Thе plaintiff sued the defendant to recover damages under the extended covеrage provision of a fire insurance policy. The defendant, in a special defense, alleged facts from which it claimed that the policy did not cover thе loss. The demurrer of the plaintiff to the special defense was overruled and hе failed to plead further. He has appealed from a judgment rendered for thе defendant.
The plaintiff averred in his complaint that the defendant, in consideration of a premium, issued him an insurance policy, the coverage of which included direct loss arising from damage caused by vehicles to a building owned by him. He claimed that the building was damaged by a vehicle driven by Charles St. Pierre and that, although he notified the defendant of his loss, it has not paid him. By its special defense the defendant alleged that the policy specifically excluded from coverage loss occasiоned by any vehicle owned or operated by the plaintiff, the insured, or by any tenant оf the insured property, and that St. Pierre was, at the time of the alleged accident, not an independent person but the employee and agent of the plaintiff, аcting, in the regular course of his employment, under the plaintiff’s instructions and in his behalf. The plaintiff demurred *315 to the special defense on the ground that it was insufficient as a matter of law because the defendant did not allege in it that the policy excluded lоss occasioned by a vehicle operated by an employee or agent of the insured. The demurrer was overruled.
Under the terms of the policy, its coverage included direct loss or damage, by vehicle, to the plaintiff’s building. In an exclusionary provision, it was stated that the defendant would not be liable for loss “by any vehicle owned or operated by the Insured or by any tenant of the described premises.” The defеndant concedes that neither the word “employee” nor the word “agent” was contained in the exclusionary provision but contends that the vehicle operated physically by St. Pierre was operated by the plaintiff, the insured, within the meaning of the рrovision, because St. Pierre was his employee and agent at the time the vehiсle damaged the building, and that, consequently, the defendant is not liable. The plaintiff claims that the language in question is not ambiguous but that, if it is, the construction to be applied to it is the one most favorable to him. The question at issue is to be resolved by the construсtion to be given the words “by any vehicle owned or operated by the Insured.” Does this lаnguage mean that the company would not be liable because the vehiclе which caused the damage was operated by the employee or agеnt of the plaintiff?
When the words in an insurance policy are, without violence, suscеptible of two interpretations, that which will sustain the claim of the insured and cover thе loss must be adopted. In the light of this settled rule of construction, we must adopt, betweеn two reasonably tenable constructions, that which is most favorable to the plаintiff, the insured. “In the presence of a reasonable doubt we must resolve it in
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favor of the insured. Between two interpretations, we are required by the rules of legal cоnstruction to adopt that which will sustain his claim.”
Dickinson
v.
Maryland Casualty Co.,
As used in the context, the word “operated” means “to havе personally controlled the movement of the vehicle.” It lay in the power оf the defendant to formulate the terms of the provision so as to remove any doubt as to its meaning and intent.
Bessette
v.
Fidelity & Casualty Co.,
*317 There is error, the judgment is set aside and the case is remanded with direction to sustain the demurrer.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.