Seaman v. MannSeaman v. Mann
Rohloff‘s attorney, the defendant Saul M. Mann, claims an interest in the $400 judgment. He was retained by Mann on a contingent fee basis whereby he was promised one-half of any judgment which might be obtained in Rohloff‘s suit against Seaman. He also holds an assignment in the sum of $200 for services rendered in other matters. This instrument, made before Rohloff took judgment, does not purport to assign the cause of action, but rather to assign the sum mentioned out of any judgment to be recovered by Rohloff against Sеaman or the supply company.
The first question argued is whether the court of chancery has and should exercise jurisdiction. That a court of law may set off against a judgment rendered by it, another judgment, whether in the same or another court, has long been recognized. Brown v. Hendrickson, 39 N.J. Law 239; McAdams v. Randolph, 42 N.J. Law 332; Schautz v. Kearney, 47 N.J. Law 56. The set-off “is ordinarily enforced by virtue of the control which courts have over their suitors and over the officers who execute their process.” Again, the power rests in the contrоl which a law court has over its own judgment; the application in substance is that the court declare its own judgment satisfied in whole or part by the set-off of the other judgment.
Although there is no decision in point in this state, I am satisfied that a сourt of equity has jurisdiction to compel a judgment creditor to set off against his judgment, another judgment which his debtor holds against him; it is a jurisdiction to prevent an unconscionable use of a judgment. Simpson v. Hart, 1 Johns. Ch. 91 (Chancellor Kent); 14 Johns. 63; 25 Am. Eng. Encycl. L. 610. The court of chancery has concurrent jurisdiction with the court in which the judgment was entered; but chancery should not interfere in the absence of sрecial circumstances, since relief may be obtained in the law court as effectively as in this court and
The only meritorious questions have to do with the interest of the attorney, Mann, in his client‘s judgment. In Phillips v. Mackay, 54 N.J. Law 319, it was held that the lien of the attorney in the judgment is superior to the debtor‘s right to off-set a judgment held by him. The statute (P.L. 1914 p. 410) extends the lien of a plaintiff‘s аttorney so that it covers full compensation for services in the cause. And when he and his client have agreеd that his compensation shall be a certain percentage of the amount which may be recovered, apparently his lien is measured accordingly. Levy v. Public Service Railway Co., 98 Atl. Rep. 847. But assuming that as against complainant, Mann‘s lien extends only to reasonable compensation, I would then say that $200, which is fifty per cent. of the judgment, is reasonable for proseсuting an action in the circuit court to judgment after trial before a jury. Therefore, Mann‘s claim to at least this extеnt is superior to complainant‘s right of set-off. There remains for consideration Mann‘s claim under the assignment for sеrvices in other cases.
Rohloff‘s suit in which he recovered judgment was one for false arrest. Such a cause оf action is not assignable before judgment. Weller v. Jersey City, c., Railway Co., 68 N.J. Eq. 659. “In the absence of a statutory provision to the contrary, nothing is assignаble, either in law or in equity, that does not directly or indirectly involve a right to property.”
The second count prays that complainant‘s title, as trustee, to certain lands be quieted as against the lien of Rohloff‘s judgment. Since the alleged lien will be canceled pursuant to the decree on the first count, the dispute on the second count becomes academic.