143 S.E.2d 457 | S.C. | 1965
This appeal is from an order of the Honorable John Grimball, Judge of the Fifth Circuit, denying appellant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The pertinent facts appearing in the record are as follows:
On May 31, 1961, in the Court of General Sessions for
Appellant contends here, as he did before the Circuit Judge, that he is unlawfully confined and that he is entitled to immediate release because:
1. By surrendering him to Florida, South Carolina waived its right to require him to complete service of his South Carolina sentence; and
2. By surrendering him to South Carolina after his sentence in Dade County and his commitment to the State Prison at Raiford, Florida relinquished jurisdiction of his person, and therefore its detainer filed with the South Carolina authorities was without warrant in law and of no effect.
As to the first of these contentions he argues : that except for the provision of Article 4, Section 11 of the Constitution
The power-of a state to waive temporarily its strict-right to exclusive custody of one confined for violation of its laws in order that another state may: subject him to trial for a crime against it is a power inherent in sovereignty, founded on principles of comity as. between sovereigns; it requires no affirmative statutory, authority ; such waiver is a matter that addresses ..itself solely, to. the discretion of the sovereign granting it. Rau v. McCorkle, 47 N. J. Super. 36, 135 A. (2d) 224; Application of Butler (Okl. Crim. Ct. of App.), 346 P. (2d) 348. Cf. Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U. S. 254, 42 S. Ct. 309; 66 L. Ed. 607, 22 A. L. R. 879; Johnson v. Lowry, 183 Ga. 207, 188 S. E. 23; and Gilchrist v. Overlade (1954), 233 Ind. 569, 122 N. E. (2d) 93. This power' is Appropriately exercised on the "part of the state by the Governor, as its Chief Executive. Whether or not'- he may effect the release in-such manner as permanently to waive the state’s jurisdiction of the prisoner is a matter upon which we need not speculate, -for the -executive order in this case expressly negatived the idea of a permanent Waiver :in these words: • -- •-'
*257 “It is further ordered that at the conclusion of the trial of Mervin Lee Scott and he has received sentence on said charge of first degree murder, that said prisoner is to be returned to the State of South Carolina by the Sheriff of Dade County, State of Florida, to the prison from which he was received, to serve the remainder of his prison sentence in South Carolina.”
One accused of crime is entitled to trial or other disposition of the charge against him at a time when the evidence for and against him is fresh. The state is likewise entitled to a prompt trial of the accused. Release of appellant to Florida for trial for murder there, conditioned upon his return to South Carolina for completion of his sentence here, was in furtherance of sound public policy; it deprived appellant of no substantial right. Rau v. McCorkle, supra.
Appellant’s second contention is also without merit. Judicial inquiry in this proceeding is limited to the question of the legality of appellant’s present confinement. 25 Am. Jur., Habeas Corpus, Sections 2, 13; Douglas v. Hall, 229 S. C. 550, 93 S. E. (2d) 891; Wyatt v. State, 243 S. C. 197, 133 S. E. (2d) 120. Appellant’s present confinement is pursuant to his South Carolina sentence; it is not referable to the Florida detainer. -
.j; We take this occasion to commend counsel, appointed by this court, for his. vigorous and able presentation of the appeal herein.
Affirmed.