333 So. 2d 619 | Ala. Crim. App. | 1976
Second degree murder; sentence: thirty-five years.
The appellant was indicted and convicted for the murder of his brother, Paul Scott. The alleged murder took place in the evening on March 3, 1975. There was substantial evidence presented at trial from which the jury could conclude that the appellant willfully shot and killed Paul Scott with a twelve gauge shotgun. The appellant testified that the shooting was accidental.
There are three arguments presented by the appellant on appeal which deserve consideration.
A reading of the trial transcript reveals that the appellant was drunk at the time of the shooting and at the time he made the two incriminating statements. The rule is well established that intoxication, short of mania or such an impairment of the will and mind as to make the person unconscious of the meaning of his words, will not render a statement or confession inadmissible. Anderson v. State,
Intoxication which would affect the voluntariness of a statement is primarily a question of fact which first addresses itself to the trial judge to determine admissibility and later to be submitted to the jury for whatever consideration it may deem appropriate. There was ample evidence, even though conflicting, from which the trial judge could conclude that the appellant was not intoxicated to the extent of mania. Judge Cates in Woods, supra, stated the proper function of the jury in situations such as we have in the present case as follows:
"When this problem of incremental evaluation of alcoholic influence occurs in homicides the Law throws its hands skyward and leaves the judgment to its Johannes Factotum, the jury." (Footnote omitted.)
The jury's judgment was not against the weight of the evidence.
On March 4, 1975, the appellant made an incriminating statement to a police officer. The statement was given after the appropriate Miranda warnings were issued, and the statement was used against the appellant at trial. The statement was made after the appellant had slept in the woods for an entire night. The temperature had been subfreezing, and the appellant had sobered up considerably. We hold that there was sufficient evidence from which the trial court could find that all these statements were made voluntarily.
Mere drunkenness, voluntarily produced, is never a defense against a criminal charge unless it is so extreme as to render impossible some mental condition which is an essential element of the criminal act. The degree of intoxication necessary to negate the element of malice must be so excessive as to paralyze the mental faculties and render the appellant incapable of forming or entertaining the design to take life.Walker v. State,
As stated earlier, the problem of incremental evaluation of alcoholic influence is a question of fact for the jury. We hold that the jury's finding regarding the element of malice was not against the weight of the evidence.
There is no uniform legal standard against which such action can be measured. Smith v. State,
We do not find the statement of the prosecutor to be so highly prejudicial that it was incapable of being cured by the ruling of the trial judge. We have often cited Arant v. State,
AFFIRMED.
TYSON, HARRIS and DeCARLO, JJ., concur.