Seabury v. County of DutchessSeabury v. County of Dutchess
Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the
“A defendant who moves for summary judgment in a slip-and-fall case has the initial burden of making a prima facie showing that it neither created the hazardous condition nor had actual or constructive notice of its existence for a sufficient length of time to discover and remedy it” (Yioves v T.J. Maxx, Inc., 29 AD3d 572 [2006]; see Britto v Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., Inc., 21 AD3d 436 [2005]; Joachim v 1824 Church Ave., Inc., 12 AD3d 409, 410 [2004]; Stumacher v Waldbaum, Inc., 274 AD2d 572 [2000]). Only after the movant has satisfied this threshold burden will the court examine the sufficiency of the plaintiffs’ opposition (see Britto v Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., Inc., supra; Joachim v 1824 Church Ave., Inc., supra).
The defendant Dutchess County Agricultural Society, Inc. (hereinafter Dutchess), failed to make a prima facie demonstration that it had no actual or constructive notice of the condition (see Jean-Pierre v Touro Coll., 23 AD3d 524 [2005]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendant Dutchess‘s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.
The defendant Century Decorations, Inc. (hereinafter Century), established, as a matter of law, that it neither created nor had actual or constructive notice of any dangerous condition that allegedly caused the plaintiffs’ injuries (see Piacquadio v Recine Realty Corp., 84 NY2d 967 [1994]). The plaintiffs’ vague and conclusory deposition testimony failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the stairs were defectively constructed (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against Century.
Crane, J.P., Goldstein, Lifson and Carni, JJ., concur.