportunity to establish, to the satisfaction of the trial justice and this Court, in a connect-the-dots fashion, that the 2008 amendment to the definition of a “[c]riminal offense against a victim who is a minor” applies to a long-expired 1993 conviction and sentence and, if so, whether a conviction for failing to register results in new, additional, or expanded registration obligations, has long
Notwithstanding the state‘s waiver, and despite the undisputed facts that Atryzek‘s registration obligations expired on June 19, 2010, we pause to discuss the concerns that underlie this new registration requirement.
In 2008, the General Assembly redefined the criminal conduct that gave rise to Atryzek‘s initial requirement to register by adding a conviction for failure to
register to the definition of “[c]riminal offense against a victim who is a minor[.]”
Before us, the state argues that, in Atryzek I, this Court contemplated that the trial court would entertain this new theory on remand. We disagree. “Our cases make clear that the [trial] courts * * * that receive our remand orders may not exceed the scope of the remand or open up the proceeding to legal issues beyond the remand.” Willis v. Wall, 941 A.2d 163, 166 (R.I. 2008). In Atryzek I, we remanded the action for the determination of when the expiration of Atryzek‘s sentence for the Massachusetts offense occurred and, thus, when the duration of his duty to register for that offense terminated. See Atryzek I, 197 A.3d at 338. We included in the factfinding process an inquiry into whether failing to register “further extended Atryzek‘s duty to register[,]” based on the 1993 conviction, not whether failing to
register created a new registration requirement. Id. (emphasis added). Such an inquiry would “open up the proceeding to legal issues beyond the remand[,]” Willis, 941 A.2d at 166; thus, the trial justice properly precluded this new legal theory from his review.
Finally, the state has conceded that, under its theory, there would have been a gap in Atryzek‘s duty to register from June 19, 2010, when his registration obligation from the 1993 conviction ended, until February 2, 2012, when Atryzek entered pleas of nolo contendere to the failure-to-register offenses. We are hard-pressed to contemplate that the Legislature anticipated an intermittent registration requirement based on statutory amendments to the underlying offense. The possibility of a new duty to register based on Atryzek‘s failure-to-register convictions in 2012 would have opened the door, as counsel for Atryzek has cogently argued, to further inquiry into whether Atryzek entered knowing and voluntary pleas in 2012 and 2013, and of the effectiveness of his counsel at the time. See Rodrigues v. State, 985 A.2d 311, 313-14 (R.I. 2009) (discussing Rule 11 of the Superior
Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, we quash in part and affirm in part the judgment of the Superior Court. We quash that portion of the judgment that vacated the convictions for the 2009 and 2010 offenses. The remainder of the judgment is affirmed. The papers in this case shall be returned to the Superior Court with our decision endorsed thereon.
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT – CLERK‘S OFFICE Licht Judicial Complex 250 Benefit Street Providence, RI 02903
OPINION COVER SHEET
| Title of Case | Sebastian Wells Atryzek v. State of Rhode Island. |
| Case Number | No. 2019-215-M.P. (PM 15-4499) |
| Date Opinion Filed | February 11, 2022 |
| Justices | Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ. |
| Written By | Associate Justice Maureen McKenna Goldberg |
| Source of Appeal | Providence County Superior Court |
| Judicial Officer from Lower Court | Associate Justice William E. Carnes, Jr. |
| Attorney(s) on Appeal | For Applicant: Carl J. Ricci, Esq. For State: Christopher R. Bush Attorney General Department |
SU-CMS-02A (revised June 2020)
Notes
“Any person who is required to register or verify his or her address or give notice of a change of address or residence who knowingly fails to do so shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, be imprisoned not more than ten (10) years, or fined not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or both.”
Until the instant petition, the state had made no mention of an argument under the additional sections of the registration act it now points to, such as“since the General Assembly amended R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37.1-2 in 2008 to provide that a conviction for failing to register as a sex offender, see R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37.1-10, gave rise to a duty to register as a sex offender, Atryzek would have had a duty to register as a sex offender in 2012 and 2013 based on his 2009 and 2010 failure to register convictions irrespective of whether he still had a duty to register based on his 1992 [sic] Massachusetts conviction.”