47 Iowa 658 | Iowa | 1878
It was held in McCarty v. Clark, 10 Iowa, 588, that the assignment of a promissory note as collateral security for the payment of another debt passed the title to the indorsee, and that he could sue in his own name without averring or showing that the indebtedness secured by the note had been paid.
In Sands v. Wood, 1 Iowa, 263, it was held the words, “ I assign the within note to Miss Sarah Coffin,” amounted to an indorsement, and the party so transferring the note became liable as an indorser.
The effect of the assignment in Sands v. Wood was to assign and transfer whatever title the assignor had in the note. He used no words that in and of themselves indicated that he bound or made himself liable in case the maker after demand failed to pay the note. But it was held the law as a legal conclusion attached to the words used the liability that follows the indorsement of a promissory note.
It will be difficult, we apprehend, to draw a distinction between that case and the one at bar. Here the defendant assigned all his right and title in the note, and this in legal contemplation was the effect of the assignment in Sands v. Wood.
In neither case was there any limit attached to the liability of the assignor, that resulted as a legal conclusion. It must be regarded as settled in this State that the assignment of a promissory note iy the payee thereof, in writing on the note, vests the legal title therein in the assignee so as to enable him to bring an action in.his own name against the maker. Such being true an assignment amounts to an indorsement, and makes the assignor liable as an indorser, witbin the rule laid down by Parsons, above cited.
The result is the demurrer should have been overruled.
Reversed.