*1 property there an intent show was to convert the larceny. to the nse of the taker to constitute This case prior decided to the was and 1953 amendments which supra. in § resulted At that time the 41-3929, statute provided that exist an intent there to convert to provision by taker’s use. This was eliminated policy amendment. In that case the covered loss robbery pilferage” alleged “theft, thief was employ employed aj; of the assured but was garage the car where was stored. enacting Legislature § 41-3929, defined lar- ceny including bailee as the use of a bailed vehicle contrary provisions agreement to the or condi- tions under which obtained. The intention to con- significantly vert to the use the taker was omitted from the amended and it clear that statute, such necessary intent is taking- not now in this state where the provisions falls within the of said section. Under the undisputed testimony in the at bar the acts Rogers clearly Hubert fall within definition of, and larceny as set out the statute. constitute, judgment accordingly reversed and the cause judgment remanded with to enter directions in favor appellant damage stipulated plus statutory of penalty for the attorney’s
and a reasonable fee.
Scurlock, Commissioner of Revenues v. Henderson. 5-339 268 S. W. 2d 619
Opinion May delivered 31,
[Rehearing denied June 1954.] *2 appellant. T. Reinmiller, for Ward and Russell O. appellee. Elsijane Roy Roy, S T. and Reid for question Chief Justice. for Smith, G-rieein provided by exemptions determination is whether tax 6(d) (sup.) of Act Ark. 84-3106 § § Stat’s, machinery may purchases of one be invoked favor who tangible extends to for personal cotton. The property . . used manufacturers or processing, processors or for further com- distributors manufacturing; tangible personal [also] pounding, or expansion replacement, property repair, used or for processing existing or facilities .” purchased gin A. March, Henderson, Jr., W. machinery corporation used at from a Texas Mar- Revenues asserted Arkansas. The Commissioner of vel, paid price obligation based on the for the $208.88, machinery. position gin- is that The Commissioner’s ning within cotton legislative intent. general know matter of information that We ginned, including leaves and hulls when trash — seeds from the are taken fiber. removed, and —is purpose, the seeds hulls serve one commercial an- principal such becomes the com- cotton as and other, marketing processing. modity, ready says But, appellee, field has taken un- the raw material necessary dergone without which its transformation, impaired. would be value conceded that is a flexible
It must be applied any might strictness be altera- term cutting such as trees conver- raw material, tion of preliminary washing potatoes plac- lumber, sion into thrashing- ing husking selling corn, them sacks, removing- grain, from straw- similar stems wheat and the like. berries, is that cotton becomes commercial
Our conclusion ginned. Samples, commodity be- taken either when buyers grade quality ginning, fore or after enable offerings offerings price controlled that are and make — demand for limits domestic and world narrow within placed ginner’s plat- on the after it has been fiber *3 ready compressed. It is for or then form, or manufacturing. Georgia largely Warehouse
The State relies appellee Jolley, 172 Ga. S. E. 172, 157 v.Co. principle in enunciated that case traversed thinks the Manufacturing Ginmng & in v. Farmers Mutual Moore Company, 2d 209. Another case 51 77 Pac. Ariz. presently Boston discussed is Assessors bewill Mass. al., Taxation et v. Commissioners of E. 2d 129. N. in A constitu- was decided 1921.
The county permitted or the voters a tional amendment political at an election to determine subdivision other enlargement of exist- or whether new manufactories years. tax-exempt period ing- for a of five ones should be Jolley county adopted policy constructed Macon execution gin. sheriff levied a tax modern sought injunction. Jolley af- year an refusing- enjoin, firming to trial court in action said: Court meaning “Considering ‘manufac- of the word ’ the mean- turing with our consideration in connection plain ‘processing’, word ing- it must stage process only or ‘processing’ to some reference has generic meaning manufacturing. of the word manufacturing has relation related to as ‘cotton’ product cotton as a marketable in the marts of commerce. universally recognized The term referring ‘cotton’ is something which can be manufactured so as to be of use civilized man. we are of the So that the ‘processing’ process means word put cotton after has been in a form marketable ginning”. opinions our
None of has construed Dictionary help as utilized in Act 487. definitions but may for it must be conceded little, that the term relate range might to a broad one transactions, of which have inception only slightly raw material altered in constituting indispensable step but an form, continu- progressive ous conversion into an article of com- operation might, merce. Such initial in some circum- process. be a stances, De- fining equally “definition” is difficult, closely is so connected classification until that, nature of the latter some measure under- pur- [definition] stood, cannot discussed to much pose”. Logic, § Mills, I. J. S. viii, lay purpose
It is not our here to down an inflexible applicable 6(d) of § rule Act 487. Our conclusions necessarily must be restricted to of cotton. *4 Appellee correct result thinks the reached was the Court Arizona in case. The Moore’s distinction —not in the stressed either fact brief—lies exemption claims that one who the benefit of an must clearly right. gone Our have establish the cases far in holding exemptions presumed. tax that are never In Fitzgerald, Brodie Ark. 22 v. S. W. 29, Mr. Justice Desty Hughes quoted also on Taxation. He cases, cited approval exemptions, the that no statement matter grace upon how the meritorious, are acts the restrictively sovereign, [for] treated, and must be every . . reasonable intendment must be made design power not the to surrender was any property propor- or to due its taxation, tion of the burden of taxation”. language just copied quoted by was Mr. Justice Mehaffy Company, in Wiseman v. Madison Cadillac 2d Ark. 103 A. 1208. S. W. See L. In R., Judge Mehaffy Cooley the Wiseman case cited on Taxa p. 2Vol. 4th Ed., § 1403. There the textwriter tion, Exemptions presumed, said:££. never bur are [resting] clearly right den aon claimant to establish his exemption, alleged grant exemption and an will be strictly cannot be out inference construed, and made beyond implication, but must reasonable doubt. In other taxation is the words, since rule exception, exemption ought, make intention to an be.expressed unambiguous it can clear terms; language not taken intended when to have been depends doubtful the statute on which or uncer is tain”. positive language guide, as turn
With let us appellee to the Arizona stresses and which he logic relies for decision. contradiction Judge there statement Lockwood’s plaintiffs de and defendants admitted that the obligation pay under a tax. The fendants were question pro ginning cotton fell within the whether provision gross income on which visions of the statute’s percent, or under the the rate was one-fourth of one privilege exacting percent. provision tax one sales Judge parties agree Lockwood then said: ££The also the case is that where of law which decisive of rule particular enactment, statute a there is the same comprehensive general in its most which, also a one subject in the would matter embraced include sense, operative, particular particular enactment one, the general to affect such one be taken cases must language general in the included within provisions particular enactment”. *5 analysis comprehensive paragraph a
In devoted to a expressed delightfully statutory sections, of the two carefully opinion writer concluded that the reasoned, litigants- by agreed to the of construction under rule ginning undoubtedly it is since cotton, product, provisions agricultural falls within the (a) general provi- rather subsection than within being ‘any tangible (g) personal sions of subsection property whatsoever” ’. actually it seen that be what the court did
Thus will tax- was ing authority determine which of the two classifications the apply should cotton,
intended particular language and since thought by enactment contained the test rule the court to meet of law approved. agreed upon, the lower rate was by appealed controversy Assessors to which reference has made, been distinction Boston, cannot By drawn. of Massachusetts machin- laws manufacturing corporations exempted ery of imposed corporation there was local taxation. a Instead, ap- for Boston franchise tax. The board assessors pealed having single judgments, with in a twelve all dealt by opinion written Mr. Justice Ronan for the Scouring Company, Merchants Wool a Judicial Court. corporation, would from local Massachusetts justified judicial if nature taxation of its business manufacturing corporation. finding it domestic that was a processing- company’s that of business was plant others at for the account of and waste wool raw in Boston.1 explanation: “If the wool when received contains this slightly scouring good it contains a because not in condition is machine; matter, foreign it is fed into excessive amount dusting^ machine; heavily put it into a or if matted it is matted is breaker or if containing tag put breaker. a machine known as the Wool it is machine, picking then a burr and if wool is not burrs is treated by submerging relatively it is carbonized it into a free from burrs ready scouring, sulphuric it acid. When the wool is is solution of belt, pine, put conveyor the wool studded with catches upward it and evened off a toothed it is combed out and raises finally deposited submerged rake, hot water to which by squeezed out, in a vat in which it is and it is agitated a chemical solution is added and where from this and the water a series of rakes. The wool is removed vat submerged again vat in a solution a second compound. and treated chemical It is then removed water another finally conveyed in a It a fourth
in a similar manner vat third vat. submerged rinsing again bleaching vat where it is known as bleaching in water which a solution is added if the customer desires vat, the wool to have a certain color. The wool is removed from this *6 Judge analyzing said that tlie Ronan fairly if rea- statute should be construed “to effectuate, sonably legislative purpose. possible, intent and given ‘engaged manufacturing’ not to a words are be ’’ meaning. narrow or restricted touching It the construction manu- been said that has par- facturing, peculiar processing, commodities to a and geographical necessarily ticular district is influenced local or area and necessities. The activities posi- in much Massachusetts better Judicial Court of authority lawmaking tion than to determine what the we purpose inviting manufac- mind when had in encouraging do- non-resident or tories into the or state, plants, exemptions organizations were mestic to build provided. necessarily legislative has a intent
The “feel” of industry, and activities; and relation to local commerce, inevitably know true what courts to be blends with kinship judicial notice. change
Strictly speaking, any in a com- or alteration “processing,” modity process,- utilized in as but exemption hav- have been selected a word must Act, upon manufacturing. bearing ing some direct agree is not with the court We manufacturing, that the Commissioner and or making It assessment. follows correct judgment reversed. must be dissent. and McF addin, Justices Robinson Millwee dissenting. ma- Justice, Minor W. Millwee, rule of jority construction its touchstone takes as presumed, exemptions never are tax the axiom that beyond exemption grant be made out must undoubtedly true, but, This is a reasonable doubt. strongly most clauses are to construed taxpayer, they strictly
against to be so con- customer, ready carding dried, and shipped bagged, cloth, rugs. processes thread, spinning The different steps changing subjected has been are essential wool up it can made into cloth.” of raw before wool purpose destroy strued toas defeat or the intent the enactment, and no strained construction will be given them that will effect that v. end. State Wertheimer Bag Co., 253 Ala. 124, 127, So. 2d 824. It has been *7 expresses exempt said “If the act the intent judicial property, appropriate. certain not construction is exemption.” to defeat Estate, re Bendheim’s App. 100 Cal. 2d 398, 2d P. 874. The ultimate con statutory interpretation sideration in all of cases is the legislature, intention of the and this intention must primarily language be determined from the McKinley, statute itself. Labor, Commissioner v. of Payne R. L. Company, & Son Lumber 200 Ark. S. 2dW. opinion strongly majority relies much Georgia Jolley, of v.
cited case Warehouse Co. 172 Ga. E. in which 172, 157 S. the court “The term said: universally recognized referring 'cotton’ is to some thing can be manufactured use so as to be of opinion a civilized man. So we of the word 'processing’ process manufacturing means a cotton put by ginning, after it has been ain marketable form merely separation which is seed, and seed cotton is not referred the constitu It difficult to see how the tional amendment.” Georgia arbitrarily draw a line court can thus by chain of from the boll to the bolt of cloth evolution saying point a certain before the cotton is prepared being processed undergoing to be rather than processing. Perhaps reasoning of the case can explained by express the court’s statement that the purpose of the Constitutional amendment under consid encourage manufacturing; eration in that case was to “processing” considers the word in the light “manufacturing” ascribing rather than any meaning appellee argues its own. In case, separating “manufacturing” “or” that the word “processing” gives meaning each word uncolored accepting the other. connotations But even Georgia rationale of the case, Warehouse still it seems undeniable is a far less inclusive scope activity tbe term and need embrace near “manufacturing”, bolding, and tbe court’s synonymous that tbe effect, terms are seems strained indeed. problem statute is of this of tbe construction
Tbe Kennedy v. Board State for as is one, a difficult said 25: Ia. N. Review, 276 W. Assessment “Technically speaking any change, chemical or otherwise certainly legislature .”, is a . . almost facility every from taxation did not intend to steps product. in theory, from seed to end Under such water, be reached,
ridiculous results could implements, play farm all in the fertilizer, etc., development early crops eventually which are used processors. Kennedy manufacturers In the *8 supra, problem, recognizes goes case, the court “ say: on legislature to . . . but I not believe do to de a call the intended so strained construction processing. crops by veloping . . fertilizer a of means of growing in of the article not the common use of is processing, change in term a but some the article special grown after it processing.” a means treatment is logical This would a much seem more place to draw the line than forth in that set supra. case, Warehouse Commissioner Cor- Boston v. In Assessors
porations al., et 323 Mass. Taxation opinion, discussing majority in in N. E. cited 2d manufactory, scouring company’s a a nature as wool scouring “If the were done a textile the court said: factory, in his own would be difficult manufacturer department say employed scouring to that in the those engaged manufacturing. in If were not the manufac- department in turer let the work that an inde- out to pendent performed to in contractor manufac- factory, manufacturer could the insurer turer’s not compensation payment workmen’s to avoid independent injured employee contractor of the performing a in a of or the trade or words, manufacturer. other business scouring integral part wool is an essential and manufacturing scouring of textiles. The does merely foreign more than It remove matter from the wool. portion removes of the natural elements contained say not the fibers. To does start until has been scoured not seem to be after wool does a realistic view of the situation. It would be more step say scouring accurate first trans- forming product. the wool new finished We think manufacturing begins scouring.” with the might very applied
The rationale of this case well be holding manufacturing, experts for there were cannot be used for who testified that the cotton until it has been ginned, certainly ginning portion “removes a the natural contained in the elements fibers.” But our statute would seem necessitate that this court uphold go appellee, that far order the award to viewing “processing” light for even in the of “manu- facturing”, synonymous; still the terms are not indeed, b¿ to meaningless redundancy. hold them so would to render contrary, exemp-
To the our something tion would seem to be satisfied with less than manufacturing; “something what this is, less” is the only remaining problem for consideration. the writer that a
It would seem to common sense point “manufacturing” between of distinction *9 “processing”, viewing light latter composed former, is that of various processes, processes empt operations composed but that other are legislature
also, and that the intended to ex- activity process which is a in manufacture exempt processes op- not to in other forms of eration. ginning clearly construction, this
Under manufacturing. In this connection would supposed naturally industry that the members of the they engaged a fair as to what notion would have were previously, expert in. As stated witnesses testified can be used that cotton after ginning. Appellee journals, many introduced into evidence trade pamphlets dealing
bulletins and with cotton “process” culture which show that the words commonly used reference to the ginning of cotton cotton men. it is difficult Indeed, anyone activity to discuss the under consideration repeated without use of these words. Thus the legislature, intention of the determined a reason- interpretation able exempting the words of the statute, would seem to be to from taxation (cid:127) machinery ginning. used in cotton Such was the interpretation placed appellant on the statute until controversy instant arose. course, Of wisdom of the Legisla- was a matter for the ture —and not this court. paragraph opinion, majority
In the final “ginning processing hold manufacturing”, is not leaving speculate just this writer to as to what possibly could be and also what and manu- facturing are. holding, respectfully Prom I dissent. join
Justices McPaddin and Robinson in this dissent.
Karoley v. Reid. 269 S. W. 2d 5-438 Opinion May delivered July 5, rehearing delivered 1954.]
[Supplemental on