3 Wash. 625 | Wash. | 1892
Lead Opinion
This was a proceeding under the act of March 21,1890, to appropriate a strip of land one hundred feet in width for the purpose of a right-of-way for appellant’s railroad across lots one and three, in section three, township twenty-five north, range three east, in King county, and to ascertain and determine the compensation to be paid to the owners and all others interested for the taking or injury to said land. It appears that one Patrick O’Meara was the owner of both of said lots, and that respondents were tenants of lot three under a lease for the term of five years from August 12,1889, of which term .about one year had expired at the time of the commencement of these proceedings. The state was also a nominal party on account of its ownership of the tide lands, a small portion of which the petitioner claimed Would be occupied by the right-of-way, but was not represented at the trial. Lot three lies on the shore of Puget Sound, and was used by respondents, as appears from the record, for the purpose of gardening and of raising poultry and swine. But a small portion of the whole tract, however, was actually devoted to those purposes, and that consisted of a narrow .strip between the water’s edge and a high bluff on which were situated the garden, orchard, dwelling house, and various other buildings used by the respondents in the prosecution of their business. Appellant’s right-of-way crossed this portion of the premises, and it is claimed by the respondents that it includes within its limits all the buildings excepting the dwelling house, which was only partially on the right-of-way, the fences, and many fruit trees, and that the appropriation of this land by the railroad destroyed a large quantity of growing vegetables and deprived them of the use of the most valuable portion of their leasehold estate. At the trial in the superior court, as before indi
No exceptions are taken to the charge of the court to the jury, and the only errors alleged relate to the ruling of the court in the reception and rejection of testimony. Most of appellant’s objections are without any substantial foundation, not being supported by the record, but there is one, however, that cannot be overlooked, and which must work a reversal of the judgment. It is this: The respondents were permitted to introduce testimony as to the value of the land taken, and of the buildings which were upon it when they took possession under their lease, and of the value of fruit trees growing thereon. So far as the respondents were concerned, the question was not one of the value of the premises, for that would not necessarily determine the value of the lease, but of the value of the use of the land for their unexpired term; they had only a limited interest in the land, and were entitled to compensation only for damages to that interest. If they had been the owners, the measure of their damages would have been the difference between the market value of the land before the taking of the right-of-way and immediately afterwards, irrespective of any benefits accruing from the building of the railroad, and the same principle should be applied so far as possible in determining the compensation to which they
For the error indicated, the judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial.
Hoyt and Scott, JJ., concur.
Stiles, J., concurs in the result.
Dissenting Opinion
I dissent. While the defendants would not be entitled to the value of the land, or necessarily to the value of the buildings, yet I think that value would be a circumstance tending to show the value of the leasehold interest. The value of the lease can only be gathered from such testimony, and from circumstances of this kind. At least it is one way of arriving at the value.