*2 requested that the court invalidate the WILKINS, Before MURNAGHAN and using Board’s decision a strict standard of HARVEY, Judges, Circuit Chief scrutiny. constitutional He also filed a civ- Judge United States District for the rights il action in alleg- state circuit court Maryland, sitting District of ing that the denial of a license and the designation. provide that he trаnscript hearings before the Board in order to WILKINS, Judge: Circuit file an administrative violated his O’Reilly appeals Sean J. from the deci- rights. The state circuit sion of the dismissing district court rights dismissed the civil action on brought claim pursuant ground U.S.C.A. had not exhausted (West 1981) his administrative remedies. The II. af- ultimately Special firmed. correctly not given preclu- judgments are ed, state court rights the civil dismissal of After ac subsequent section 1983 effect sive *3 of by the Court the decision before but in federal court. See Univ brought tions court de- circuit state Appeals, the Special 788, Elliott, 478 U.S. ersity Tennessee of and af- appeal administrative the cided 3225, 3220, 635 796, 92 L.Ed.2d 106 S.Ct. It found the Board. of decision firmed the Dist. City (1986); School Migra Warren only insofar “considered was residence that 75, 80-85, Educ., 104 S.Ct. 465 U.S. Bd. of prefer- no familiarity, with as it related (1984). A 895-98, feder 892, 79 L.Ed.2d se, Montgomery ence, given to per preclusive “give same the al court must It applicants.” non-rеsident over residents that those judgments court effect to state the Board of decision that “the found also of in the courts judgments would evidence, and ... by the supported is well judgments the from which the State arbitrary, unreasonable was its action 81, 104 S.Ct. 465 U.S. emerged.” Migra, this O’Reilly did not illegal.” or v. Chemical (quoting Kremer at 896 circuit moved the state but instead decision Constr. Thus, (1982)). 1889, further to schedule court of controlling on the issue However, Maryland state law the rights action. the civil from precluded assert O’Reilly is whether the of the granted motion court circuit unconstitution that the Board ing his claim the on O’Reilly’s motion to strike Board denying his nonresidence ally relied on been had rights action the civil ground him a license. now been dismissal had and the dismissed es- appeal. on Under affirmed if it applies only preclusion, or issue toppel, in federal action an O’Reilly then filed (1) issue decided the is established claim- to 42 U.S.C.A. pursuant § сourt the identical to prior adjudication is the familiarity with the determining ing that action, (2) there was present in the an area, Board considered the geographical merits, (3) and on judgment the prior final criteri- primary residency as the applicant’s the decision whom party the priv- this violatеd contends that He on. prior action. was a being used Const, clause, U.S. immunities ileges and 29, 35, 367 Md. MPC, Kenny, Inc. v. clause, IV, the commerce cl. art. § (1977). It is undisputed A.2d 490-91 Const, I, privi- cl. art. U.S. § prior in the awas immunities, process and due leges and a decision court circuit in the state the fourteenth clauses equal protection Thus, merits. on rendered Const, XIV, amendment, amend. U.S. issue raised is whether the is identical court O’Reilly also claimed state circuit in the filing an action. present transcript before the issue provide that he pro- due his appeal violated administrative prevail that to noted court The district found rights. district cess must show claim, O’Reilly his section the state circuit the final is a he because a license he was denied asserting the fac- O’Reilly from Find- precluded County. nonresident impermissi- Board held argument that court had tual state circuit ing that the is a O’Reilly’s he claim because him a license no basis for bly denied that there was County. It because a license denied he was nonresident held that transcript requirement residency, also found 1983 action O’Reilly’s section process O’Reilly’s due violate did not issue in to the rights.1 script. challenge the O’Reilly does not appeal, 1. On regarding tran- of the district
аction and argues es- that the decision of the Board topped arguing that the Board denied protectionist, and asks the Court to him nonresidency. a license because of it, utilizing invalidate a strict standard of constitutional scrutiny. III. According to the dissent language indi- Although court is cor cates thаt the state actually circuit court rect in its assertion that the state circuit O’Reilly’s considered constitutional claims court found residence was not determina and resolved them. While we would like to tive of whether an individual received a say that this issue was addressed and de- license, O’Reilly doеs not base his section cided in the state forum where the action *4 ground. 1983 claim on this Had he done so initiated, we cannot bar the doors of he would collaterally estopped from rais the federal courthouse to those pressing a ing the issue because the state circuit court basic by constitutional claim seizing upon se, found preference, per that “no [was] this language speculating that the con- Montgomery County residents stitutional issue actually addressed over applicants.” non-resident Our inter the state circuit O’Reilly it, court. raised pretation of the opinion state circuit court's but the state court did not address it.2 suggests that the Board did not automati What the court did cally deny find was that a license to resi- O’Reilly because he dence was However, only “considered was a nonresident. insofar as it rather than contending familiarity_” related to residency that disрosi was the This is O’Reil- ly’s point. tive factor in determining The state whether an indi court found that resi- license, vidual received a O’Reilly dence was a contends factor in considered determin- residency that key was the ing familiarity, factor in deter but the court did not deter- mining familiarity with Montgomery Coun mine whether this consideration was consti- ty which was in turn a key factor in deter tutional. Although the Board indicated mining whether an individual received a that only residence was aspect one of de- Thus, O’Reilly license. contends that the termining familiarity and the state circuit consideration residency in determining court found that the Board considered cri- familiarity with County vio teria familiarity, other than lates the privileges and immunities and did not indicate whether it found that resi- commerce clauses and that this issue has dence was or was controlling not the factor not been addressed. determining in familiarity or whether the cоnsideration of determining residence in O’Reilly
It is true that attempted to raise familiarity was this issue in his unconstitutional. to the state Because circuit However, language of the state record does circuit court’s sup- port finding opinion ambiguous, is this issue we cannot say was ad- with dressed. The any degree state court certainty made one it decided the reference to the constitutional issue in its issue raised in O’Reilly’s section opinion: 1983 action. Absent a identity clear issues,
Mr.
claims
should not be
consider-
estopped
ation
geo-
asserting
Board’s decision
residence was
graphicаl familiarity with Montgomery impermissibly considered in determining fa-
County, and that
the Board illegally miliarity. Without indicating
opinion
an
re-
linked this to residence in
county.
garding
claim,
the merits of O’Reilly’s
we
2. The dissent cites
Inc. v. General Motors
dispute
state court had in fact resolved the
(Fed.Cir.1987),
denied,
Thus,
827 F.2d
presented by
partiеs.
cert.
Id.
the issue here,
484 U.S.
(1988),
fore BANK, A NATIONAL
SEATTLE-FIRST Association, Banking National
Plaintiff-Appellee, Manges, MANGES, Helen Ruth
Clinton Company and County Ranch Duval Company, De Transmission
Man-Gas
fendants-Appellants.
No. 89-5631
Summary Calendar. States
United
Fifth Circuit.
April
