*1 BROTHERS, partnership, SEARLE Searle, Searle, W.
Rance Rhett A.
Randy Appel Plaintiffs
lants, SEARLE,
Edlean Defendant Respondent.
No. 15604.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Dec.
690 matter) the instant was part of the mari- Edle-
tal the same to property, and awarded (who appel- mother of the is the Searle respondent in the instant lants and also the matter). appealed to this divorce was respects.1 Court and was affirmed all claiming Appellants instituted suit in the that an undivided one-half interest “Slaugh was a asset House” (owned by Diamond Hills Motel the Searle paid had for partnership) Brothers been with funds. The trial court judicata applied ap- that res and that held estopped from pellants collaterally bringing this suit.
Appellants judgment, appealed court erred in that claiming that the trial appellants parties to the di- vorce action not be bound and could decree entered therein. decree, like Christensen, general, In a divorce
Cullen Y. Christensen of
Provo,
is conclusive as to
Taylor
judgments,
&
other final
Moody,
for
as a
parties
privies
operates
appellants.
their
action.2 In order for
subsequent
bar to
Vernal,
Ray Nash,
E.
defendant
in
apply,
res
both suits must
respondent.
volve the
or
parties
privies
same
action;
also the
and this
same cause
ELLETT, Chief Justice:
precludes the
relitigation
all issues
This case
appeal
is before this
litigated
could have
well as those
been
a
from final
order
trial court
were,
fact, litigated
prior
in the
dismissed
complaint
amended
If
subsequent
action.3
suit involves dif
prejudice
prior judg-
and held that a
parties,
ferent
cannot
those
ment of
court rendered
di-
judgment.4
the prior
vorce case wherein the defendants in this
there,
judica-
case were
was res
other
estoppel,
Collateral
on the
appellants
ta as to the
here.
hand,
cause of ac
arises from a different
(a
In the
privies
case of Searle v. Searle
prevents parties
tion and
action),
that a
determined
and issues in-
relitigating
facts
particular
commonly
in the
piece
fully litigated
second suit that were
“Slaugh
plea
known as
House” and recorded first suit.5 This means
defendant,
Woodey
name of the
can be asserted
(who
appellants
Searle
is the father of the
suit who
Searle, Utah,
(1974).
Am.Jur.2d,
1. Searle v.
(1971);
1. the issue decided action, not subse with the one adjudication identical mencement of the first presented question? thereto, appellants action in cannot be quent in the that so subject to privity in the regarded as the on judgment
2. Was a final there rendered therein.11 Further judgment merits? 1953, amended, more, U.C.A., as 48- under the party against 3. Was the whom specific 1-22(1), are co-owners partners with privity in plea party is asserted a or directly oppo which is partnership property adjudication? a to party prior the to successive interests. site In a the California Su- opinion, a for preme recognized necessity the previ fourth tests The first and the issue in the first case fourth test: “Was permit appli not the ously outlined also do competently, fully, fairly litigated?”8 estoppel in this case. cation of collateral adopted by the These four tests have been legally not The interest was jurisdictions as the correct stan- majority divorce suit. represented prior in the Woo- above, dard apply. to As to the second test the prior the dey B. defendant no that the divorce decree dispute there is capacity acting was in his individual suit was a final rendered in the former and was not plaintiff as the of the husband judgment merits. Points on the One for the capacity acting representative in a the Four will be discussed infra. Under that Respondent urges Woo- partnership. test, appellants the third it is clear that acting agent as the dey B. Searle not to the first action were hence, the is partnership; action; hence, they can be way the inaction in the by his action or bound pursuing the estopped or barred However, general is rule litigation. with privity” is if were “in second suit any agents principals do not to the divorce action. relationship rights to mutual or successive not, consequence as a and are person a legal The definition of thereof, There with each other. privity another, is identi person a so privity fore, is not principal repre fied in interest with another he agent, unless judgment obtained right. a legal This includes sents party privy or there principal became relationship rights or mutual successive defending by actually openly Court has said as property.9 Our court, applied or action.12 judgments decrees of Bacon, 494, 396, Colo.App. Pomeroy, 103 Utah 136 P.2d Tanner v. 6. Waitkus v. 506 10. 31 344, (1972), 957, (1943). 392 P.2d P.2d rev. 183 517 Colo. 960 (1973). 396 209, McKnight, 209 P.2d 34 Cal.2d 11. Dillard v. 807, 892, (1942). 7. 122 P.2d 895 19 Cal.2d (1949). 387 Co., Furs, 58 8. Ins. Teitelbaum Inc. Dominion Co., 165 12. Deorosan Warehouse v. Haslett 601, 559, Cal.Rptr. 439 Cal.2d 25 422, Cal.App.2d Free- 435 Ed., Judgments, man Sec. 5th Barker, Taylor 262 P. right The to intervene as Memoranda was submitted suit does not bind the plaintiff by counsel for both the and the so subsequent suit where he failed to inter transcript defendant. Am.Jur.2d, Judgments, vene. 46 Sec. 530 previous action between discusses point follows: to. plaintiff’s parents referred A party principal regard- case to the undisputed From facts stranger judgment ed as a to the ren- memoranda, presented in counsel’s previous dered in the action where he was further the doctrine finds that subject mat- directly interested estoppel appears instant thereof, ter right and had no make case and is a bar to the claim. defense, testimony, cross-examine adduce [Emphasis added.] witnesses, control the proceedings ap- appears It also Order from this peal judgment, though from the even he court relied entirely on counsels’ memoran- *4 could have made himself a to the da, which memoranda contained references previous The right action. to intervene previous to the but litigation which were not, in an does in of action the absence its necessarily not independently examined by exercise, subject one possessing it to the the trial court. We with a dealt similar being by risk of the result of the problem in City Parrish v. Layton Corp.15 litigation, judi- under the doctrine of res wherein we stated: cata. . . The there was a mere that fact The foregoing by been adopted rule has this record of on file in another action the Court.13 place clerk’s office did not these records Collateral is not to de- estoppel available in evidence. . . the record . Since feat appellants’ claim partners since the of the action not before the were not to parties made the first suit and court, to sustain trial there is no basis the there is not sufficient evidence in the record plaintiff’s determination that claim was to show that the interest of the judicata. barred the of res doctrine in the “Slaugh litigated. House” was ever Appellants cannot be bound the decree The standard rule was this reiterated in previous they entered the suit nor are year Ruffinengo earlier this in estopped litigating own claim Miller14 when we said: against the property in a~ suit estoppel Collateral is not a defense they were parties privies since not against a litigant who was not a to first and the issue raised in the judgment the action and to claimed litigated second action was estoppel. created an never prior proceeding. The court trial erred in In the us, matter now before no trial was holding judicata that the of doctrines res trial, held. On the date set for the court estoppel and collateral appel- barred the instructed the counsel for to parties both pursuing lants from suit. In making attempt to settle the case and if they that ruling, opinion we an express do not (cid:127) failed to an agreement, reach to submit to question whether or not the memoranda solely to the court addressed to asset partnership. of the the issue of the res effect of the divorce parties action. The were not af- judgment is reversed remanded opportunity present forded an testimony appellants. trial. Costs are awarded or to make a In proffer proof. its Order, the JJ., Amended HALL, stated: WILKINS and concur. 13. McCarty Co., Utah, Royal v. Parks Glove Ins. Utah, 19(b), also cf. Rule provides of Rules Civil Utah, Procedure which persons ought parties that who to be made jurisdiction who are nonetheless outside the of court, by any judgment the are not affected rendered therein. given mony divorce action. The
CROCKETT, (dissenting): Justice transcript of court’s that “the order recited opin- the main I agree am unable to action previous it held ion erred when that trial court was referred parents plaintiff’s between the estoppel that collateral . to” full consideration and that “after my judgment is plaintiffs. It barred the that the doctrine the court further finds conformity with ruling was in is a bar to estoppel collateral ... justice. equity principles incontestably plain It is claim.” judgment It is that the conceded family, including that the members normally not bar the divorce action would herein, actively involved were because plaintiffs’ action here suit, which turn involved whatev- However, upon thereto.1 any family er interest of them had I survey think of the total circumstances Further, they fully aware of assets. ruling. justified court was in its trial being to the the adverse claims asserted correctly opinion The main indicates subject of is the Slaugh House is appli- that doctrine of sons, Randy Rhett suit. Two (1) is cable when it shown that: testify on behalf of their were called same judgment is on the same issue and the father that trial. facts; litigated was essen- (2) the issue thus that there was ever It not contended (3) support prior judgment; tial to agreement. his In written who were the that it was between *5 Rhett Searle character- plaintiff same, with them. privity arrangement. it an informal ized as (1) question no As there can be had Slaugh this House father stated that House,” which is the sub- “Slaugh that this part- such a purchased with funds of been suit, of one the assets about ject was in his being its recorded nership and that pro- dispute there oversight. He also was but an name plaintiffs’ for the ceeding. Therein counsel kept rents collected he stated that father, Woodey B. asserted which he could in an account therefrom Slaugh property was owned one half House desired, spend on as but with the his own he by and the other half by the putting it back. intention of parties’ part- a result a claimed sons as This is a where situation and the sons nership between the father equity to assert own- seeking the aid of are (these urged also that the plaintiffs). He of record property which stood ership property. father be should awarded under name. Even only in their father’s (2) as to any question Neither there them, he was the contended the facts as determina- above because it is obvious that partner- of the claimed partner managing ownership the house was a tion as to the control ship, who had awarding it to the mother predicate therefrom; he income and the dispute Searle). (plaintiff therein Edlean representing as regarded should be thus question The more critical is whether they interests protecting whatever plaintiffs, these the sons Further, had therein.2 claimed in- sufficiently the divorce fully aware of plaintiffs themselves they therein that volved interested ownership of disputation concerning the regarded parties in properly should They participated property. actively privity thereto. lawsuit, no but asserted claim so, doing they stood appears It that this matter was submitted themselves. Instead was made ad- to the trial court the basis of the testi- until the determination family relationship Hodson, is one factor which That 2d Richards v. Texaco, Inc., Utah, determining may whether be considered in Belliston v. Am.Jur.2d, Judgments, exists, privity see 46 Section 532 and cases cited therein. (and verse to own) their father’s inter-
ests. Such claim as they contesting have in
the record title to the property is based
solely upon supposed oral declarations made
within the family, self-serving declara-
tions at that.
The purpose of the doctrine of collateral
estoppel is to protect from being
subjected to harassment being compelled
to litigate controversy more than impresses
once.3 This case me as being
very good of a situation example where the
trial justified applying and, therewith, consistent conclud-
ing that in equity good conscience the
plaintiffs should now be estopped from
seeking the relief asked
mother.
For the reasons stated above I would
affirm the dismissal of the case.
MAUGHAN, J., concurs in the views ex-
pressed in dissenting opinion of
CROCKETT, J. *6 BLACKHAM,
In re Don O. Disciplinary Proceeding. Rokich, Magna, John A. for Blackham. No. 15610. Greenwood, Sadler, Pamela T. James L. Hanson, Wadsworth, Russon, Supreme & Court of Salt Utah. City, Lake Bar. Utah State Dec. PER CURIAM: Formal disciplinary proceedings were against Appellant commenced Blackham the Ethics Disciplinary Committee of the Utah State Bar. After hearing before officer, a hearing designated by the Utah Commission, State Bar findings of fact hearing entered officer. These findings approved and adopted by the Bar Commission which entered an order recommending appellant suspended 3. Bahler Fletcher, 257 Or.