5 A.2d 196 | Pa. | 1939
The defense to the note in suit was that defendant, a married woman, executed it solely as an accommodation maker for one Karl Rogowski. On a previous appeal a judgment for plaintiff was reversed by this Court in
Appellants complain of those portions of the charge which relate to the law applicable to a married woman's endorsement of negotiable instruments, or to her becoming an accommodation maker of such paper. Some parts of the charge assigned as error are unobjectionable; others become objectionable only when separated from the context and evident meaning of the whole charge. The question of whether or not appellee had proved her defense was properly left to the jury, and the court below correctly instructed it as to the burden of proof. It was said in Walters v. W. S. Life Ins. Co.,
Appellants took only a general exception to the charge, which is not sufficient to raise these questions on appeal. Unless the error in the charge is basic and fundamental, it must be excepted to particularly. See Grollman v. Metropolitan LifeIns. Co.,
The part of the charge more particularly dwelt upon was: "when one takes a note upon which a married woman's name appears, he is bound to ascertain whether or not she is signing as an accommodation maker or whether she is borrowing the money herself. He can't take a chance." The court below defended this excerpt by citing a quotation from the former case of Sears v.Birbeck,
Even under the Act of June 3, 1887, P. L. 332, which was construed more strictly than the Act of June 8, 1893, P. L. 344, section 2 (the present law), one who lent money directly to a married woman was not required to see that it was borrowed for or applied to a purpose recognized in the Act giving her contractual capacity. See Spotts' Estate,
In the present case Sears had refused to lend money to Rogowski unless he obtained Mrs. Birbeck's signature. Mrs. Birbeck had never asked Sears for a loan for herself. Sears therefore had every reason to believe that the note given by Mrs. Birbeck and her husband was given by them to accommodate Rogowski. Although he made out a check to Mrs. Birbeck's order, attempting thereby to give the appearance of a direct loan to her, the entire transaction appears to have been merely a device to circumvent the statute.
Complaint is made that the court below in its charge stressed appellee's evidence and thus led the jury. We have only the words of the charge before us, and while the court reviewed appellee's evidence more elaborately than appellants' this is not reversible error unless it is plainly prejudicial to one of the litigants. The jury was carefully instructed to rely on its own recollection of the testimony, and there was no misstatement of the facts. *506
Appellants were given ample opportunity at the conclusion of the charge to correct or supply any deficiencies, and having failed to avail themselves of it, they cannot now complain. SeeKonchar v. Cebular,
It is charged that the judge made improper remarks during the trial concerning the evidence. No exception was taken at the time they were made, and an exception at the conclusion, "to the remarks of the court made during the course of the trial," is not sufficient foundation on which to base an assignment of error. Such an exception gives no indication as to which of the remarks were objectionable; it does not give the trial judge an opportunity to correct any error in this respect. SeeSlocock v. Leggit,
The sixteenth assignment of error does not set forth the pertinent portion of the record as required by Rule 26 of the Supreme Court,1 nor is the point set forth in the statement of questions involved, which Rule 50 makes mandatory. Under such circumstances it need not be considered: Kennedy et al. v.Rothrock Co.,
In summarizing a part of the testimony, the trial judge read to the jurors the statement of facts contained in the first opinion of this Court in
Judgment affirmed.
