21 Tex. 708 | Tex. | 1858
If the plaintiff can maintain an action of trespass to try title, it must be by virtue of three years’ possession, under color of title, within the provision of the 15th Section of the Statute of Limitations. (Hart. Dig. Art. 2391.) But the Court appears to have considered that her claim was founded on the 16th Section of the Statute, (Hart. Dig. Art. 2392,) and accordingly instructed the jury that to enable her to maintain the action, she must have had five years’ possession, paying taxes, &c. This was an evident misapprehension of the case. The plaintiff did not claim under a deed, but under a certificate and survey, which was color of title, as defined in the 15th Section.
The Court further instructed the jury, in effect, that the pending of the suit of Lane against Rose was an interruption of the possession of this plaintiff in 1844, when Rose was her tenant. This, we think, was error. We do not think she was affected by the pendency of the suit against Rose, from
There is a want of conclusive certainty in the testimony as respects the question whether the plaintiff was in possession of any part of the land claimed by the defendant, Lane, during each of the three years next before the trespass of which she complains. The question of fact must be referred to the decision of the jury ; and it may not become necessary in this case finally to pass upon the question of title by limitation under the 15th Section of the Statute.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
Reversed and remanded.