143 Ga. 689 | Ga. | 1915
(After stating the foregoing facts.)
Those portions of the Federal employers’ liability act of 1908, under the provisions of which this suit is brought and the defendant sought to be held liable to the plaintiff for the injuries received, are as follows: “See. 1. That every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between any of the several States or Territories, or between any of the States and Territories, or between the District of Columbia and any of the States or Territories, or between the District of Columbia or .any of the States or Territories and any foreign nation or nations, shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce, or, in case of the death of such employee, to his or her personal representative, for the benefit of the surviving widow or husband and children of such employee, and, if none, then of the next of kin dependent upon such employee, for such injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, road-bed, works, boats, wharves, or other equipment. . . Sec. 3. That in all actions hereafter brought against any such common carrier by railroad under or by virtue of any of the provisions of this Act, to recover damages for personal injuries to an employee, or where such injuries have resulted in his death, the fact that the employee may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, but the damages shall be diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to such employee: Provided, That no such employee who may be injured or killed shall be held to have been guilty of contributory negligence in any case where the violation by such common carrier of any statute enacted for the safety of employees contributed to the injury or death of such employee.”
Under the provisions of this act, and the testimony of-the plaintiff relative to the circumstances under which he undertook to do the work in which he was engaged at the time he received the injuries complained of, we do not think that he could be called a mere volunteer. If he was a mere volunteer, he was not entitled
This evidence might show that the departure of the train from Alton on its way to Birmingham could be expedited so as to enable the train to arrive more nearly on time if the plaintiff would give the assistance which he testified was requested of him; but there is nothing in this testimony to show that such a state or combination of circumstances existed as to amount to an emergency. The word “emergency” is thus defined in the Century Dictionary: “A sudden or unexpected happening; an unforeseen occurrence or condition; specifically, a perplexing contingency or complication of circumstances. . . A sudden or unexpected occasion for action; exigency; pressing necessity.” This definition is quoted in the case of United States v. Sheridan-Kirk Contract Co., 149 Fed. 809, 814. And in the case of Mallon v. Board of Water Com'rs, 144 Mo. App. 104 (128 S. W. 764), we find the following-definition : “The word ‘emergency’ signifies some sudden or unexpected necessity, requiring immediate or at least quick action.” And the following in the case of Mayott v. Norcross, 24 R. I. 187 (52 Atl. 894) : “An ‘emergency’ is a condition of things appearing suddenly or unexpectedly; that is, it is an unforeseen occurrence. As related to the law of negligence, it may properly be defined as any event or combination of circumstances which call for immediate action without giving time for the deliberate exercise of judgment ox discretion, in short, an exigency.” Other similar definitions will be found under the head of “Emergency” in 3 Words & Phrases, 2361, and 2 Words & Phrases (2d Series), 255, 256.
Judgment reversed.