In re: SDDS, INC., a South Dakota, Corporation, Petitioner. SDDS, Inc., Appellee/Cross-appellant, v. State of South Dakota, Appellant/Cross-appellee. Mark W. Barnett, Attorney General of the State of South Dakota; Joyce Hazeltine, Secretary of State of South Dakota; George S. Mickelson, Governor of the State of South Dakota, Defendants. Action for the Environment, Intervenor Defendant.
Nos. 98-3588, 99-1034, 99-1035
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
Submitted: May 8, 2000. Filed: Sept. 15, 2000.
225 F.3d 970
Edward T. Lyons, Denver, CO, argued, for Appellee.
Before MCMILLIAN, JOHN R. GIBSON and BEAM, Circuit Judges.
McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge.
This matter began in 1991 with a complaint filed in the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota by SDDS, Inc. (SDDS), against the State of South Dakota (the State), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to
The background facts have been stated in our prior opinions. See SDDS VIII, 97 F.3d at 1032-34. Briefly summarized, this litigation arises out of an unsuccessful effort by SDDS to construct and operate a multistate solid waste disposal (MSWD) facility near Edgemont, South Dakota. Opposition to the MSWD facility prompted, among other things, two ballot initiatives. The second ballot initiative, or referendum, effectively ended SDDS‘s plan to develop the MSWD facility. See id. at 1033 (“The electorate vetoed the MSWD facility, which ‘shut down’ SDDS‘s MSWD site.“). SDDS brought the present
For nearly ten years, the two cases—one in federal court, the other in state court—followed long, convoluted, and intertwined procedural journeys. Along the way, we twice reversed summary judgment dispositions by the district court in favor of the defendants. See SDDS III, 994 F.2d at 494; SDDS VI, 47 F.3d at 272. Consistent with our decision in SDDS VI, the district court, on April 24, 1995, entered judgment in favor of SDDS and against the defendants, declaring that the second ballot initiative violated the dormant commerce clause and assessing costs to the defendants. In SDDS VIII, 97 F.3d at 1041-42, we instructed the district court to enter an order enjoining the defendants from relitigating certain specified issues in the state court proceedings. After the mandate for SDDS VIII issued on November 15, 1996, the district court issued the required injunction on December 12, 1996. The South Dakota Supreme Court held that the state courts were bound by the district court‘s order granting the defendants injunctive relief, notwithstanding its disagreement with that order on the merits, and, on May 18, 1998, the United States Supreme Court denied the defendants’ resulting petition for a writ of certiorari. See SDDS, Inc. v. State, 569 N.W.2d 289, 293-95 & n. 9 (S.D.1997) (SDDS IX), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1118, 118 S.Ct. 1796, 140 L.Ed.2d 937 (1998) (SDDS X).
On June 9, 1998, the State moved pursuant to
Appeal No. 98-3588
The State appeals from the district court‘s order of August 24, 1998, denying the State‘s
Cross-appeals Nos. 99–1034/1035
The State also appeals the district court‘s November 6, 1998, award of attorneys’ fees and costs, again relying on the argument that the underlying judgments were void on Eleventh Amendment grounds. SDDS cross-appeals, arguing that the district court abused its discretion in failing to award the full amount of attorneys’ fees requested.
Upon review, we note that the State‘s appeal from the award of attorneys’ fees and costs assumes success on its appeal from the district court‘s August 24, 1998, decision, involving the merits of the State‘s belated Eleventh Amendment defense. Having affirmed the August 24, 1998, order, we find no basis for reversing the district court‘s decision to award SDDS attorneys’ fees and costs. (It would, of course, defy logic to permit the State to invoke its Eleventh Amendment argument to now preclude SDDS from recovering attorneys’ fees and costs which were incurred in defeating that very argument.)
Furthermore, on careful review of the district court‘s determination of SDDS‘s reasonable attorneys’ fees, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to award SDDS‘s entire request. The district court‘s order of November 6, 1998, is affirmed.
Petition to recall the mandate
In the spring of 1999, the inverse condemnation case in South Dakota state court proceeded to trial before a jury on the issue of SDDS‘s damages. On April 6, 1999, the jury found that SDDS‘s damages amounted to $10.1 million. The State moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or a new trial, and, on January 6, 2000, the state trial court held a hearing on the motion. Ruling from the bench, the state trial court denied the State‘s motion for JNOV but granted a new trial on the basis of instructional error. Thereafter, on February 23, 2000, SDDS challenged that ruling by filing a petition in this court requesting that we recall, clarify, and supplement our mandate in SDDS VIII. In essence, SDDS argues that the state trial court has misconstrued the federal injunction, and we should therefore reopen and revise our earlier decision in order to compel a different ruling by the state court. SDDS describes the relief it seeks as follows: “This would necessarily consist [of] an additional direction to the district court to enjoin the Defendants and the state trial court from relitigating any of those issues expressly and by necessary implication decided by this Court in SDDS VI or SDDS VIII.” SDDS‘s Petition to Recall, Clarify and Supplement Mandate at 12 (emphasis added). In SDDS VIII, we directed the district court to enjoin the defendants, not the state courts, from relitigating certain issues. The district court complied with our directions, and the South Dakota Supreme Court ruled that the district court‘s order is binding upon the state courts. We do not, however, sit as a court of appeals over the South Dakota courts. We have neither the power nor the inclination to provide
MCMILLIAN
Circuit Judge