The plaintiff in the trial court appeals the dismissal of two counts of a seven count complaint against the District of Columbia (“District”), setting forth claims stemming from a sexual assault committed upon her by an ambulance attendant employed by the District. She urges this court to hold the District vicariously liable for intentional torts by an employee, for acts committed outside the scope of employment, under a theory of “breach of non-delegable duty of protective care.” We decline to do so and accordingly affirm.
I.
On June 2, 1988, appellant, seriously injured in an automobile accident, was transported in a District of Columbia owned and operated ambulance for emergency treatment at D.C. General Hospital. Claiming that during the ride to the hospital the ambulance attendant, David Joy, sexually molested her, she filed a seven count complaint against the District. 1 The only count considered by the jury was Count I, alleging that the government was negligent in the hiring, training, supervision, and duty assignment of Joy. The jury returned - a verdict in favor of the District of Columbia on that count. Prior to trial, the trial court had dismissed the other counts, including Counts VI and VII, which alleged breach of implied contract of safe carriage and breach of non-delegable duty to provide safe carriage, ruling that the “public duty doctrine” barred recovery. Only the trial court’s ruling as to those two counts is challenged in this appeal.
The District argues here, for the first time, that appellant’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Alternatively, it contends that dismissal was proper because the rule of respondeat superior does not apply to intentional torts committed by employees acting outside the scope of employment. 2 *960 With respect to the latter contention, appellant maintains that vicarious liability can be imposed on the District on the basis of a breach of a non-delegable duty of protective care. Because we hold that there can be no vicarious liability on the part of the District under these circumstances, we do not address the District’s statute of limitations claim. 3
II.
Appellant acknowledges that the causes of action asserted by her have not heretofore been recognized in this jurisdiction. She asks this court to fashion new law because, she argues, the District should be held accountable under the circumstances of this case, for the torts of its employees — even if the tortious act is beyond the scope of employment-under a theory of breach of non-delegable duty of protective care. Appellant claims that “the better reasoned case law, the Restatement (Second) of Agency and sound public policy all support the proposition that the District of Columbia should be held accountable for the subsequent conduct of its ambulance attendant.” After reviewing the material presented, we decline to accept appellant’s invitation because we are of the view that such an expansion of tort liability invokes significant public policy concerns that are better left to the legislature to resolve.
III.
It is well settled that “[u]nder the doctrine of
respondeat superior,
an employer may be held liable for the acts of his employees committed within the scope of their employment.”
Boykin v. District of Columbia,
*961 Appellant now asks us to do what the Boykin court declined to do, at least on the facts of Boykin, ie., extend tort liability to acts committed by employees outside the scope of their employment. This extension of vicarious liability could be based, argues appellant, on either of two grounds: (1) that the District’s ambulance service is a common carrier and common carriers are subject to a broader scope of liability than are others, or (2) a special relationship is created between the ambulance service and an ambulance passenger, who surrenders control over his or her safety, which imposes a special duty upon the ambulance service to protect the passenger from harm whatever the source. For the reasons set forth below we reject both grounds as bases for recovery.
A. Common Carrier
Appellant urges us to find liability on the part of the District, under the facts presented here, by adopting the so-called “common carrier” doctrine which essentially imposes “no-fault” liability, and by extending that liability to include ambulance services. Because under our precedents, unlike the rule in a handful of other jurisdictions, common carriers are not subject to a wider scope of liability than others, we find no need to reach the question of whether an ambulance is a common carrier for those purposes.
In one jurisdiction that recognizes broad common carrier liability, the highest court has observed that “[cjommon carriers ... are held liable for the negligence or the wilful wrongs of their employees, under the rule that a carrier is under an obligation to use a very high degree of care to prevent injuries that might be caused by the wilful misconduct of others.”
Worcester Ins. Co. v. Fells Acres Day Sch. Inc.,
*962
This court, however, has never imposed a higher duty on common carriers or extended liability beyond standard negligence or scope of employment
respondeat superior
principles. “Although [precedent] speak[s] of a common carrier as being held to the highest degree of care, there are no categories of care, i.e., the care required is always reasonable care. What is reasonable depends upon the dangerousness of the activity involved.”
District of Columbia Transit Sys., Inc. v. Carney,
Moreover, we recently considered anew the scope of liability of common carriers and held that “[a] common carrier is required to protect its passengers against assault or interference with the peaceful completion of their journey.”
WMATA v. O’Neill,
B. Special Relationship
Appellant also contends that this court should hold that a special relationship, creating tort liability, was established between the ambulance service and appellant. 8 She finds support in the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 214 and comment (a) (1958):
A master or other principal who is under a duty to provide protection for or to have care used to protect others or their property and who confides the performance of such duty to a servant or other person is subject to liability to such others for harm caused to them by the failure of such agent to perform the duty.
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By contract, however, or by entering into certain relations with others, a person may become responsible for harm caused to them by conduct of his agents or servants not within the scope of employment; the extent of this liability depends upon the duty assumed.
In essence, appellant is arguing that, as a matter of law, an implied contract was creáis ed imposing a duty on the part of the ambulance service to “deliver” people safely to the hospital and to protect them against criminal acts of employees. Appellant, however, presents no facts showing that the District promised to assume such a responsibility. And without proof of such an undertaking by the District we decline, for the reasons stated above with respect to so-called common carrier liability, to hold that ambulance services implicitly contract to ensure the safe transport of their passengers against every kind of injury.
We find support for our conclusion in
G.L. v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., Inc.,
Appellant also cites authorities for the proposition that a higher duty of care is owed once a special relationship is created. Those holdings are grounded, however, in no more than the expanded common carrier type of liability that we have held affords appellant no relief. For example, in
Siropes v. Heritage House Childrens Ctr.,
Moreover, in a case involving facts very similar to those presented in
Stropes,
the Supreme Court of Montana, whose common carrier liability is essentially the same as our own, refused to hold the state liable for the criminal conduct of an employee who was acting outside the scope of employment.
See Maguire v. State,
Appellant also relies on
Bembenista v. United States,
Bembenista,
however, is distinguishable from this ease on both the law and the facts. First, we note that action was brought under the FTCA, which imposes liability upon the federal government for “injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the
negligent or wrongful act
or omission of any employee of the Government while acting
within the scope of his office or employment.” 28
U.S.C. § 1346(b) (emphasis added). No recovery is available, however, when the act causing the injury is an intentional tort.
See
28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (excludes from the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity “[a]ny claim arising out of assault [or] battery5’). The
Bembenista
court held that under the FTCA “the Bembenistas may proceed on a theory that the government is liable for a breach of duty to a hospital patient to whom it owed a special obligation of protective care.”
Bembenista, supra,
We find further support for our view that
Bembenista
does not support recovery, on the ground asserted here, by the holding in
G.L. v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., Inc., supra.
There the Supreme Court of Oregon refused to broaden the vicarious liability of a hospital, finding that the only cause of action available was one based on negligence principles. In that case, a patient was sexually assaulted by a hospital employee. The patient brought an action seeking damages against the hospital on the basis of strict liability under
responde-at
superior:
14
The court observed that the “most common limitation on employer liability is that the intentional act must have been undertaken with the intent of furthering the business purposes of the employer, however misguided that intent might seem.”
G.L., supra,
Finally, appellant relies on
Eversole v. Wasson, 80
Ill.App.3d 94,
Recovery on a negligence theory may or may not have been available in this case. Since the counts of the complaint 16 seeking recovery on that ground were dismissed on statute of limitations grounds, however, that question was not presented to the Superior Court in a timely fashion. Appellant cannot revive that theory of recovery by recharac-terizing it as a “special relationship” imposing liability.
IV.
In summary, we decline to adopt either the common carrier doctrine that imposes liability upon the employer for torts committed by employees outside the scope of employment, or the non-delegable duty expansion of re-spondeat superior liability. We are satisfied, as were the highest courts of Oregon, in G.L. v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., Inc., supra, and Montana, in Maguire v. State, supra, that such a major extension of current law must be left to the legislature.
Affirmed.
Notes
. Count I alleged negligent hiring, supervision, training and duty assignment by the District of Columbia Emergency Ambulance Bureau and the jury found against appellant on that count. Counts II through V asserted that the District was liable under the theory of respondeat superior for assault and battery (Count II) and intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count III), and was liable for negligence (Count IV) and negligent infliction of emotional distress (Count V). The trial court dismissed those four counts on statute of limitations grounds. Appellant challenges neither the trial court's action with respect to those four counts, nor the jury’s verdict against her on Count I.
. Appellant contends that the District also raises this argument for the first time on appeal, and hence should be held to have waived it. The District's assertion of the public duty defense in the trial court, however, can fairly be held to encompass its argument in this court that any duty it owed appellant should not be extended beyond ordinary principles of negligence and
respondeat superior.
Moreover, the issue before us of the scope of the District's duty to persons transported by ambulance is purely one of law and, therefore, even if the District on appeal does not defend the trial court’s reliance upon the public duty doctrine proper,
see, e.g., Powell v. District of Columbia,
Further, we recently held that "judgment of the trial court may be affirmed on a ground not raised or considered below.”
Sheetz
v.
District of Columbia,
. Appellant correctly argues that our precedent uniformly holds that if the statute of limitations defense is not raised in the trial court, generally it cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
See Ledman v. G.A.C. Finance Corp.,
. In
Worcester,
although it discussed the liability of common carriers and the fact that Massachusetts had adopted and applied the broader liability imposed on common carriers, the court nonetheless refused to impose "common carrier-type liability on an enterprise such as a group daycare center."
Worcester Ins., supra,
. In
Rabon, supra,
a private security agency was sued after one of its employees sexually assaulted an employee working at a building the agency was employed to protect. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit discussed the “extraordinary liability of common carriers" and three justifications for imposing a higher standard of care. "First, the contract of passage between the carrier and the passenger is said to contain an implied assurance that the passenger will be transported safely. Second, common carriers are thought to be charged with public responsibilities; the stringent standard of care is therefore imposed as a matter of public policy. Finally, it has been suggested that the special duties of the common carrier arise from the fact that the passenger has entrusted his safety, as a bailor entrusts his goods, to the custody and safekeeping of the carrier.”
Rabon, supra,
*962 The court also observed that "fpllaintiff's right to recovery may be sustained only by extending the exception to the traditional rule of respondeat superior that a principal is not liable for his servant’s unauthorized intentional tort in derogation of the common law.” Id. at 1282. The court held that even though South Carolina followed the common carrier doctrine imposing broader liability, it did not "impose ... a higher standard of civil liability than that to which ordinary business enterprises are held." Id. at 1281.
The court concluded that because South Carolina courts were “reluctant to expand tort liability,” the right to recover was limited to established case law under respondeat superior. Id. at 1282.
. We reiterated in
O’Neill
that the standard of care WMATA, as a common carrier, owes to its passengers is that of "reasonable care in the • circumstances.”
O’Neill,
.
But see Nazareth v. Herndon Ambulance Serv., 467
So.2d 1076, 1079-80 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1985) (holding that an ambulance is a common carrier subject to requirements as stringent as local buses or cabs, and is held to high standard of care imposing "extraordinary duty”);
Bricks v. Metro Ambulance Serv., Inc.,
. Appellant proposes the following "special relationship test" to determine when the District's tort liability would extend to intentional torts outside the scope of employment; "Where an employer has a duty of care to provide protection to a person who is impaired and dependent, generated by the impaired person’s surrender of control over his or her own safety to the employer, then the employer would be liable for wilful torts inflicted on that person by an employee.” For the reasons stated in the text we find no basis for imposing liability under these circumstances, beyond that presently available.
. The court noted that Indiana's common carrier exception to
respondeat superior
imposing broad liability "is premised on the ceding of power to ensure one's safety and protection from an individual to the enterprise which purports to provide it, and the exception ... has been applied to enterprises other than common carriers.”
Stropes, supra,
. See supra at 963.
. The court did note that "we have limited application of the non-delegable duty exception to the respondeat superior doctrine to instances of safety where the subject matter is inherently dangerous.”
Maguire, supra,
. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (1988 & Supp. IV).
. In Counts IV and V of her complaint, appellant sought recovery on the very grounds on which Bembenistas recovered. Those counts were dismissed, however, on statute of limitations grounds. We, of course, do not address whether appellant could have recovered on those grounds under the circumstances of this case.
. The patient also sought recovery on an implied contract theory, which is discussed supra at 963.
.Although the court observed that “[o]rdinarily when a servant commits an intentional tort concerning a matter personal to him, the tort is deemed to have been committed outside the servant’s employment though done during working hours and on the master’s premises,” it nonetheless found that a special relationship was created that required the School District to protect the student.
Eversole, supra,
. Counts IV and V.