Adams, J.

The judgment of nonsuit, we take it, was based upon the theory that the contributory negligence of the intestate bars the plaintiff’s recovery of damages. Upon no other principle can we sustain the judgment in behalf of all the defendants. As the burden of showing contributory negligence ordinarily rests upon the defendants, we must decide whether the plaintiff’s evidence establishes this defense. If it does, the judgment must be affirmed.

In Covington v. Furniture Co., 138 N. C., 374, the Court, quoting Labatt, 333, gave the following statement of the rule which controls in the present ease: “The general rule of law is That when the danger is obvious and is of such a nature that it can be appreciated and understood by the servant as well as by the master or by any one else, and when the servant has as good an opportunity as the master or any one else of seeing what the danger is, and is permitted to do his work in his own way and can avoid the danger by the exercise of reasonable care, the servant cannot recover against the master for the injuries received in consequence of the condition of things which constituted the danger. If the servant is injured it is from his own want of care.The rule is especially applicable when the danger does not arise from the defective condition of the permanent ways, works, or machinery of the master, but from the manner in which they are used, and when the existence of the danger could not well be anticipated but must be ascertained by observation at the time.’ ”

The intestate was grown, married, and experienced in the operation of electric elevators. The danger to which he was exposed was obvious; it was as easily discernible by himself as by any other person; he was permitted to do his work in his own way, it was his duty to. make use of his faculties; and if he had done so he would have avoided the danger and have prevented the injury. In returning from the lunch room not only did he run, according to the testimony of an eye-witness he “jumped into the elevator shaft and got killed.” The way was open; *798 the corridor was “quite light.” The law does not impose on the employer any duty to take better care of his employee than the latter should take of himself. Pigford v. R. R., 160 N. C., 93, 101. Indeed, without the employer’s knowledge the employee rushed voluntarily and heedlessly into a place of unconcealed danger from which an attentive glance would no doubt have saved him.

In the application of this principle to varying facts in suits for the recovery of damages for injury or death resulting from a fall in an elevator shaft, the weight of authority is in support of the judgment rendered by the trial court. Several of the leading cases are cited in the briefs. Instead of entering into an elaborate discussion of them we need only say that the facts disclosed by the plaintiff’s evidence justify the conclusion of the trial court. The reason is thus stated in Kauffman v. Machine Shirt Co., 140 Pac., 15. “Nor is the situation helped by the allegation that when he returned the elevator and shaft were to all appearance in the same condition in which he left them. There is no statement that he looked or that if he had looked there was any physical reason why he could not have seen that the elevator had been moved. In the absence of any such showing, the court must assume that To look was to see,’ and that if he had looked he must have noticed the danger. One may not thus heedlessly disregard the commonest precautions for his own safety.”

The basic principle of this decision is upheld in Murry v. Earl, 128 At., 436; Poindexter v. Paper Co., 84 Mo. App., 352; Gallagher v. Snellenburg, 60 At., 307; Sodomka v. Cudahy, 163 N. C., 809; Stanwood v. Clancey, 75 At., 295; Johnson v. Washington Route, 209 Pac., 1100.

The intestate’s negligence need not have been the sole proximate cause of the injury; if his negligence was one of the proximate causes the plaintiff is not entitled to judgment against the defendants or either of them. Lunsford v. Mfg. Co., 196 N. C., 510. The motion for non-suit was made at the close of the plaintiff’s evidence; and as this evidence shows contributory negligence on the part of the intestate the plaintiff cannot recover. Nowell v. Basnight, 185 N. C., 142; Foard v. Power Co., 170 N. C., 48. The conduct of the intestate, from which only one inference can reasonably be drawn, brings the plaintiff’s case within the principle adhered to in Royster v. R. R., 147 N. C., 347; Williams v. Mfg. Co., 180 N. C., 64; Pope v. R. R., 195 N. C., 67. Judgment is

Affirmed.