*646 OPINION
Bеnjamin Phillip Scott appeals his conviction for aggravated assault. The trial court assessed punishment, enhanced by two prior convictions, at twenty-five years’ confinement. Appellant claims that the triаl court erred in denying his request to withdraw his plea of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty. We hold that appellant made his request too late in the proceeding to have a right to withdraw his plea; therefore, the decision to withdraw the plea was within the trial court’s discretion. We hold that the trial court did-not abuse its discrеtion in denying the request. Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s point and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Appellant waived his right to a jury trial and entered a plea of not guilty. After the State presented evidence, both sides rested and closed their cases. Closing arguments were then conducted by counsel. Upon conclusion of the arguments, the court recessed. When the court reconvened, appellant mоved to reopen so he could change his plea of not guilty to guilty. The court overruled appеllant’s motion.
In his sole point of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his request tо withdraw his plea of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty. Appellant asserts that the court’s refusal to allоw him to change his plea deprived him of a fair trial. If he was permitted to enter a plea of guilty, appellant argues that deferred adjudication would have been an available sentencing option. Thus, appellant claims he was harmed by the court’s action.
The developed case law cоncerning the withdrawal of pleas presents primarily the situation where a defendant seeks to enter a plea of not guilty in place of a previous guilty plea. Although the case before us presents the exact opposite event, appellant urges us to apply the same principles of lаw. We agree the same principles apply.
A lenient practice prevails in Texas concerning the withdrawal of a guilty plea.
See McWhorter v. State,
When the law governing the withdrawal of guilty pleas is applied to the withdrawal of not-guilty pleas, the issue before us is whether appellant had a right to withdraw his plea at the time he attempted tо do so. Appellant contends that he requested permission to change his plea prior to the time judgment was rendered. Therefore, appellant argues that the trial court had no discretion to refuse the request. However, under the standard set forth in
Jackson,
if the trial court had already taken the case under advisement before the request to withdraw was made, then appellant is not entitled to withdraw his plea as a mаtter of right.
Jackson,
A case is deemed to have been taken under advisement after each side has concluded its presentation of evidence on the subject of guilt, the defendant’s guilt has been established, and the only issue remaining to be decided is the appropriate punishment.
Thompson v. State,
In the present case, the court recessed after presentation of the evidence and the argument concluded. Aрpellant did not ask to withdraw his plea until the court reconvened. Immediately after hearing and overruling appellant’s motion, the trial court announced its verdict of guilty and proceeded to the punishment рhase of the trial. The trial court, in essence, “took the case under advisement” when it recessed fоllowing closing arguments. This point in the proceeding is analogous to when a jury would retire. The fact that appellant’s request was made before the trial court stated its finding of guilt and imposed punishment is inconsequentiаl in this ease.
See Thompson,
Therefore, we hold that appellant could not withdraw his plea as a matter of right because his request came too late in the proceeding. The withdrawal of the plea was within the sound discretion of the trial court. The record does not demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in denying appellant’s request. Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s point of error.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
