Scott v. O'LearyScott v. O'Leary
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Deemer
— This action was brought by Clyde Scott, a minor, during his lifetime, in the name of George Scott, his next friend. During its pendency, but before trial, Clyde Scott died, and plaintiff, Blanche Scott, the administratrix of his estate, was substituted as plaintiff. It is not claimed that Clyde Scott died as a result of his injuries; but it is averred that he suffered personal injuries, was at expense for medical treatment, that he lost time, and that his horse was killed and his buggy and harness injured. In speaking of the plaintiff, we shall, unless otherwise stated, refer to Clyde Scott.
It is averred in the petition that plaintiff, while driving a single horse hitched to a top buggy, along a public highway in Johnson county, Iowa, known as the lower Muscatine road, traveling in a southeasterly direction, met the defendant, who was coming from an opposite direction in a large high-powered automobile at an excessive, unlawful and unreasonable rate of speed, with the lights of his car in an imperfect condition, and that he (defendant) reck*225lessly and carelessly and without looking to see if there was any one in the road, and without using any care or caution, drove his automobile directly into plaintiff’s horse and vehicle, killing the horse, injuring the buggy and- harness, and throwing him (plaintiff) to the ground, serously injuring him. He further pleaded that defendant did not turn out or give him any part of the highway, and that he might have avoided plaintiff had he been so minded; but on account of not paying4 -attention to where he was going, the defective condition of his lights, and the high rate of speed, the collision occurred. Plaintiff introduced testimony in support of all of these-issues, and it is not seriously contended that the verdict is without support. The points relied upon for reversal have reference to rulings made on the admission and rejection of testimony, to the instructions given, and to the proposition that deceased was, as a matter of law, guilty of contributory negligence.
*226
Testimony regarding buggy and automobile tracks near tbe scene of tbe accident, was objected to as calling for tbe conclusion of tbe. witness. Manifestly these objections are untenable.
*2274. Contributory e^de^c*0151 habits. *226A witness was asked if be knew of tbe habits of tbe deceased as to his sleeping while driving upon tbe public highway, and another as to certain statements made by Clyde Scott during his lifetime, .in which be stated that be *227was in the habit of going to sleep while driving on the high-waN tilis testimony was excluded, and of this complaint is made. In this connection should be stated that defendant claimed Scott was asleep at the time of the collision. Where there are no eyewitnesses of a transaction, it has been held that testimony as to the habits of one whose conduct is in question, may be- shown as bearing upon his care or the want of it. Frederickson v. Railroad Co., 156 Iowa, 26. See, also, Dalton v. Railroad Co., 114 Iowa, 259; Gray v. Railroad Co., 143 Iowa, 268; Hall v. Rankin, 87 Iowa, 261; Stone v. Hawkeye Ins. Co., 68 Iowa, 737. But the testimony must relate to his general habits and not to particular instances. The general rule in civil cases is that good character, or the reverse, can not be shown in negligence cases. Wigmore on Evidence, sections 64, 65, and cases cited.
6. Evidence: wfthsaat!de-s cedent. Mrs. Kate Scott, Clyde’s mother, was called as a-witness and permitted to testify, over objection, that deceased-was ^er son> an(l that she had given him his time and permitted him to work for himself ; that he collected his own wages, attended to Ms own business affairs, and owned property in his own *228name. The only specific objection was that the question eliciting this information called for a personal transaction with one deceased; that the witness was incompetent; and that the statement would be a conclusion of the witness. There was also a general objection that the testimony was incompetent. None of these objections were tenable. This testimony will be considered again when dealing’ with the instructions.
It should, also be stated that the son Clyde, was married on November 16, 1910, which was something like three months after the accident. These are all the rulings on the testimony which need be considered.
IV. The trial court gave the following instructions:
*229This is complained of because of the use of the phrase “operating an automobile at an average speed of more than twenty miles per hour is prima facie guilty of negligence.” The words in parenthesis are also complained of. The instruction, in so far as it relates to speed, was in the language of the statute. Code Supp. section 1571-h. And we see no error in repeating that language although it may be a little obscure. Defendant admitted, while on the stand, that he .was running his automobile, at the time of the accident, at the rate of thirty miles per hour, and he also admitted that fact to others. Of course it may be difficult to’ determine whether or no one is operating an automobile at an average speed of more than twenty miles per hour, without knowing the distance traveled, and time occupied, but that is no reason for withholding a statement’ of the law as written. It would seem that a “joker” was introduced into this section of the statute, and that it might be’ well for the Legislature to remedy the matter. If the jury should have thought the court intended to charge that a rate of speed of more than twenty miles an hour was prima facie evidence of negligence, still we would not be disposed to reverse the judgment, for, under the circumstances disclosed by this record, we should say that such a-rate of speed was prima facie evidence of negligence. But this is not what the instruction said.
If the jury disregarded the instructions of the court, the allowance for damages to the harness must have been small in any event, and such allowance would not call for a reversal. The verdict was small in view of the injuries sustained, and such errors as appear in the record aré not sufficient to call for a reversal.
*232No prejudicial error appears, and the judgment will be, and it is, — Affirmed.