| N.Y. Sup. Ct. | Dec 6, 1893
The only question that can be properly considered on this appeal is as to whether this verdict should be set aside or modified as excessive. That seems to be conceded by counsel on both sides, and is the logical result of the order appealed from. If the learned judge had felt called upon to interfere with the verdict for errors and exceptions on the trial, he would have
- “In actions for damages for torts, it is the well-established law of this state that verdicts of jurors will not be set aside for excessiveness unless the amount is so great as manifestly to show that the jury must have been actuated by passion, partiality, prejudice, or corruption;” citing Coleman v. Southwick, 9 Johns. 45" court="N.Y. Sup. Ct." date_filed="1812-01-15" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/coleman-v-southwick-5472967?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="5472967">9 Johns. 45; Gale v. Railroad Co., 13 Hun, 1; Minick v. City of Troy, 19 Hun, 253; Gale v. Railroad Co., 53 How. Pr. 395; Whiteman v. Leslie, 54 How. Pr. 495; Collins v. Railroad Co., 12 Barb. 492" court="N.Y. Sup. Ct." date_filed="1852-02-02" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/collins-v-albany--schenectady-railroad-5458195?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="5458195">12 Barb. 492.
And he adds:
“The case is one of that kind where, if the plaintiff is entitled to recover at all, it is peculiarly the province of the jury to say how much. * * * The question of damages, in such case, is one which it is the special duty of the jury to determine; and, while the court may reduce a verdict, it seems to me that, if the court thinks the verdict is so large as to indicate that the jury was actuated by improper motives, it is better to set the verdict entirely aside, and have another jury pass upon it, rather than determine itself what the verdict shall be, and thus assume and exercise the functions of a jury.”
While the policy of the reduction of the amount of a verdict by the court is, we think, properly questioned by the learned judge, its power to do so is conceded, and seems to be established on authority. Holmes v. Jones, 121 N.Y. 461" court="NY" date_filed="1890-06-03" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/holmes-v--jones-3586339?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="3586339">121 N. Y. 461, 24 N. E. 701. Yet the exercise of the power to interfere with a verdict on the ground that it is excessive is confined to cases of manifest misconduct or impropriety on the party of the jury, as evidenced by the excessive and unreasonable amount of the verdict. This rule was adopted in this state as early as the case of Tillotson v. Cheetham, 2 Johns. 63" court="N.Y. Sup. Ct." date_filed="1806-11-15" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/tillotson-v-cheetham-5472017?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="5472017">2 Johns. 63, when the court said:
“We cannot interfere on account of the damages. A case must be very gross, and the recovery enormous, to justify our interposition on a mere question of damages, in an action of slander.”
This language was quoted with approbation in Root v. King, 7 Cow. 636, when the court refused to set aside or interfere with
“To justify the granting of a new trial, the damages must be flagrantly outrageous and extravagant, evincing intemperance, passion, partiality, or corruption on the part of the jury.”
Tested by these rules, we cannot concur in the opinion of the learned trial judge in setting aside or reducing this verdict. The jury was required to assess these damages, and while this court or .the trial court might, as an original question, have fixed a lower measure of damages, in view of the gravity of this charge we cannot say that the jury, in arriving at and pronouncing their verdict, have evidenced by it that they were influenced by any of the improper motives which would authorize this court, within the rules of law above referred to, to set aside this verdict. The order of the special term must be reversed, with $10 costs and printing disbursements.