52 S.E.2d 40 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1949
1. An attorney who has been disbarred by virtue of having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude is not as a matter of law forever barred from the practice of law, where such attorney has been granted a full pardon of the crime for which he was convicted. His reinstatement rests within the sound discretion of the court wherein he was disbarred, as provided by law.
2. After the elapse of 12 months from the date of disbarment, within which time an attorney may not apply for reinstatement under the provisions of Code § 9-519, there is no statute of limitations upon applications for reinstatement.
The petitioner excepted to this judgment and brings the case here for review. 1. "An attorney must be removed by the superior court of the county of his residence for the following causes: 1. Upon his being convicted of any crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude. In either case the record of his conviction is conclusive evidence. 2. When any judgment or rule absolute has been rendered against him for money collected by him as an attorney, which he fails to pay within 10 days after the time appointed in the order, in which case the record of the judgment is conclusive evidence, unless obtained without any service under some law authorizing such a proceeding. 3. Upon it being shown to the satisfaction of the court that he has been guilty of any deceit or wilful misconduct in his profession. 4. For want of a sound mind, or for indecent behavior in or out of the courthouse, whereby he becomes a nuisance to the court, his brother members of the bar, or the public." Code, § 9-501. "When an attorney at law is thus removed, after the lapse of 12 months (unless removed because of his having been convicted *663 of a crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude) it is in order for him to be restored upon the application of two-thirds of the members of the bar of the county where he was removed, and of those who usually practice in the superior court of said county, if approved by the judge of the circuit." Code, § 9-519.
The trial court was evidently of the opinion that an attorney who has been convicted of a crime or misdemeanor is forever
barred from the practice of law in this State by virtue of the provisions of Code § 9-519. Considered alone this Code section might seem to exclude an attorney from the practice of lawforever where he has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Was this really the intention of the statute? "All statutes are presumed to be enacted by the legislature with full knowledge of the existing condition of the law and with reference to it, and are, therefore, to be construed in connection and in harmony with the existing law, and as part of a general and uniform system of jurisprudence, and their meaning and effect is to be determined in connection, not only with the common law and the Constitution, but also with reference to other statutes and decisions of the court." Botts v. Southeastern Pipe-Line Co.,
In the instant case the court must assume that whatever was done under the judgment of disbarment was rightly done and that the conduct for which Mr. Scott was found guilty was such as rendered him an unfit person to be at the bar. While generally every court should temper justice with mercy, it may do so only within the limits of its power and must not out of a sense of sympathy and forgiveness be led into a usurpation of the law which they are enjoined to enforce, still we can not but feel that both on principle and precedent sentences of disbarment and exclusion need not be exclusions forever and if and when the court finds that Mr. Scott, who has suffered ten years and five months exclusion, and that the sentence however right has had the salutary effect of awakening in him a higher sense of honor and duty, the court should not be inexorable, yet the court ought not to look at the application for reinstatement with respect to the punishment of the individual himself, the court has a duty to perform to parties ligitant, the public, and the profession of the law to see that persons applying for reinstatement to the bar are persons in whose integrity and honor reliance may be placed, and if the court is satisfied that the conduct of a man has been such as to inspire confidence in his character the court may reinstate him. Ex parte Pyke 122 Eng. Rep. 1354, but "`the attorney seeking reinstatement has the burden of satisfying the court of his fitness to be restored to so honorable a fellowship.' In re Kaufman [
As we have said, the court was evidently, judging from his order refusing the application, under the impression and of the opinion that since the applicant had been disbarred by virtue of having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude he was forever barred from reinstatement, and the court did not, therefore, exercise his discretion to determine the applicant's fitness for re-admission. When it clearly appears from the actual language of the order that the judge failed to exercise any discretion whatever, and that his refusal of [the application] was *666
based entirely upon an erroneous construction of the law that as a matter of law he could not grant the application such judgment was erroneous. Marion County v. McCorkle,
2. The solicitor-general objected to the grant of the application upon the ground that the application was barred by the statute of limitations since it had not been brought within three years from the date of the judgment of disbarment. We do not understand such to be the law. A judgment of disbarment is a final judgment, subject to all statutes and rules touching that subject, it is true, and in In re Bradley,
The court erred, therefore, in dismissing the petition for reinstatement.
Judgment reversed. Gardner and Townsend, JJ., concur.