MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On Dеcember 3, 2010, after multiple proceedings before now-retired Judge Anderson, this Court entered judgment in favor of Vanguard Products Group, Inc., and Telefonix, Inc., (“Defendants”) and against Se-Kure Controls, Inc., (“Plain
ANALYSIS
I. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “costs — other than attorney’s fees — should be allowed to the prevailing party.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d)(1). A “district court may not tax costs under Rule 54(d) [, however,] unless a federal statute authorizes an award of those costs.” Republic Tobacco Co. v. N. Atl. Trading Co., Inc.,
(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal;
(2) Fees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily obtained for use in the case;
(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses;
(4) Fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case;
(5) Docket fees ...; [and]
(6) Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of interpreters, and salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special interpretation services....
28 U.S.C. § 1920. Even if authorized by statute, however, “a cost must be both reasonable and necessary to the litigation for a prevailing party to recover it.” Little v. Mitsubishi Motors N. Am.,
On December 3, 2010, the Court entered judgment in favor of Defendants after finding United States Pаtent No. Re 37,-590, which Defendants were accused of infringing, invalid. (R. 480, Min. Entry.) Therefore, Defendants are the prevailing party and are entitled to recover all allowable costs pursuant to Rule 54(d).
II. Untimeliness
At the outset, Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ amended petition for costs should be dismissed in its entirety as untimely. (R. 488, PL’s Objs. at 1-3.) Under Local Rule 54.1(a), a prevailing party must file a bill of costs with the Court “[wjithin 30 days of the entry of a judgment allowing costs.” N.D. 111. L.R. 54.1(a). Judgment was entered in favor of Defendants on December 3, 2010. (R. 480, Min. Entry.) Defendants filed their original petition for costs eleven days thereafter, on December 14, 2010, seeking a total of $39,892.57 in costs. (R. 482, Defs.’ Pet. for Costs at 1; R. 480, Min. Entry.) Plaintiff filed objections to the original petition for costs, (R. 483, PL’s Initial Objs.), and shortly thereafter, on December 31, 2010, Defendants filed the amended petition for costs presently before the Court. (R. 484, Defs.’ Am. Pet. for Costs at 1.) Plaintiff concedes that this amended petition is “technically within the 30-day period allowed by the Local Rules,” but nevertheless argues that it should be considered untimely because the Defendаnts have added entirely new costs- — -namely, expert witness fees — that were not included in the original petition for costs. (R. 488, PL’s Objs. at 2.)
The Court disagrees. Plaintiff has not provided, and the Court has not found, any case law to support Plaintiffs theory that an amended petition for costs should be dismissed as untimely because it includes new costs not found in the prevailing party’s original petition for costs, even though the amended petition was filed within 30 days of entry of judgment. In general, it is within the discretion of the Court to allow revisions to a petition for costs, timely or otherwise. See O’Regan v. Arbitration Forums, Inc.,
III. Court Transcripts
Defendants request $782.04 in costs for court transcripts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920(2). (R. 484, Defs.’ Am. Pet. for Costs at 4.) A prevailing party may recover costs for court transcripts “necessarily obtained for use in the case.” 28 U.S.C. § 1920(2). “[TJranscripts need not be absolutely indispensable in order to provide the basis of an award of cоsts; it is enough if they are ‘reasonably necessary.’ ” Shanklin Corp.,
Defendants requested first copies of a daily transcript of the August 6, 2002 hearing transcript at a rate of $1.10 per page, for a total of $22.00. (R. 484-1, Defs.’ Ex. C at 2.) In 2002, the rate established by the Judicial Conference for an original ordinary transcript was $3.00 and $0.75 for a copy, whereas the rаte for an original daily transcript was $5.00 and $1.00 for a first copy of a daily transcript. Cengr v. Fusibond Piping Sys., Inc.,
Defendants also requested an original of a daily transcript of the September 30, 2005 hearing at a rate of $5.50 per page, for a total of $253.00, and first copies of an expedited transcript of the October 3, 2007 and February 27, 2008 hearing transcripts at a rate of $.90 per page, for a total of $11.70.
Finally, Defendants also requested first copies of an ordinary transcript of the April 3, 2008 hearing transcript at a rate of $0.83 per page, for a total of $81.34. (R. 484-1, Defs.’ Ex. C at 5.) After November 1, 2007, parties could recover up to $3.65 per page for ordinary transcripts and $0.90 per page for а first copy. Brown v. Cnty. of Cook, No. 06-617,
In sum, the Court reduces Defendants’ request by $515.20 and allows Defendants to recover a total of $266.84 in transcript costs.
IV. Deposition Transcripts
Defendants’ original petition for costs requested $31,240.53 in costs for deposition transcripts pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
V. Copying Costs
Defendants also seek $5,501.43 in copying costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4).
Plaintiff argues that Defendants should not be allowed to recover any of then-copying costs because they have provided insufficient evidence to demonstrate that these costs are properly recoverable. (R. 488, PL’s Objs. at 5.) Defendants, for then-part, have submitted various invoices for photocopying that was outsourced during the course of litigation. (R. 484-2, Defs.’ Ex. D at 6-22.) While the invoices provide the dates, number of sets created, quantity of pages copied, and rates charged per copy, none of the invoices describe the nature of the documents copied, or the purpose of the copies. See Leggett & Platt, Inc. v. Hickory Springs Mfg. Co.,
Defendants attempt to overcome this deficiency by stating that most of the copy costs they have submitted for reimbursement “occurred during the preparation of the taking and defending of depositions.” (R. 484, Defs.’ Am. Pet. for Costs at 5.) They also argue that the total amount they are seeking in copying costs is reasonable for several reasons. First, Defendants assert that they are only seeking copying costs for photocopies that they outsourced and not the countless copies Defendаnts’ counsel made in-house. {Id. at 4-5.) Second, Defendants assert that it would have been “nearly impossible” to properly identify and attribute all of the photocopying they produced in light of what Defendants claim were the more than 100,000 pages of documents produced by the parties, over 30 depositions taken, and more than 500 deposition exhibits marked and used. {Id. at 5.) Finally, Defendants reason that these costs are reasonable in general because of the size and length of this case, which lasted almost eight years. {Id.)
Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ assertions are still not enough to allow recovery for these costs. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ claim that “most” of the copying costs were related to depositions is highly suspect since some dates on Defendants’ invoices do not entirely line up with dates of the depositions in this case, as documented by Plaintiff. (R. 488, Pl.’s Objs. at 5-6.) For instance, Plaintiff points out that the last deposition Defendants conducted occurred on Fеbruary 22, 2007, yet many of the invoices Defendants submitted are dated after that date. {Id. at 6; R. 488-1, PL’s Ex. C. at 16.) According to Plaintiff, considering that it conducted the remaining depositions, it is unclear why Defendants would need to make copies for depositions Plaintiff was taking. (R. 488, PL’s Objs. at 6.) Moreover, Plaintiff .points out that in light of the related litigation involving Plaintiff that was simultaneously being handled by Defendants’ counsel in a separate case, it is “impossible” to discern whether invoices that are simply marked “Se-Kure” relate • to the instant case or the related case. {Id.)
Plaintiffs objections have merit. In light of these objections and the supporting evidence, Plaintiff has met its burden of affirmatively showing that Defendants are not entitled to all of the costs they seek. M.T. Bonk,
Based on the information Defendants havе proffered, however, the Court cannot verify with absolute certainty that these remaining costs were necessary for the litigation and not simply for the convenience of counsel. Yet, more certainty has inhered by deducting some of the invoices that Plaintiff has validly objected to. The Court remains mindful of Defendants’ assertions in support of its costs regarding the difficulty of keeping track of all copying costs in a case of this size, Northbrook,
VI. Exemplifications
Defendants also request $2,375.00 in costs for a single exemplification they acquired to use in a hearing pertaining to their inequitable conduct counterclaim against Plaintiff. (R. 484, Defs.’ Am. Pet. for Costs at 5.) In order to recover this cost, Defendants must demonstrate that the exemplification was “necessarily obtained for use in the case.” 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4); Cefalu v. Vill. of Elk Grove,
Defendants argue that the exemplification was necessary to aid the Court in understanding the evidence presented in the inequitable conduct hearing held in front of Judge Anderson. (R. 484, Defs.’ Am. Pet. for Costs at 5.) Plaintiff, however, argues that the exemplification did just the opposite by creating confusion and requiring briefing by both sides to clarify thе information contained in the exemplification. (R. 488, PL’s Objs. at 7.) Indeed, in his opinion on the inequitable conduct
VII. Expert witness fees
A. Recovery of expert witness fees under Rule 26(b)(4)(E)
Defendants’ amended petition for costs also seeks reimbursement for costs associated with the depositions of three of their expert witnesses. (R. 484, Defs.’ Am. Pet. for Costs at 3-4.) Defendants argue that these costs, which were incurred pursuant to Rule 26(b)(4)(E), are a recoverable cost under Rule 54(d).
The Court agrees with Plaintiffs reasoning. Both Plaintiff and Defendants rely on Chambers v. Ingram,
Unlike the losing party in Chambers, however, Plaintiff, the losing party in the instant case, does not challenge the prevailing Defendants’ request for its expert witness fees as untimely; rather, Plaintiff argues that it, too, is entitled to recover its own expert witness fees irrespective of the fact that it is not the prevailing party in this case. Although Chambers does not provide direct authority for this proposition, the Seventh Circuit did not explicitly state that only a prevailing party may recover expert witness fees post-judgment under Rule 26(b)(4)(E). Because the Seventh Circuit only had before it a petition for such costs from the prеvailing party and not from the losing party, it had no occasion to rule on whether a losing party can also petition for the same Rule 26(b)(4)(E) costs that the prevailing party was seeking in Chambers. Nevertheless, the fact that the Seventh Circuit in Chambers analyzed the recoverability of the prevailing party’s expert witness fees under the rubric of Rule 26(b)(4)(E) and not under Rule 54(d) strongly suggests that the recovery of a party’s own expert witnesses’ fees under Rule 26(b)(4)(E) is independent of any limitations set' forth in Rule 54(d), including the condition that a party seeking reimbursement for costs be the prevailing party in a case. See id. at 360-61 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(4)(E) advisory committee’s notes to 1970 Amendments; Nichols v. Layman,
An ample number of district court cases within the Seventh Circuit also support the conclusion that a party’s recovery of its own expert witness fees under Rule 26(b)(4)(E) is independent of Rule 54(d). See, e.g., Barnett v. City of Chi., No. 92-1683,
A few district courts within the Seventh Circuit, however, have tied a party’s recovery of its expert witness fees under Rule 26(b)(4)(E) to Rule 54(d). For example, in Fairley v. Andrews, which Defendants rely upon, the district court interpreted Chambers as holding that “expert witness fees pursuant [to Rule 26(b)(4)(E)] are recoverable as costs under Rule 54(d).”
This does not end the matter, however, as Plaintiff is seeking to recover expert witness fees for two of its experts who were deposed in 2007 pursuant to Rule 26 despite the fact that it is not a prevailing party. Under Rule 26(b)(4), parties may depose an opposing party’s expert witnesses under certain circumstances. Fed. R.Civ.P. 26(b)(4)(A), (D). And, pursuant to Rule 26(b)(4)(E), a “court must require that the party seeking discovery pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent in responding to discoveryf,]” unless “manifest injustice” will result. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(4)(E). The purpose of the rule “is to avoid the unfairness of requiring one party to provide expensive discovery for another party’s benefit without reimbursement.” See United States v. City of Twin Falls, Idaho,
While the plain language of Rule 26(b)(4)(E) supports this conclusion, the Court has not found any Seventh Circuit authority, nor has Plaintiff provided any additional authority, directly on point as to whether a losing party may request these fees as well. The closest the Seventh Circuit has come to addressing this issue is in Schrott v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.,
Although the Court’s own research has not uncovered a district court case within the Seventh Circuit where expert witness fees under Rule 26(b)(4)(E) were granted to a losing party after judgment had been entered against the party, a few district courts have noted that such fees are not limited to a prevailing party. Nilssen v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., No. 01-3585,
Courts in other jurisdictions have also allowed a losing party to recover expert witness fees post-judgment pursuant to Rule 26(b)(4)(E). For example, in Louisiana Power & Light Co., the prevailing plaintiff won a jury verdict against several defendants and submitted a pеtition for costs to the district court that, in addition to attorneys’ fees and other taxable costs, sought to recover expert witness fees under Rule 26.
B. Defendants’ request for expert witness fees
Defendants seek a total of $13,680.00 in fees submitted by three of their expert witnesses in connection with their depositions: Charles Kuyk, Walter Herbst, and Mark Despres. (R. 484, Defs.’ Am. Pet. for Costs at 3-4.) Kuyk, Defendants’ damages expert, spent 16 spent preparing for and attending his deposition, at a rate of $405.00 per hour, for a total of $6,480.00. (Id. at 3.) Herbst, Defendants’ technical expert, also spent 16 hours preparing for and attending his deposition, at a rate of $300.00 per hour, for total of $4,800.00. (Id.) Despres, another technical expert, also spent 16 hours preparing for and attending his deposition, at a rate of $150.00 per hour, for a total of $2,400.00. (Id.)
Again, under Rule 26(b)(4)(E), compensating an expert for time spent in responding to discovery is mandatory. Fed. R.Civ.P. 26(b)(4)(E). Additionally, the rule requires that: (1) the costs of the expert not be imposed if doing so will
In general, courts determine the reasonableness of an expert’s fee by considering the following factors: (1) the expert’s аrea of expertise; (2) the education and training required to provide the expert insight that is sought; (3) the prevailing rates of other comparably respected available experts; (4) the nature, quality, and complexity of the discovery responses provided; (5) the fee actually being charged to the party that retained the expert; (6) fees traditionally charged by the expert on related matters; and (7) any other factor likely to be of assistance to the court in balancing the interests implicated by Rule 26. See Royal Maccabees Life Ins. Co.,
Here, Plaintiff does not challenge the hourly rate charged by any of Defendants’ experts as unreasonable, nor has еither party provided any evidence as to the factors mentioned above. Nonetheless, the Court finds that based on the nature and complexity of this patent infringement case and the rates charged by Plaintiffs own experts for similar services ($400.00 and $210.00 per hour), the rates sought by each of Defendants’ experts ($150.00, $300.00, and $405.00 per hour) are reasonable. See Nilssen,
Although Plaintiff did not contest the hourly rates charged by Defendants’ experts, Plaintiff does contest the amount of time Herbst and Despres spent in preparing for and attending their depositions: (R. 488, Pl.’s Objs. at 3.) Specifically, Plaintiff argues that their fees should not be recoverable because their billing statements do not provide an adequate breakdown of the time they actually spent preparing for and attending their depositions. (Id.) Defendants admit that Herbst’s and Despres’ billing statements are not as detailed as Kuyk’s, but contend that the amount of time Defendants are seeking to be reimbursed for their experts’ services is “very reasonable and conservative.” (R. 484 Defs.’ Am. Pet. for Costs at 4.)
In general, courts in this District have concluded that, under Rule 26(b)(4)(E), it is reasonable for a party to recover expert witness fees from the opposing party for the time an expert spent both preparing for and attending a deposition conducted by the opposing party.
Defendants have included in their amended petition for costs a very detailed billing statement for Kuyk’s fees that supports the 16 hours of his services that they seek to be reimbursed for. The relevant entries in Kuyk’s billing statement show that he spent at least 7 hours preparing for his deposition during the two days prior to his deposition, and on the day of his deposition he spent 9 hours both preparing for and attending his deposition. (R. 484-2, Defs.’ Ex. E at 34-35.) This aligns with Defendants’ assertion that each expert spent roughly one day (8 hours) preparing for and one day (8 hours) participating in each of their depositions, for a total of 16 hours in fees per expert. (R. 484, Defs.’ Am. Pet. for Costs at 3-4.) Because this falls well within the 3 to 1 preparation to deposition time ratio that the Court has held to be reasonable in this case, and Plaintiff has not disputed Kuyk’s fees, the Court awards Defendants the entirety of Kuyk’s fees, or $6,480.00.
Despite the lack of detail, Plaintiff does not challenge this breakdown as incorrect, nor has Plaintiff offered evidence or even suggested that each expert’s deposition lasted for a length of time different than what Defendants have asserted. In general, “[w]here the parties offer little evidence to support their positions, the court may use its discretion in determining the reasonableness of the charged fee.” Liquid Dynamics,
Lastly, Plaintiff does not argue that any manifest injustice will result in reimbursing Defendants for these fees, and the Court finds no manifest injustice in allowing Defendants to recover these fees. A finding of manifest injustice is rare and is granted only in extreme circumstances. See, e.g., Nilssen,
C. Plaintiffs request for expert witness fees
Applying the same standards laid out above, the Court next addresses Plaintiffs
Although Plaintiff, like Defendants, did not submit any additional documentation to support the hourly rates its experts charged, both Levko’s and DiLonardo’s rates ($400.00 and $210.00 per hour, respectively) are substantially similar to Defendants’ experts’ rates (ranging from $150.00 and $405.00 per hour). Thus, for the same reasons the Court held Defendants’ experts’ rates to be reasonable, supra, the Court, in the exercise of its discretion, finds that Plaintiffs experts’ rates are also reasonable. Royal Maccabees,
Plaintiff has included detailed billing statements from its experts in support of its requests. With respect to DiLonardo, Plaintiff seeks reimbursement for 32 hours that he billed, as well as travel expenses. (R. 488, Pl.’s Objs. at 4.) Specifically, DiLonardo spent 7 hours attending his deposition and 25 hours preparing for his deposition. (R. 488-1, Pl.’s Ex. B at 11.) This ratio of preparation to deposition time, approximately 4.6 to 1, exceeds the 3 to 1 ratio the Court has determined to be reasonable for this case. Thus, the Court allows Plaintiff to only recover for 21 hours of preparation time for DiLonardo, for a total of 28 hours (21 hours for preparation, plus 7 hours for the deposition). Applying DiLonardo’s rate of $210.00 per hour to the 28 hours results in $5,880.00 in fees. In addition, DiLonardo incurred $562.49 in travel expenses for attending his deposition, which are recoverable. Nilssen,
With respect to Levko, Plaintiff seeks reimbursement for 30 hours of his time. (R. 488, Pl.’s Objs. at 4.) As an initial matter, upon the Court’s review, Levko’s billing entries that mention “deposition” only add up to 24 hours. (R. 488-1, Pl.’s Ex. A at 4, 7.) Those entries that mention the term “deposition” are listed below:
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Plaintiff has failed to inform the Court as to the length of time of Levko’s deposition. In the absence of this information, the Court, in the exercise of discretion, allows Plaintiff to recover 7 hours for Levko’s deposition — the same amount of time as the deposition for Plaintiffs other expert, DiLonardo, and treats the remaining 5 hours from February 6th as preparation time. Liquid Dynamics, 2002 WL
Lastly, the Court finds that there would be no manifest injustice in allowing Plaintiff to recover these fees against Defendants. While Defendants’ counterclaims against Plaintiff in this case included a charge of inequitable conduct for pursuing this patent infringement suit against Defendants, unlike the court’s finding in Nilssen,
The fact that Plaintiff is not the prevailing party in this case is, again, irrelevant with respect to the issue of expert witness fees. Thus, finding no manifest injustice against Defendants, Plaintiff shall be awarded a total of $14,042.49 in expert witness fees pursuant to Rule 26(b)(4)(E).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants’ amended petition for costs (R. 484). Defendants’ bill of costs, requesting $38,693.77, is reduced by $20,263.44 ($515.20 (court transcripts) + $3,330.75 (copying costs) + $2,375 (exemplification) + $14,042.49 (expert witness fees credited to Plaintiff)). Defendants are awarded costs taxable to Plaintiff in the amount of $18,430.33 ($38,693.77 (total costs requested)-$20,263.44 (total deductions)).
It is this Court’s hope that this order will bring this long-pending litigation, which has been handled by multiple judicial officers, to an end.
Notes
. Although Defendants state that they seek $38,667.34 in costs, (R. 484, Defs.' Am. Pet. for Costs at 2), Defendants have actually identified a total of $38,693.77 in costs in their amended petition for costs ($13,680.00 in expert witness fees, $16,355.30 in deposition transcript costs, $782.04 in court transcript costs, $5,501.43 in copying costs (as calculated by the invoices actually provided), and $2,375.00 in exemplification costs).
. Defendants submitted an invoice for $11.70 for costs associated with both the October 3, 2007 and February 27, 2008 hearing transcripts. Because the invoice is unclear about the number of pages to allocate to each transcript, the Court treats the entire invoice as a request for the costs associated with the October 3, 2007 hearing transcript.
. Although Defendants state that they seek $5,495.00 in costs, the invoices they have submitted in support total $5,501.43. The Court relies on the latter amount in calculating the amount Defendants may be awarded.
. Both Plaintiff and Defendants have cited to Rule 26(b)(4)(C) in their briefs to support their rеquests for expert witness fees. On December 1, 2010, the Federal Rules Advisory Committee issued amendments that included changes to Rule 26 as a whole. These changes resulted in a renumbering of Rule 26(b)(4)(C) to Rule 26(b)(4)(E); however, no substantive changes to the language contained in former Rule 26(b)(4)(C) were made. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 26, advisory committee’s notes to 2010 Amendments. Similarly, a stylistic change was made to former Rule 26(b)(4)(C) in amendments issued on December 1, 2007; the change — editing "shall require” to "must require” — should have no substantive effect on the way courts have interpreted former Rule 26(b)(4)(C) up until now.
. Plaintiff appears to raise an argument as to the timeliness of Defendants' request, but fails to develop the point. (R. 488, PL’s Objs. at 4.) The Court declines to make a finding as to the timelines a party must adhere to when requesting expert witness fees pursuant to Rule 26(b)(4)(E) as both parties in the instant case, like the prevailing party in Chambers, have requested these costs soon after final judgment was entered and in connection with or in response to a petition for costs.
. In a footnote, and without citing to any case law, Plaintiff suggests that in order to recover costs under Rule 26(b)(4)(E), the parties were obligated to meet and confer on the issue beforehand pursuant to Rule 37. (R. 488, Pl.’s Objs. at 4 n. 2.) Nothing in the text of either rule supports this conclusion, and none of the cases relied upon by the Court that discuss Rule 26 mentions this as a possible bar to recovering expert witness fees under Rule 26(b)(4)(E). Accordingly, the Court declines to deny Defendants’ request for expert witness fees on this basis.
. Plaintiff briefly mentions in a footnote that there is mixed authority on this issue, but ultimately acknowledges that Waters v. City of Chicago, 526 F.Supp.2d 899 (N.D.Ill.2007), recognizes that the majority view tends towards including expert preparation. (R. 488, PL’s Objs. at 3 n. 1.)