266 Pa. 52 | Pa. | 1920
Opinion by
Plaintiff filed a bill in equity against the City of Pittsburgh and certain of her officials to enjoin the extension of a public road or alley, called Archon way, an ad
No reason was stated and none is known why a city ought not to be allowed to make the agreement referred to in the bill. Such agreements are not unusual, and benefit the city in that, without expense to it, additional property is opened to public improvement, and increased taxation results. It may safely be said that nearly all streets are opened as the result of pressure by property owners who expect to be benefited thereby. Their use by the public, however, constitutes a public use, no matter by whom requested, and justifies the opening (Penna. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Phila., 242 Pa. 47) ; and the fact that the city’s purpose is to comply with the terms of such an agreement and thereby to benefit also the abutting owner who executes it, does not detract from the public use or prevent the city from exer
Penna. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Philadelphia, supra, lends no aid to plaintiff’s contention. There an act of assembly gave to Philadelphia the right to take in fee property outside of the lines of its highways, and sell it to some one else. We held the act unconstitutional and enjoined the city from taking plaintiff’s property under it, because it was clear no public use was to be imposed upon the land so taken, which, on the contrary, was to pass into private ownership and use to the exclusion of the public. It was in effect an attempt to take plaintiff’s property without his consent, in order to sell it to someone else. What was said in Sipe v. Boro. of Tarentum, 263 Pa. 338, to the effect that the evidence did not show the street in that case was opened as the result of an agreement between the city and a property owner, was state! simply as an additional reason why appellant’s contention therein could not prevail. It was not said that if the opening had been the result of a private agreement it would have rendered voidable the municipality’s act. Even in the case of a railroad or other quasi-public corporation such a bill as this would not be sustained (Mountz v. Pittsburgh, Bessemer & Lake Erie R. R. Co., 265 Pa. 67); much less will it be in the case of a municipality.
The decree of the court below is affirmed and the appeal dismissed at the costs of appellant.