95 Mo. 300 | Mo. | 1888
This is a proceeding in equity instituted in the circuit court of Nodaway county, to vacate and annul a certain deed purporting to have been executed on the twenty-third of April, 1883, by Maggie R. Scott, conveying to defendant certain lands in the counties of Nodaway and Yernon in this state, and other lands in the states of Ohio and Nebraska, and also all the j)ersonal .property of said Maggie; which said deed was filed for record in the recorder’s office in Nodaway county on the seventeenth day of September, 1883. On the trial of the cause the court rendered judgment for defendant, from which plaintiffs have -appealed.
The grounds set up in the petition for vacating this deed are substantially as follows : First, that the deed was never delivered to defendant; second, that said Maggie R. Scott did not make the deed in the form in which it now appears and in which it was recorded ; third, that in whatever form said deed was executed by said Maggie, if executed by her at all, it was procured to be executed, by fraud and undue influence on tlie part of defendant exerted- by him over her in consequence of confidential relations existing between them.
The deed sought to be vacated conveyed to defendant, “for and in consideration of the sum of being provided for during her natural life as she desires, affection, and other very valuable considerations to her in hand paid by the party of the second part, the receipt of which is acknowledged,” all the real and personal estate of said Maggie. It is dated the twenty-third of April,
The evidence of the notary and attesting witness .sufficiently prove the execution of the deed, .and its acknowledgment before the notary. W. E. Baird testified that he was requested by said Maggie to. witness the deed; that he never read it or heard it read, nor were the contents of the deed stated to him further than that it was a deed from Maggie R. Scott to David A. Scott; that he could not say whether the deed was filled out or not; that he did not look at it only when his signature was to be written; that said Maggie took the deed away with her.
Robert E. Baird, tbe notary, testified that he took the acknowledgment of this deed and also of another one a month or two previous; that one of these deeds was handed by said Maggie to Scott in the hall, and his impression was that it was the last one acknowledged. This deed, so far as the fact is disclosed by the evidence, from the time it was executed and acknowledged and handed by the notary to said Maggie, does not again appear till the seventeenth day of September, 1883, two days after the death of said Maggie, when it was given by defendant to one McMillan to be filed for record, and was by him on said day filed for record in the recorder’s office of Nodaway county.
Mr. Noel, the recorder, testified that at the time the deed was filed his attention was called to it and he thought it was not all written at the same time; that there were at that time about three shades of ink, the ink in the descriptive part was lighter, the lower part of the description was lighter than the balance of it, newer
' Where a deed has been executed and acknowledged, the possession of it by the grantee is presumptive evidence of its delivery. Yarnall v. Yarnall, 6 Mo. 326. It is affirmed in the case of Huey v. Huey, 65 Mo. 689, that the lodgment of a deed properly executed and acknowledged by the grantor in a place to which the grantee has access, and from which he can without hindrance transfer it to his own possession, with the intent on the part of the grantor that the grantee may, after his death, take it and have it recorded, does not constitute delivery of the deed.
The first question to be considered is, do the facts in evidence overcome the presumption arising from defendant’s possession of the deed, that it was delivered. As preliminary to the discussion of this question it is proper to state the relations the various parties sustained to each other.
It appears that Alexander F. Scott died in 1865 in Harrison county, Ohio, the owner of a large amount of real and other estate, leaving said Maggie R. Scott, his widow Eleanor, one of the plaintiffs, and the other plaintiffs in this suit, as his heirs ; that defendant is the cousin of said Maggie, and commenced boarding, in Í868 with the family of said Eleanor while going to school; that he assumed to act for said Eleanor as her agent in some matters pertaining to the estate of said Alexander, induced her to sell some of the lands and convey other lands to said Maggie ; that he was authorized to sell certain lands in Yernon county, this state, at nine dollars per acre and was to receive one dollar p.er acre for making the sale, that he sold the land for $12.50 per acre, and accounted for it at nine dollars per acre and kept the balance. The evidence tended to show that Maggie was engaged to be married, in 1871 or 1872, to Rev. Workman, that this engagement was
The facts disclosed by the folloAving evidence are relied upon to overcome the presumption raised by defendant’s possession of the deed that it was delivered.
Lamon Scott testified as follows: “In May, 1883, after David A. returned from Ohio, I had a talk with him. Before this I had written a letter to Maggie about the partition of the land'in Vernon county. I met David on the street in Maryville, and asked him what Maggie wanted to do about the division of the land in Vernon county, and he said he intended to let her do as she pleased, as my mother had blamed him for meddling, and he would have nothing to do with it, and he did not know what Maggie intended to do about it.”
The letter of this witness was replied to on the fourteenth of May, 1883, by said Maggie, as follows: “ Your letter of recent date at hand and contents noted. I think the remaining lands o,ught to be divided, but in which of the two ways I scarcely knoAv. It may not cost so much for to settle up by each of us making quitclaim deeds to each' other, but would it be quite as satisfactory a Avay of doing business as to partition it through court ?”
“ E. Springfield, Jefferson Co., Ohio,
“July 15th, 1883.
“Dearest Cousin : — Your letter of the tenth containing P. O. order at hand. If you think I had better start west without having my dresses fixed, I suppose about next Tuesday or Wednesday (24 or 25), would be about as well as any time this month; cannot at least hear from you and get ready earlier than this. If not at this time, I would prefer waiting until about the sixth of next month, as I do not care about traveling between the above mentioned times. If we are to Toe married you may meet me, if not,-1 would just as leave go alone. Can’t you make it suit to meet me in St. Louis ? Write me full instructions — -what time to leave here, and what train to take ; and if you are to meet me, I would rather you would be at the place named in advance of me, as I do not want to wait. Shall I pack my box and have it taken to the station when I go, and shipped as freight, and what shall I do with Nellie’s squirrel ? I have never got any cage for her. Please answer me fully every-, thing I ask you. * * * Hoping to hear from you right away, I will close.
“As ever, M.
“Be sure and write me full instructions.”
Another letter of hers, dated twenty-eighth of July, 1883, was also read in evidence, so much of which as bears upon the questions involved is as follows: “Your letter of the twenty-fifth containing instructions came to hand last evening. I have nothing of importance to write you. I am afraid I will not have money enough ; do not think I will have my box shipped, as I want to have some money over and above what gets my ticket, but will pack it and have it ready to go at any future time. If nothing happens to hinder me will start on the sixth of August. * * * I suppose another week will finish up our writing to each other.”
The deposition of D. H. Edwards is as follows : “In August last (1883) David A. Scott and his cousin came to my house, in Nevada, Missouri. David had been to my house several years ago. David Scott said when he came to my house, last August, that he was there to look after lands of A. P, Scott’s estate; that he was the agent and attorney of his cousin Maggie, and he expected she would be here in a short time. Within a day or two he brought a young lady to my house from the train, and introduced her to me as his cousin, Miss Scott. They staid at my house several days and went to the country to look at the lands. They went to Ball Town to look at the lands there, and, after their return, he said they went to look at the land that she might choose the part that she would take in the division of the lands.”
Thirza Edwards testified for plaintiffs by deposition: “ David Scott came to Nevada, Missouri, with his cousin last August (1883); that, within a day or two after David came, he brought a young lady to the house from the train, whom he introduced as his cousin, Miss Scott, and as the sister of the other young man named William B. Scott. David said, while here, .that he was acting as the agent and attorney of his cousin Maggie ; that they were here to look over the land in which Maggie had an interest coming from her father’s estate, with a view of dividing it and for her to make a selection of her part. Miss Maggie told me that she was here to look after her
Mary Scott testified as follows : “Know David A. Scott and knew Maggie R. Scott; Maggie came to Nod-away county in August, 1883 ; I met her then and was with her about two weeks; I heard her speak of her lands several times during the week; I heard David Scott, the defendant, ask her. how she liked the country; I did not hear her reply. David said to her, £ You had better build you a house on your land and make up your mind to stay here.’ This conversation was at Lawson Scott’s house about a week before the Nodaway county fair, which was held the last days in August and first days in September, one week; I believe she came away from there on Wednesday during the fair. David Scott came then and took her away in a buggy.”
It appears that said Maggie was taken from the fair to the Luona hotel, in Maryville, where defendant boarded, and that while there, during the sickness of which she died in about two weeks, she said to Anna Shepherd that “ she came to marry Mr. Scott, but her folks objected and she was in trouble; * * * that she had come out to marry Dave, and her folks objected and she was worried,” and that was the only talk she had with her. It further appears that, on the night of the tenth or eleventh of September, the life of said Maggie was despaired of; that she asked the doctors what her chances were and they told her no chance, and she said, then, “if no chance, I want to marry Dave this night.” It appears on that night, about the time she became aware of her condition, she spoke in the presence of defendant of the manner in which she wished to dispose of her property.
Salina Terry, who had been called in as a nurse for said Maggie on the third or fourth of September and
The evidence of this witness, as to what was said concerning the disposition of-her property in defendant’s presence, is corroborated by that of five other- witnesses, one of whom, Mrs. Smartwood, testified that she spoke of disposing of her property; wanted Dave to have two thousand dollars, her uncle four thousand dollars, his mother six hundred dollars, and the remainder divided among her brothers and sisters. When she mentioned Dave, he spoke up and said, “ Never mind me, I am well enough off.”
William Scott testified, “ that on the night of the eleventh of September, Maggie asked Dr. Moore what her chances were; he said they were against her; she said, ‘ I reckon then I must die.’ She soon after spoke of her property and said she wanted to leave Sam Scott
Rev. Gerhart testified that he was called to see-Maggie about midnight; that she was very sick and he •thought she was dying. .“She asked the doctor how long he thought she would live and then said she wanted to be married, but not in these words, but in disconnected sentences, but so that I understood her. I told her I should not think of such a thing — she was hinting all the time about being married. It is hard to say what she said, just like a person who has an indefinite idea about something. I repeated several times that I would not think of such a thing as getting married. When she would utter a word, others put in and no sentence was completed, so I could not get it. David was one who would-put in, and say, ‘ be quiet and all would be right; ’ he said that several times. I was there about an hour ; I considered her irrational and beside herself I did not marry them.’ ’
Mrs. Smartwood testified that she was present the-night of the marriage. “Hatch came in and asked Maggie if she realized what she was doing, and she said she did; I think she was in her right mind at the time, as sensible as any woman; she spoke about giving her money away; after the marriage she seemed better theta alance of the night and better for two days ; she-was-out of her head a good deal while asleep, but when I would wake her up she would know everything; on being told by her doctors that there was no chance, she-said, ‘if no chance I want to marry Dave that night.’ I unpacked her trunk, and got her clothes ; Dave came in next morning and asked her if she realized that she was married, and she said yes, and he asked her if she realized that he was her husband, and she said yes, and seemed to know him as well as anybody. * * * I went to her trunk to get her clothes and packed it and put it in shape twice ; it was in a small bedroom; I found once after she was dead, on Monday or Tuesday, her trunk open and things scattered; I repacked it; do-not know when it was opened.”
Mrs. Woodworth testified to the same effect as to the condition of Maggie’s mind as the above.
Dr. Nash, attending physician, testified: “I was present in the room when Maggie was married, could hear the minister but could not hear what she said; I
It was shown by the deposition of John Milone, who was postmaster at Urichsville, Tuscarawas county,' Ohio, that he kept a receiving stamp with which he stamped the date, when letters coming in the mail to his office were received; that a large envelope directed to “David A. Scott, Urichsville, Tuscarawas county, Ohio,” was stamped with said receiving stamp on the opposite side as received, “April 26, 8 o’clock, a. m.,” and that his impression was said envelope was mailed somewhere in Ohio. It is also shown by the evidence of McMillan, to whom defendant, on the seventeenth of September, 1883, gave the deed in question to be filed for record, that it was in this envelope and that the address on it to •“David A. Scott, Urichsville, Tuscarawas county, Ohio,” was in said Scott’s handwriting.
It has been said by an eminent chancellor, “Tellme what the parties have done under a deed, and I will tell ■you what that deed means,” and in Patterson v. Camden, 25 Mo. 22, it is said: “I know of no better mode of ascertaining the meaning of a writing than is shown if all the parties acted on a particular meaning.” So it may be said that this principle equally applies in the consideration of the question whether or not a deed has been delivered. The legal effect of the deed in question, if, .after its execution and acknowledgment, it was delivered
The action of said Maggie, as well as the action of defendant, after the deed was executed and acknowledged, cannot be reconciled with the fact that this deed was delivered. As late as August, after its execution, the land in Vernon county, which it purported to convey,. was spoken of, both by said Maggie and defendant, as the land of said Maggie, and after she left said county and went to Nodaway county,. defendant said to her, that “you had better build a house on your land and stay here,” when if this deed had been delivered to him, he knew as a lawyer, that she did not own a foot of lend, nor a single dollar with which to build a house. If this deed had been delivered before she came to Vernon county, defendant knew that he alone was the owner of said Maggie’s undivided interest in the land in said county belonging to the heirs of Alexander Scott, deceased, and yet he said he was there as her agent and attorney to look aftev these lands, and went with her to see them in order that she might choose what part of it she would take as bers. So in May, 1883, when, after his return from Ohio, he was asked what Maggie would do with reference to the division of the land in Vernon county, it would have been natural for him to have said, if the deed in question had then been delivered, I own these lands and not Maggie, but instead he said, he did not know what she would do about it, and that he did not intend to meddle with it, but let her do as she pleased. Coming on down to a later period, to the night of the eleventh or twelfth of September, 1883, when she was upon her deathbed, and informed that nothing more could be done for her, and impressed with the belief
If, anterior to this time, she had delivered this deed to defendant, she must have known it, and have known that it conveyed to him everything, real and personal, that she had, and it is incredible to suppose, that, in this extreme moment, she would undertake, if said deed had been delivered, to dispose of the property it conveyed and designate the persons to receive it after her death, an event which she, as well as those around her, believed was then about to take place. The evidence shows her to have been an intelligent, accomplished woman, and the fact is established beyond cavil or dispute ; that she undertook to direct the disposition of many thousands of dollars worth of property as her own, in view of approaching death, is wholly irreconcilable and inconsistent with the fact that she had delivered the deed in question to defendant conveying to him everything that she owned or possessed.
The evidence relied upon by defendant to show delivery of the deed at the time it was executed and acknowledged is not satisfactory. One of the attestants testified that, after its acknowledgment, said Maggie took the deed with her when she went away. The notary testified that he had taken her acknowledgment to two deeds, and had an impression that one of them, the last one acknowledged,'was handed to defendant in the hall of the house after it was acknowledged. The theory that the deed was then delivered is inconsistent with, and contradictory of, the other theory, which
The authorities cited by counsel abundantly establish the proposition that marriage is such a valuable consideration as will support a deed, and we have so held in the case of Lionberger v. Baker, 88 Mo. 447. But a deed, if made on such consideration, before it can be operative as such, must, like all other deeds, be delivered, and after a careful examination of the evidence we have reached the conclusion that the deed in question was never delivered, and for that, if for no other reason, plaintiffs are entitled to the relief sought in their bill. If a contract of marriage, which the evidence tends to establish, existed between said Maggie and the defendant, the evidence fails to show any willingness or effort on defendant’s part to fulfill it till the night of the eleventh or twelfth of September, 1883, when the life of said Maggie was
There is abundant evidence in the record to show that defendant acted as the agent and adviser of said Maggie, and in some instances as her attorney, and that he had possession of her confidence ; but in the view we have taken of the case it is unnecessary to discuss the point made by plaintiffs’ counsel, that the deed, if executed, acknowledged, and delivered, was procured to be executed by the undue influence of defendant over said Maggie growing out of such confidential relations.
The judgment will be reversed and cause remanded with directions to the circuit court to enter a decree in conformity with this opinion.