Bеfore this Court are two related cases concerning injuries sustained by the plaintiffs allegedly due to the ingestion of lead-based paint. These cases present the same legal issue we addressed today in
Richwind Joint Venture 4 v. Brunson,
Summary judgment is аppropriate “if the motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute as to any
*691
material fact and that the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Maryland Rule 2-501(e).
See Heat & Power v. Air Products,
Ingram Scroggins et al. v. Herbert Dahne
The premises in the instant case are located on the second floor of 1928 North Fulton Avenue in Baltimore City, Maryland (“apartment”). During all times relevant to this case, the apartment was owned by Dahnco, Inc. (“Dahnco”) or Herbert Dahne. Mr. Dahne is an officer of Dahnco and was responsible for maintaining, managing, and operating the apartment during the time the lead poisoning occurred. Gail Scroggins and her son Ingram Scroggins, Jr. lived in the apartment from June 1973 until February 1976. In early 1974, when Ingram was being treated for a blocked intestine, he was found to have elevated levels of lead in his blood. *692 Ingram was 20 months old at the time he was diagnosed with lead poisoning.
In March of 1990, the minor Ingram Scroggins, by his mother as next friend, and his mother individually, brought suit against Herbert Dahne. The complaint alleged negligence (count 1), loss of the infant’s services during minority (count 2), violation of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act (count 3), strict liability (count 4), and willful and wanton disregard for human life which gave rise to punitive damages (count 5).
After about a year of discovery, Dahne filed a motion to dismiss cоunts 2 through 5 on the grounds that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. This motion was granted in November of 1991. Discovery continued with respect to the remaining negligence count. In March of 1993, Dahne sought summary judgment on the nеgligence count claiming that, because it was undisputed that he had no notice of flaking lead paint, he could not have breached a duty to the plaintiffs and was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. After a hearing on the motion, the trial judgе granted summary judgment.
It is undisputed that Dahne received no written or oral notice from Ms. Scroggins of flaking paint in the apartment. 1 The plaintiffs argue, however, that notice should be imputed to Dahne because he had notice of a hole in thе wall of the premises, and if he had come to the apartment to repair that hole, he would have seen flaking paint. The child’s mother contends that she caught her son eating plaster from the hole in the wall. She claims that she then “cоmplained to the landlord with regard to a hole in the wall from which Ingram was eating.” The January 10, 1974 records from Johns Hopkins Hospital, where the infant plaintiff was diagnosed with lead poisoning, indicate that the child was “noted to be eating *693 plaster” twо days prior to his admittance to the hospital. The hospital records further indicate that there was no prior history of the child eating paint or plaster. It appears from the evidence that the plaintiff notified the landlord of the hole in the wall sometime between when she noticed the child eating the plaster and when she took the child to the hospital two days later. Evidence from the plaintiffs’ own expert also indicates that the plaster around the hole was not the source of the child’s lead poisoning, and there is no evidence to indicate that any other notice of flaking or peeling paint was given to the landlord prior to that time.
As explained today in
Richwind,
The plaintiffs also assert on appeal that the trial сourt wrongly dismissed their claim that Dahne violated Mary *694 land’s Consumer Protection Act (“CPA”). See, e.g., Maryland Code (1975, 1990 RepLVol.), Commercial Law Article, §§ 13-101 through 13-501. Although the CPA was in effect during the plaintiffs’ tenancy in the apartment, it was not until July 1, 1976 that amendments “including certain real property transactions ... аnd certain leases and rentals within the scope of the Consumer Protection Act” became effective. Chapter 907 of the Acts of 1976. The plaintiffs moved out of the apartment in February of 1976, before the Act applied to rental рroperty transactions. Therefore, the CPA is not applicable to the instant case. 2
It is a basic rule of statutory construction that “[a] statute is presumed to have prospective effect only, unless there is a clear legislativе intent that the statute operate retroactively.”
Songer v. State,
Jacquetta Davis et al. v. Jack W. Stollof et al.
Appellant Jacquetta Davis, the infant daughter of Valerie Brooks, was found to be suffering from lead poisoning while residing at 1924 North Patterson Park Avenue in Baltimore City (“premises”). From the time of her birth in August 1982 until November 1986, Jacquetta lived with her mother and sevеral other relatives in the premises. Jacquetta’s grand *695 mother, Ruby Lee Patterson, rented the premises in about 1977, and Ms. Patterson lived with Jacquetta and Ms. Brooks from 1982 to 1986. Although Ms. Patterson had previously dealt with a variety of landlords during the time she lived at thе premises, when the lead poisoning occurred, defendants Jack W. Stollof and Friendship Realty Company (landlords) owned and managed the premises. Valerie Brooks sued the landlords, individually and on behalf of Jacquetta, under theories of nеgligence, violation of the Consumer Protection Act, and strict liability. She sought both compensatory and punitive damages. After hearing argument on the negligence and CPA claims, 3 the trial judge granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all counts.
In thеir answer to the landlords’ motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs simply restated the facts tending to show there was flaking paint in the premises, and argued that the presence of such paint is a violation of the Baltimore City Housing Code and, therefore, is evidence of negligence. See Balt. City Code (1983 RepLVol.), Art. 13. The plaintiffs brought forth no evidence, however, tending to prove the dispositive issue of whether the landlords had notice of peeling paint. In fact, the evidence in the record clearly shows that no notice concerning any paint problems was ever given to the landlords prior to Jacquetta’s injury.
Although Ms. Patterson and Ms. Brooks indicated in depositions that at some time prior to 1984 there was chipping paint in the premises, both parties also stated that they never informed the landlords of this problem and that they never requested the premises be painted. 4 Second, the interrogatory replies of the defendants show no communication from Ms. Patterson, Valerie Brooks, or anyone else regarding paint *696 prior to Jacquetta’s diagnosis. As no dispute remains on this determinative fact, the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and we affirm the grant of summary judgment on the issue of negligencе.
The plaintiffs also argue that the CPA allows a cause of action against a landlord for leasing a property which contains lead-based paint.
See
Md.Code (1975, 1990 Repl. Vol.), Comm. Law Art., §§ 13-101 through 13-501. In
Rich-wind,
we determined that the CPA does not create a strict liаbility cause of action under such circumstances.
Richwind,
JUDGMENTS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANTS.
BELL, J., concurs in the result only.
Notes
. In both his responses to interrogatories аnd his responses to plaintiff’s request for admission of facts, Dahne consistently maintained that he never had any knowledge of lead paint in the apartment until after Ingram was hospitalized and the Baltimore City Health Department sent him notice of lead paint violations.
. As set out in
Richwind Joint Venture 4 v. Brunson,
. At the summаry judgment hearing, the plaintiffs submitted on all claims except Jacquetta Davis's claims of negligence and violation of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act.
. At the summary judgment hearing, the plaintiffs argued that the fact that the premises were not painted for seven years is evidence of negligence. We note that, although paint in one location may flake in
*696
less than seven years, paint in another location may last well beyond seven years with no signs of flaking. Therefore, we believe that the mere fact that the premises in question were not painted for seven years is not, by itself, evidence of negligence. The tenant, seeing the premises on a daily basis, is in the best position to observe flaking paint. Thus, notice of such a condition is a prerequisite to recovery by the plaintiff in a negligence action.
See Richwind,