WILLIAMS v. OHIO; BRADLEY v. ALABAMA; SCOTT v. OHIO
No. 86-5307; No. 86-6015; No. 86-5953
Supreme Court of the United States
1986
479 U.S. 923
No. 86-1153. FBK REALTY CORP. v. CROTTY, COMMISSIONER, DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING PRESERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Motion of Associated Builders & Owners of Greater New York Inc. for leave to file a brief as amicus сuriae granted. Certiorari denied.
No. 86-5307. WILLIAMS v. OHIO. Sup. Ct. Ohio; and No. 86-6015. BRADLEY v. ALABAMA. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied.
JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting.
Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel аnd unusual punishment prohibited by the
JUSTICE WHITE, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN joins, dissenting in No. 86-5307.
In this case, the Ohio Supreme Court rejected petitioner‘s claim that a stаtutory aggravating factor that repeats an element of the crime is unconstitutional because it fails to narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty. This decision is consistent with Wingo v. Blackburn, 783 F. 2d 1046, 1051 (CA5 1986), cert. pending, No. 86-5026, but in conflict with Collins v. Lockhart, 754 F. 2d 258, 263-264 (CA8), cert. denied, 474 U. S. 1013 (1985). I would grant certiorari to resolve this conflict.
JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting.
In these cases, petitioners’ death sentences were founded on statutory aggravating factors that rеpeat elements of the underlying capital offenses. For reasons stated in Wiley v. Mississippi, 479 U. S. 906 (1986) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting from denial of сertiorari), I would grant the petitions for review.
No. 86-5953. SCOTT v. OHIO. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.
Petitioner was convicted and sentenced to death by a jury that heard the trial judge indicate that, on the basis of newspaper accounts hе had read, he believed petitioner was involved in the crime. Because the judge‘s statement deprived petitioner of a fair trial, I would grant certiorari in this case.
During voir dire, the trial judge stated to the jury:
“Not only was Mr. Scott-at least from thе newspaper reports that I think that I had read-was involved in this, there were three other... individuals who....” 26 Ohio St. 3d 92, 95, 497 N. E. 2d 55, 59 (1986).
Defense counsel interrupted to object to this comment on petitioner‘s involvement in the crime. He subsеquently made a motion for a mistrial, in which the prosecutor joined. The trial court denied the motion, but delivered a cautionary instruction admonishing the jury to base its verdict only on the evidence introduced аt trial. The judge also told the jury, “you must not take any impression from anything I have done or said as to what your decision should be.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 26-27.
The Ohio Supreme Court attempted to excuse the remark. The court insisted that “[t]he judge‘s comment did not concern [petitioner‘s] guilt or innocence, but, rather, notеd the fact that the news media had reported [petitioner‘s] involvement with the crime.” 26 Ohio St. 3d, at 96, 497 N. E. 2d, at 59. This is a ludicrous reаding of the statement. How the jury could reasonably have interpreted and applied the comment determines whether it should be considered prejudicial. See, e. g., Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U. S. 510, 516-519 (1979). In this case, the jury could reasonably take the comment at face value, namely, as a statement that, based on what he had reаd in the newspapers, the judge believed petitioner was a participant in the crime. Before the jury had even heard any of the evidence, the judge had effectively become a witness against petitioner. See United States v. Murdock, 290 U. S. 389, 393 (1933).
Moreover, even under the Ohio Supreme Court‘s dubious interpretation, the judge‘s comment deprived petitioner of a fair trial. The only legitimate judicial references to pretrial publicity would have been inquiries about exposure to pretrial publicity or warn-
The Ohio Supreme Court relied on the cautionary instruction given to the prospective jurors, maintaining that it “minimize[d] any prejudicial effect this comment may have had....” 26 Ohio St. 3d, at 96, 497 N. E. 2d, at 59. This reliance is misplaced. Because “the influence of the trial judge on the jury is necessarily and properly of greаt weight, and... his lightest word or intimation is received with deference, and may prove controlling,” Starr v. United States, 153 U. S. 614, 626 (1894), some errors are so fundamental that no instruction can undo the damage they cause. See Quercia v. United States, 289 U. S. 466, 472 (1933). A comment on рetitioner‘s guilt is certainly such a fundamental error; it is “most likely to remain firmly lodged in the memory of the jury and to excite a prejudice which would preclude a fair and dispassionate consideration of thе evidence.” Ibid. Moreover, any reference to extrajudicial evidence by the trial judge destroys the fundamental premise of any trial-that the ultimate decision rests solely upon evidence prеsented by the parties within the confines of the rules of evidence.
The remedy for this extraordinary errоr was close at hand. No witness had yet been sworn. The panel of prospective jurors might have bеen discharged and a new venire called without difficulty. Nonetheless, the trial judge plunged ahead and petitioner was tried by a jury exposed to comments that overwhelmed the presumption of innocence. Because we cannot tolerate such interference with petitioner‘s right to a fair triаl in a capital case, I would grant the petition for certiorari.
In addition, petitioner‘s death sentence was founded on a statutory aggravating circumstance that repeats an element of the underlying capital offense. As in No. 86-5307, Williams v. Ohio, and No. 86-6015, Bradley v. Alabama, I would grant review for reasons stated in my dissent from denial of certiorari in Wiley v. Mississippi, 479 U. S. 906 (1986).