*895 Opinion
Dеfendant San Diego County District Council of Carpenters (Union) appeals from an order granting a preliminary injunction restraining defendant, its officers, agents, representatives and members from picketing on the property of plaintiff Sears, Roebuck & Company (Sears), but permitting them to picket on the public sidewalks adjacent to Sears’ private property.
Sears operates a retail department store on property which it owns in Chula Vista, San Diego County. The store building itself is centered on the large, rectangular-shaped piece of land. Walkways abut on the building on all four sides; these in turn are surrounded by a large parking area. All of the walkways and the entire parking area are located on Sears property which on its external limits is bounded on three sides by public sidewalks and streets, and on the fourth by private residences separated from the store property by a concrete wall. Sears’ store is the only building on the premises.
Defendant Union is a labor organization created for the purpose of negotiating terms and conditions of employment on behalf of certain employees in the carpentry trades.
In October 1973, the Union was informed by one of its members that Sears was having carpentry work done in its Chula Vista store. On October 24 two business representatives of the Union visited the store and determined that platforms and other wooden structures were being built by carpenters who had not been dispatched from the Union’s hiring hall, that the work was covered by the master agreement between the Union and the Building Trades Council of San Diego County and that the men engaged in it came within the classification of journeyman carpenters. Later the same day representatives of the Union met with Sears’ store manager and requested that Sears either contract the work through a building trаdes contractor who would use dispatched carpenters, or in the alternative, sign a short form agreement obligating Sears to abide by the terms of the Union’s master labor agreement with respect to the dispatch and use of carpenters on the job. The manager indicated that he would consider the matter, but despite repeated inquiries by the Union, he never responded.
*896 On the morning of October 26, the Union established picket lines on plaintiff’s property. Pickets patrolled on the parking lot areas immediately adjacent to the walkways abutting the sides of the building. They carried signs indicating that they wеre AFL-CIO pickets sanctioned by the “Carpenters’ Trade Union.” It is not disputed that at all times while they were on Sears’ property the pickets conducted themselves in a peaceful and orderly fashion. The record discloses no acts of violence, threats of violence, or obstruction of traffic. The security manager of the store requested that the pickets be removed from Sears’ private property, but the Union’s business representative refused, stating that the pickets would not leave unless compelled to do so by legal action.
On October 29, Sears obtained a temporаry restraining order enjoining the Union, its agents, representatives and members from picketing on Sears’ property. The Union complied by removing its pickets to the public sidewalks adjacent to, but outside of, the property. Sears claimed that while Union was picketing on the public sidewalks, certain deliverymen and repairmen refused to cross the picket-lines to service the Sears store. The Union, on the other hand, asserted that its pickets on the public sidewalks were ineffective because they were too far away from the store. As a result, on November 12, 1973, the Union removed its pickets allеgedly because of their ineffectiveness. The pickets never returned.
On November 21, 1973, the superior court granted a preliminary injunction restraining the Union, its officers, agents, representatives and members from “causing, instigating, furthering, participating in, or carrying on picketing on the plaintiff’s property . . . .” The court expressly declared, however, that “this order and preliminary injunction shall not apply to the public sidewalks on 5th Avenue, ‘H’ Street and T Street which are adjacent to the private property of plaintiff.” This appeal followed.
Although the Union launches several related attacks on the triаl court’s injunction, essentially its main contention is that the court did not have the subject matter jurisdiction of the underlying labor dispute and thus was devoid of all judicial power to enjoin the picketing. We are satisfied that this contention has merit. We shall point out that federal law preempts both state and federal court jurisdiction of the controversy at hand, that such law confers exclusive jurisdiction on the National Labor Relations Board (Board) and that to such rule of preemption there *897 is no exception permitting state courts to exercise jurisdiction over peaceful labor activity merely because it involves trespass on private property. Accordingly we reverse the order granting the injunction.
As we have already had occasion to explain in detail (see
Musicians Union, Local No. 6
v.
Superior Court
(1968)
*898 Having satisfied ourselves that Sears was a statutory employer subject to the Act, we turn to consider the two sections having a crucial impact on the jurisdictional issue before us.
Section 7 of the Act provides that “Employees shall have the right. .. to engage in .. . concerted activities for the purpose of.. . mutual aid or protection . . . .” (29 U.S.C.A. § 157.) Section 8 defines activities which constitute unfair labor practices. (29 U.S.C.A. § 158.) It is now settled law that “When an activity is arguably subject to [section] 7 or [section] 8 of the Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the [Board] if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted.”
(San Diego Unions
v.
Garmon
(1959)
As the uncontradicted facts before us disclose, the Union, prior to instituting picketing, requested that Sears contract its work through a building trades contractor who would employ carpenters dispatched from Union’s hiring hall or, in the alternative, sign an agreement with the Union by which Sеars would be bound to hire through the Union’s hiring hall at prevailing wage scales. These facts indicate that one of the Union’s purposes in picketing the Sears store was to secure work for the Union’s members. We have heretofore recognized that a labor union “seeking to broaden the employment opportunities for its members . . . pursue[s] an objective that section 7 ‘arguably’ protects as an activity for the employees’ ‘mutual aid or protection.’.. . [1Í] Moreover, picketing for employees’ ‘mutual aid or protection’ is a classic form of ‘concerted activities’ within the meaning of section 7.”
(Musicians Union, Local No.
*899
6
v.
Superior Court, supra, 69
Cal.2d 695, 707.) The record also reflects that the picketing was for the purpose of publicizing Sears’ undercutting of prevailing standards for the employment of carpenters. In this additional respect, then, the Union’s “peaceful primary picketing to protest wage rates below established area standards arguably constituted protected activity under [section] 7.”
(Longshoremen
v.
Ariadne Co.
(1970)
These picketing activities of the Union were not disqualified for arguable protection under section 7 merely because they were engaged in upon Sears’ private property and, being without Sears’ permission or аpproval, were consequently of a trespassoiy nature. In
Labor Board
v.
Babcock & Wilcox Co.
(1956)
*900 We also consider it “arguable” that the Union’s activities constituted recognitional picketing subject to the provisions of section 8 (b)(7)(C) of the Act: “(b) It shall bе an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents ... (7) to picket or cause to be picketed . . . any employer where an object thereof is forcing or requiring an employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his employees ... unless such labor organization is currently certified as the representative of such employees: . .. (C) where such picketing has been conducted without a petition under section 159(c) of this title being filed within a reasonable period of time not to exceed thirty days from the commencement of such picketing; . . . Provided further, That nothing in this subparagraph (C) shall be construed to prohibit any picketing or other publicity for the purpose of truthfully advising the public (including consumers) that an employer does not employ members of, or have a contract with, a labor organization, unless an effect of such picketing is to induce any individual employed by any other person in the course of his employment, not to pick up, deliver or transport any goods or not to perform any services.” (29 U.S.C.A. § 158 (b) (7) (C).)
The request by Union’s business representative that Sears sign a short form agreement arguably indicates that a recognitionаl purpose underlay the picketing and belies a claim that the picketing was not subject to section 8 (b)(7)(C) because it was solely for the purpose of publicizing that Sears was undercutting prevailing wage rates for the employment of carpenters. (See
Yuba, Sutter & Colusa Counties Bldg. & Construction Trades Council
(1971)
Thus, had the picketing continued for 30 days without a petition for a representation election having been filed, Union would have arguably violated section 8 (b)(7)(C). In addition to its remedy of bringing an unfair labor practice charge before the Board, Sears might also have been entitled to injunctive relief from a United States district court pursuant to section' 10(/) of the Act. (29 U.S.C.A. § 160 (/); see
Samoff
v.
Building & Construction Council of Delaware, supra,
In sum, our determination that thе activities at issue herein are both arguably protected by section 7 and arguably prohibited by section 8 establishes a case for federal preemption. The Supreme Court has recognized, however, certain exceptions to the
Garmon
rule: “[D]ue regard for the presuppositions of our embracing federal system, including the principle of diffusion of power not as a matter of doctrinaire localism but as a promoter of democracy, has required us not to find withdrawal from the States of power to regulate where the activity regulated was a merely peripheral concern of the Labor Management Relations Act. See
International Assn, of Machinists
v.
Gonzales
[1958]
The Supreme Court left open this question in
Meat Cutters
v.
Fairlawn Meats
(1957)
It is argued that our decision in Musicians Union should be distinguished from the instant case on the basis that in the former the superior court enjoined all picketing wherever it might occur, while the injunction in this case prohibits only picketing upon Sears’ private property. This argument clearly lacks merit. As indicated, we held in Musicians Union thаt the superior court was without jurisdiction to enjoin activities, both trespassoiy and nontrespassoiy, which were arguably protected or prohibited by the Act.
We recognized in
Musicians Union
that “[t]here may be circumstances in which the use of trespass laws in labor controversies would reach activities that would have ‘no relevance to the Board’s function,’ and the state’s power to enjoin them ‘would not interfere with the Board’s jurisdiction over the merits of the labor controversy.’ ” (
Notwithstanding our definitive holding in
Musicians Union
that labor picketing arguably subject to sections 7 or 8 of the Act may not be enjoined by our courts merely for the reason that it constitutes a trespass on private property, Sears urges that we should be persuaded to the contrary by the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Burger in the subsequent case of
Taggart
v.
Weinacker’s Inc., supra,
Nevertheless, in this area of federal preemption we are bound to follow the Supreme Court’s most recent ruling. As we have indicated, the holding in Garmon precludes state court jurisdiction over the labor dispute now before us. Notwithstanding the views of individual members of the high court, the fact remains that the court itself, speaking through a majority of its members, has nоt to this date created a judicial exception to its Garmon ruling so as to except from it and thus withdraw from the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board those peaceful activities —like the activities now engaging our attention—which, although arguably subject to section 7 or section 8 of the Act, are nevertheless trespassory in nature. Furthermore, we continue to believe that “[ujnlike the power to prevent violence and public disorder, the power to prohibit peaceful picketing that trespasses on the premises of employers involved in labor disputes would ‘leave the States free to regulate conduct so plainly within the central aim of federal regulation (Musicians
Union, Local No. 6
v.
Superior Court, supra,
Moreover, while the overbreadth of the “arguably protected” standard of preemption may on occasion deprive the landowner of a remedy for an actionable wrong, such incidents merely provide a basis for criticism
*906
of the
Garmon
rule itself.
7
(See Cox,
Labor Law Preemption Revisited, supra,
85 Harv.L.Rev. 1337, 1360-1367.) But the rule remains in effect and we are not free to declare that it is inoperative in the instant case. We therefore conclude that
Garmon
properly controls this case for the reasons set forth by Justice Harlan in his separate memorandum in
Taggart
v.
Weinacker’s Inc., supra,
Accordingly, we reaffirm our decision in Musicians Union and hold that the Union’s trespass upon Sears’ property did not justify the assumption of jurisdiction by the superior court to enjoin peaceful picketing “arguably” protected and prohibited by federal law. 8 The *907 injunction must therefore be struck down. In view of the foregoing conclusion, we need not consider the Union’s contention that its picketing was a constitutionally protected exercise of First Amendment rights. 9
The order granting a preliminary injunction is reversed.
Wright, C. J., McComb, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Clаrk, J., and Richardson, J., concurred.
Notes
Defendant Union, relying upon our decision in
Russell
v.
Electrical Workers Local 569
(1966)
In so doing, we are mindful of our earlier views to the effect that the adverb “arguably” as used in the above excerpt from
Garmon
means “susceptible of reasonable” argument. (See
Grunwald-Marx, Inc.
v.
L. A. Joint Board
(1959)
The necessity for the NLRB to be the arbiter of whether concerted trespassory union activity'is protected by section 7 was cogently explained by an assistant general counsel of the Board: “This is an area that clearly calls for the exercise of the Board’s expertise and experience, requiring it to considеr and weigh such factors as whether employees or outside organizers are involved; if the latter, the extent to which the property has been opened up to outsiders for purposes other than union organization; and the feasibility of utilizing other avenues of communication. To permit the state courts to make determinations of this delicate nature is likely to result in the state court finding unprotected, and then enjoining, activity that the Board would find was protected by section 7 of the [Act], To invite such conflicts with respect to ‘conduct so plainly within *900 the central aims of federal regulation’ cаn only result in impairing Congress’ intention to obtain a uniform national labor policy.” (Come, Federal Preemption of Labor-Management Relations: Current Problems in the Application of Garmon (1970) 56 Va.L.Rev. 1435, 1443-1444; fns. omitted.)
“United Automobile Workers
v.
Russell
[1958]
In addition to the two judicial exceptions to preemption suggested in
Garmon
for matters of “peripheral concern” of the Act or for interests “deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility," there are statutory exceptions permitting a state court to exercise jurisdiction over activities arguably subject to section 7 or section 8 of the Act. We have referred above to section 14(c) of the Act (see fn. 1,
ante,
and accompanying text) which permits state courts to assume and assert jurisdiction over labor disputes where the NLRB has declined to assert jurisdiction by rule of decision or published rule because, in its opinion, “the effect of such labor dispute on commerce is not sufficiently substantial to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction . . . .” (29 U.S.C.A. § 164(c).) In addition, under section 301(a) of the Act (29 U.S.C.A. § 185(a)) “[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce ... or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any distriсt court of the United States . . . .” State courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts over suits brought under section 301(a).
(Dowd Box Co.
v.
Courtney
(1962)
We disagree with Sears’ suggestion in its citation to this court of a recent decision of the New York Court of Appeals that the Supreme Court in
Fairlawn Meats
indicatеd that an injunction directed narrowly at trespassory conduct would not be preempted. (See
People
v.
Bush
(1976)
In its per curiam opinion, the court indicated that its dismissal was based on several factors. First, it appeared that only “a bare remnant of the original controversy” remained. Second, the record disclosed that the private sidewalk upon which picketing had occurred was narrow and the Alabama court had found obstructions to customers. The obscurity of the record on these latter issues rendered the case an inappropriate vehicle for deciding the First Amendment questions raised therein.
Mr. Justice White has on at least two occasions expressed a concern for the hiatus resulting from federal preemption of activities merely “arguably рrotected.” (See
Longshoremen
v.
Ariadne Co., supra,
We have previously indicated our rejection of contrary decisions by the courts of Illinois and Wisconsin.
(Musicians Union, Local No. 6
v.
Superior Court, supra,
We also note that while the instant case was pending in this court, the Supreme Court in
Hudgens
v.
NLRB, supra,