62 Tenn. 459 | Tenn. | 1874
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Holloway M. Seals was indicted in the Circuit Court of Hickson county, for the murder of James Jones. He was convicted of murder in the second degree, and sentenced to the penitentiary for ten years. The case is before us on his appeal.
Two errors in the charge of the Court to the jury are mainly relied on, for a reversal of the judgment.
1. After defining murder in the first degree, with sufficient accuracy ' and clearness, the Circuit Judge proceeded as follows:
“If you find, then, that the defendant killed the deceased with malice aforethought, that is, wilfully of purpose, that the blow by which the life of the deceased was taken, should have that effect, but without deliberation or premeditation, the defendant will be guilty of murder in the second degree.”
It is well settled, that, to constitute murder in the second degree, there must be malice aforethought,
The prisoner was entitled to a correct exposition of the law, and in a matter of so much consequence to him, we cannot assume that the error was not injurious to 'his case, especially as he was found guilty of the offence thus erroneously defined.
2. The charge of the Circuit Judge, on the subject of voluntary mahslaughter, is objected to as erroneous. In defining voluntary manslaughter the Judge said, “Did the defendant kill the deceased voluntarily, upon a sudden heat of passion, brought about by a sufficient legal provocation — so great as that it rendered the defendant incapable of deliberation or premeditation; if he killed him under such passion alone, without malice, either express or implied, then he is guilty of voluntary manslaughter.” Again, the Judge said: “ The words of the deceased, or his conduct, or both,
The first objection to this charge is, that, in defining the provocation which will reduce murder in the second degree to manslaughter, the Judge says, it must produce a sudden heat of passion “so great as to render the defendant incapable of deliberation or premeditation.” Manslaughter, as defined in the Code, §4603, is the unlawful killing of another, without malice, either express or implied, which may be either voluntary upon a sudden heat, etc.
The sudden heat, which is the distinguishing feature in voluntary manslaughter, must be produced by adequate provocation. What is the character of the provocation which is deemed adequate, is thus defined in the case of Maher v. The People, 10 Mich. 212. “ The principle involved in the question would seem to suggest, as the true general rule, that reason should, at the time of the act, be disturbed or obscured by passion to an extent which might render ordinary men, of fair average disposition, liable to act rashly or without due deliberation or reflection, and from passion rather than from judgment.”
In the case of Quarles v. The State, 1 Sneed, 409, the rule is stated as folio avs : “ Manslaughter may be voluntary, as where, upon a sudden quarrel, two persons fight, and one of them kills the other, we are to presume that the intention accorded with the act, but if the intention and act Avere the result of impulse and passion, excited upon sudden and adequate provocation, the idea of malice is repelled, and the killing is only manslaughter.” ¥e are not to suppose that a person thus excited is deprived of all reason, so as to be incapable of purpose or intention.”
Tested by the rule recognized by the several authorities cited, Ave think the Circuit Judge stated it too broadly and strongly, when he charged, that, the heat of passion brought about by an adequate provocation,
This was tantamount to telling them that the provocation must be such, not merely that the act must be committed, when, by passion, the defendant “ was liable to act rashly or without due deliberation or reflection,” but when his reason was “ dethroned'-» by a “ whirlwind of passion,” or, as expressed by . the Judge, when the defendant was “rendered incapable, from passion, of deliberation or premeditation.”
The next objection to the portion of the charge quoted, is, that he told the jury that it mattered not how obscene the language of the deceased was, or how vexations his conduct may have been, these will not, of themselves, reduce a killing to manslaughter. To which the Judge added, “such conduct would not bo a sufficienf legal provocation to repel the presumption of malice, when the proof shows that the defendant used a deadly weapon in the killing.”
In this charge, the Judge passes upon the facts, and instructs the jury, that, as they consist' of words and conduct of the deceased, they do not constitute adequate provocation. In one sénse, it is the business of the Judge to determine what constitutes an adequate provocation but whether facts are proven, which, in law, will amount to such provocation, is a matter for the jury. We think the rule is laid down with reasonable correctness in the ease of Maher v. The People, 10 Mich., 212, as follows: “It is doubtless, in one sense, the province of the Court to define what, in law,
In the present case the Judge held, that the words of the deceased however obscene, and his conduct however vexatious, could not amount in law to reasonable or adequate provocation, and upon that view of the law, withdrew from the jury the consideration of the facts. It is true, as a general rule, that no provocation by words alone will reduce the crime of murder to that of manslaughter, but in this case the Judge instructs the jury, that no matter how vexatious the conduct of the deceased may have been, it could not amount to an adequate provocation, that is no matter how much the defendant may have been excited, no matter how much passion may have been
Other exceptions have been taken to the charge which we do not deem it necessary to notice, as the errors already pointed out, make it proper to reverse