*1
SEBASTIAN,
VICTOR
Petitioner,
Warden,
MAHONEY,
MIKE
State Prison,
Respondent.
01-167.
May
Decided
corpus requesting that he be released from his
restraint.
unlawful
(1)
initially
Sebastian
raised three
he
issues:
contended that
Department had failed to
him
time
time
award
served
prerevocation
Department
confinement
violation of Reece v.
(2)
Corrections,
7,
80,
314;
MT
2001
304 Mont.
P.3d
18
he contended
the Department
that
failed to
appropriately
jail good
its award
by failing
apply thirty-six days
day
time
eighty-one
of its
award to
(3)
date;
discharge
and he maintained that the Department's jail
policy
time
violated
62,
MacPheat v.
MT
2000
299
46,
Mont.
DISCUSSION Did Department limiting jail good of Corrections err (1993)? 53-30-105, to ten preliminary matter, aAs we must determine whether Sebastian's petition has become moot release from State because to a writ of habeas argued that was entitled
Prison. Sebastian unlawfully due corpus being imprisoned because he jail good Department's policy. unconstitutional alleges legality imprisonment of Sebastian's moot because responds imprisonment. has been released from because, although he has been released from that his case is not moot suffering liberty an on his he is still under unlawful restraint prison, - currently he is discharge year suspended date of time credit to which he is entitled. serving depends on grant moot when the court cannot effective relief.” question “A Co., 21, 19, 293 Motors, Motor 1999 MT Mont. Shamrock Inc. v. Ford ¶ 1150, if 188, 19, may A issue the corpus 19. writ of habeas ¶ unlawfully or restrained. Section petitioner moot when petitions corpus MCA. have denied for writ ofhabeas as custody parole petitioner has been released from or released (1991), v. during pendency of the action. See State Sor-Lokken 343, 351, 805 1367,1373 (denying petition as moot because Mont. P.2d custody); Quigg from 177Mont. petitioner released Crist (denying seeking release P.2d disciplinary segregation moot released on petitioner as because However, custody may release from moot some habeas parole). while *3 requested by longer grant we can no relief petitions because necessarily does moot a for custody petition release from not petitioner, Rather, a becomes moot when corpus. a writ ofhabeas habeas custody granting the court from petitioner's prevents release Shamrock, regard, relief.” 19. In this we note “it is “effective ¶ Cf. to the time the premature petition prior not to consider a habeas physical and that “immediate release is [relief]” inmate is entitled to corpus.” of only remedy not the available under writ 322, 14, 170, 14, 300 State, 2000 MT Mont. ¶ ¶ Eisenman 54, 67, Peyton (1968), U.S. S.Ct. (citing v. Rowe 391 88 ¶ 426). 1556, 20 L.Ed.2d depends is moot Whether Sebastian's habeas custody prevents granting us from effective his release from Although custody, has been released from issue
relief. he is has not of time credit to which of year suspended continues to serve a ten been mooted. Sebastian suspended of sentence completion date Sebastian's sentence. and thus is discharge of his term confinement depends on date Assuming is entitled. jail good time credits to which he based on
161 arguendo jail good policy is Department's that the time unlawful to an application discharge Sebastian's term led erroneous its date, suspended date on sentence will completion Sebastian's his person by It cavil beyond likewise be incorrect. is that a restrained beyond lawful date completion terms of a sentence its being liberty. his or her we hold unlawfully Accordingly, restrained of petition is not moot. thus turn the merits of that Sebastian's petition. argues Department's policy awarding ten days good time month prior for incarceration served (1993), to the MCA amendment constitutes wealth- holding based classification violation of our MacPheat. MacPheat, we stated: defendant, criminal
[W]ehold that if the for no other reason than [indigence], pre-sentence by unable secure his freedom bail, then posting good-time he is entitled to time he spends in facility, pre-sentence, same extent the law allows good-time credit to the criminal and, thus, defendant entirety who able to serve the facility. the state correctional MacPheat, 53-30-105(1), Section provided part: relevant adopted by department... may rules grant good
allowance to exceed:
(a) days per assigned maximum, 10 month for close, inmates I security classifications; and medium
(b) days per 13 for month those classified as II and medium classifications; security minimum
(c) days per month for having inmates after as medium or period II minimum for an uninterrupted year;
(d) days per month for those inmates school enrolled in complete study ...; successfully the course of (e) days per month for those participating inmates self- improvement designated activities department.1 Regarding argument detainees are entitled to more credits *4 subsequently provide day good time statute was amended to for one (1995). 53-30-105(1), See § day time for each served. MCA previously to we note that we have prior incarcerated (decided July 00-346
addressed this issue. Corcoran v. 13,2000), unpublished security stated in an order that levels found we custody security are with classifications county jails consistent close Therefore, the defendants who are Montana State Prison. to incarcerated are entitled ten Sebastian, however, under the former time statute. credit argues the time must not be determined the assigned security housing, the on the classification level of but rather times housed in prisoner, pointing prisoners to the out that at are justified by more secure areas than their classification. argument is that it assumes a problem with has been presentence jail
classification for time before a classification security assigned. prisoners may be classified to maximum Some history. criminal It previous on the nature of offense their pure speculation prisoner to assume that a will be either to security security maximum or minimum before classification virtually impossible apply occurs. It is to designed was not pretrial detainees because statute Any statute prisoners county jails. attempt housed instance, arguable inequities. result in group prisoners this will Sebastian, urged do we application under the defendant was entitled to same indigent assume that upon entering county detention that or she received but we also have to assume that upon entering prison, hypothetical security classification while defendant maintained that detention, indigent defendant attended and indigent completed programs, non-existent school that the defendant that the self-improvement programs, in non-existent participated pre- Applying well so detained. indigent defendant behaved while time statute this manner stretches MacPheat breaking point. reasonable adopted that the has We conclude no detainees are entitled to more
policy determining pre-1995 statute. month based on Department correctly determined 5, 2001. projected discharge April date was corpus IT HEREBY ORDERED that the IS DENIED. mail to all copy directed to this Order
The Clerk Court is record. counsel of *5 day May,
DATED this 16th GRAY, REGNIER, NELSON, CHIEF JUSTICE JUSTICES COTTER and REGNIER concur. TRIEWEILER, dissenting.
JUSTICE majority's I with the concur conclusion that Sebastian's ¶15 I the majority's is moot. dissent from conclusion that Sebastian's petition is without merit. majority opinion correctly controlling states the rule MT Mahoney,
MacPheat v. 299 Mont. but In then fails to the rule. we that if a criminal MacPheat held defendant is unable to secure his freedom no other reason than his then he indigency, is entitled to time credit for jail the time in spent county to the same extent that he have would entirety received time credit had he served of his sentence in facility. a state correctional undisputed this case it is spent days that Sebastian in
county jails awaiting sentencing twenty days county jails and awaiting probation indigence revocation. His is not an issue nor is it denied that all of the offenses for which he was were bailable. However, majority previous cites our order Corcoran v. (decided 7/13/00), 00-346 for the conclusion that county
levels jails found are custody security consistent with close at that, therefore, classifications Montana State and Prison defendants county incarcerated in are jails days entitled to no than ten per more month pre-1995 good which statute applies to Sebastian. The majority pure concludes that “it is speculation” what defendant's be when classification will he arrives at the “impossible” Montana State Prison and it is therefore detainees. First, I disagree. pro Corcoran was a se which did not address the constitutional issue way raised Sebastian and is in no binding anyone on other Corrections and Second, exactly Corcoran. we how in the long spent know reception unit each time he prison following was sent to state county jail exactly detention at a and we know what his classification was after he reception was transferred from the unit.
possible comply with the mandate of and MaePheat determine exactly how much would entitled receive had he been of his entirety able serve facility. the state correctional Prison Sebastian was first sent to Montana State example, 29,1990. He county jail was housed following August days September 14,1990, reception in the unit for seventeen until He of “Minimum II.” was then received an institutional classification days for the per time at the rate of ten unit and a minimum of fifteen days spent reception seventeen Minimum month for the time thereafter while classified However, in the spent eighty-three II. because he sentence, denied at least five awaiting imposition on his eighty-three time credit for that per month indigency. *6 January Sebastian arrived at the second time prison
¶21 in which he spent days reception following and eleven the unit to I.” The time he was sent the was classified “Minimum third in unit and spent days reception State Prison he three the was to the Montana was classified “Minimum II.” The last time he sent again in the unit and spent twenty days reception State Prison he was “Minimum classified II.” words, many classify it took to exactly days we know how other
¶22 prison the that each each time he sent to and we know Sebastian was classified, for which he was time he was it was to a classification Allowing time credit. days good to more than ten month of entitled spent by the amount of time days total him at rate he reception giving in unit and credit Sebastian classifications, his actually prison following various given was time credit Sebastian it is to determine how much quite simple jails indigency. his county because of was denied while Therefore, Equal Clause is no sound reason under the Protection there equal'treatment. him deny as enforced in MacPheat to in is that it reasoning majority opinion problem with the in the based on conditions assumes time should be calculated in contrary, the established MacPheat county jail. principle On the as if his entire to the same that the defendant entitled fact that prison. in had served the state sentence been the fact county jail while in and no had been classification jails county not intended that was is irrelevant. opinion, majority 12 of the Contrary reasoning does time credit
awarding appropriate that, any entitled to was require assumption not county that there are entering jail. classification We know upon Instead, required post none. we are to assume that he was able bail any county jail. would not time in pre-sentence and have served Nor maintained need that he original do we to assume county jail participated programs. or that he in non-existent The fact they jails exactly point. have programs no Those can their programs afford bail serve entire sentence with access to term imprisonment. which can reduce the of their Those who cannot longer programs afford serve because no are available. speculating programs, Instead of about we need non-existent to look at his actual record at prison exactly the state to determine post-sentence pre- what record was then to his jail sentence time. example, any or inmate assume other served days in county jail prior to conviction and imposition
because he could afford bail. that he not Assume then was sentenced unit, prison thirty where he the reception minimum security classified for discharged prison portion days. his sentence after 300 additional We know that had he been able bail he have credit prison would for 530 at the rather than thirty and that but the for all first of those he would have to at least thirteen of credit rather per month basis, On ten. calculation of actual time credit to which he was no for speculation. entitled leaves room speculate do not about he could in county what have earned county jail. because we assume he would have been in We look to his actual record in what he see would earned *7 prison had his entire sentence been served there. majority's case, indigent Because of the in this decision criminals longer Sebastian's situation are than those can they
afford bail though even have committed the same crime and their circumstances are otherwise identical. This is a which liberty denies financial a compelling status. Without basis for (and distinction of Corrections has demonstrated none), Equal violates Clause Protection of the State Constitution. I part these concur in part reasons dissent
majority opinion. joins
JUSTICE LEAPHART foregoing dissent.